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‘“Collaboration is a Very Delicate Concept”: Alliance-formation and the Wars of 
Independence in Indonesia and Malaysia, 1945-1957’ is a case study in the 
interface between late colonial empires and colonized societies. Unlike traditional 
studies that continue to focus on British or Dutch (military-political) efforts to 
open specific avenues towards independence, the thesis analyses how local elites, 
their constituencies or individuals determined and navigated their own course—
through violent insurgencies—towards independence.  
 The thesis dispenses with (colonial) notions of ‘loyalty’ and ‘colonized-
colonizer’. Instead, it takes the much more fluid concept of local alliance-
formation and combines it with theories on territorial control to elucidate why 
certain individuals or groups co-operated with colonial authorities one moment 
only to switch to the freedom fighters’ side the next. 
In showing the complexities and ambiguities of association, the thesis 
advocates and executes an agenda that transcends the narrow political-
diplomatic scope of decolonization to restore the agency and motivations of local 
political parties, communities and individuals. The red thread throughout the 
thesis, then, is that Indonesians, Chinese and Malays pursued their own, 
narrow—often violent—interests to survive and secure a (political) future beyond 
decolonization.  
Ultimately, the limits of alliance-formation are probed. The search for 
territorial control by colonial and anti-colonial forces necessitated zero-sum 
outcomes to pre-empt alliance breakdowns. As such, coercion remained the 
major motivational force during decolonization: coercion local communities 
participated in more than has been hitherto acknowledged in relation to the 
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Transformative connectivity lies at the heart of colonialism. Colonial expansion 
and ‘colonialism’, defined as such, constituted ‘an encounter’ wherein 
communities that were ‘already […] living in those places where colonies were 
established’ were subjugated by incoming others. At the points of contact, ‘the 
original inhabitants and the newcomers’ locked ‘into [a] most complex and 
traumatic relationship’ that changed both—predominantly because power-
relations were decided in favour of the colonizers.1 The effects of these changes, 
encapsulated in shared histories, continue to link Asia and Europe and spark 
heated debates regarding the relations between the two. In April 2017, more than 
500 Indonesians sought to litigate against the Dutch state to seek justice for their 
fathers who had been killed by Dutch troops during the war of decolonization 
between 1945-1950.2 To this day, the Malaysian government continues to enforce 
sedition laws it has copied directly from the British colonial playbook to, 
according to Amnesty International, ‘silence, harass and lock up hundreds of 
critics’.3  
 This thesis deals with the vicissitude and ambiguities of colonial 
connectivity during the wars of decolonization in the Netherlands East Indies and 
British Malaya between 1945 and 1957. In this period, Dutch and British 
administrators for the last time attempted to add to the already established 
legacies of oppression through enforcing a continuation of colonial 
                                                 
1 Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism (London: Routledge, 2015), 19-20. Loomba controversially added that 
these relationships were ‘the most complex and traumatic […] in human history’; Ronald J. Horvath, ‘A Definition of 
Colonialism’, Current Anthropology, 13, 1 (1972), 46; colonialism belongs to ‘imperialism’, a ‘groβräumiger, 
hierarchisch gordneter Herrschafsverband polyethnischen und multireligiösen Charakters, dessen Kohärenz durch 
Gewaltandrohung, Verwaltung, indigene Kollaboration sowie die unversalistische Programmatik und Symbolik einer 
imperialen Elite […] gewärleistet wird’, Jürgen Osterhammel, ‘Europamodelle und Imperiale Kontexte’, Journal of 
Modern European History, 2, 2, (2004), 172. 
2 ‘Nieuwe Rechtzaken op Komst over Nederlands-Indië: Honderden Nabestaanden van Mannen die in Nederlands-
Indië zijn geëxecuteerd, Bereiden Schadeclaims Voor’, Trouw, 2 April 2017, https://www.trouw.nl/home/nieuwe-
rechtszaken-op-komst-over-nederlands-indie~a0c342d0/. Last visited on 13 April 2017.  
3 ‘Malaysia Must End Unprecedented Crackdown on Hundreds of Critics Through Sedition Act’, Amnesty 
International Press Release, 26 January 2016, http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/malaysia-must-end-
unprecedented-crackdown-on-hundreds-of-critics-through-sedition-act. Last visited on 13 April 2017; K. Loganathan, 
A. Salman and E. M. Wati Mohammad, ‘Fetters on Freedom of Information and Free Speech in Malaysia: A Study of 
the Licensing and Sedition Law’, e-Bangi. Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 10, 2 (2015), 297-309. 
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connectedness. Naturally, connections within the colonized territories between 
colonial authorities and those they subjugated abounded; they are the subject of 
this study. During the Indonesian War for Independence and the Malayan 
Emergency, however, nationalists also peered outside the colonies. Across the 
Strait of Malacca and the Java Sea they searched for reciprocal inspiration and 
support. Indonesian and Malay students in Cairo already in the 1920s felt their 
shared religion and language united them, although this idea largely remained 
tied to the students in Cairo.4 Still, Malay leaders joined the early nationalists 
organized Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI; formed in 1927) and agreed to a 
conceptualization of a ‘Greater Indonesia’ wherein the Malays constituted ‘part of 
the Indonesian people’.5 Nationalist leaders in both Malaysia and Indonesia 
revived the idea of Greater Indonesia in 1945 during the final months of the 
Japanese occupation, but Japanese pressure—undoubtedly coupled with the 
return of the British and Dutch—forced the nationalists to relinquish the idea 
once more.6  
Mutual admiration and intellectual support remained. In 1949, the Malay 
Dato bin Ja’afar Onn, then leader of the nationalist United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO), said Malays sympathized ‘100% […] with the struggle’ of 
Indonesia which they considered a ‘brother nation’. Malays and Indonesians both 
wanted independence but unfortunately, he continued, his organisation could not 
actively support the Indonesian freedom fighters as that would go against the 
British intentions of granting self-rule incrementally. He did, however, reiterate 
his belief that ‘Indonesia is the champion of Malaya’s future’.7 In Central Java, a 
Yogyakarta printing house in 1951 published Sejara dan Perjuangan di-Malaya 
(History and Struggle in Malaya), written by Ibrahim Haji bin Yaacob, another 
early stalwart of Malay nationalism who propagated Greater Indonesia.8 Former 
                                                 
4 Angus McIntyre, ‘The “Greater Indonesia” Idea of Nationalism in Malaya and Indonesia’, Modern Asian Studies, 7, 1 
(1973), 77; William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 88-89. 
5 McIntyre, ‘The “Greater Indonesia” Idea’, 78. 
6 McIntyre, ‘The “Greater Indonesia” Idea’, 81, 83. 
7 Onderhoud met Dato Onn en Prof. Dobby, 22 January 1949, No. 836/D/I, Koloniën/Geheime Mailrapporten 
2.10.36.06/184, Ministerie van Koloniën: Geheime Mailrapporten, serie AA, The National Archives, The Hague. 
8 Precis of Book (144 Pages.), annex to Director, Special Branch, Singapore to Commissioner of Police, Singapore, 8 
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Malay anti-Japanese fighters would cross into Indonesia and take up arms again; 
Singapore developed into a hub for weapon smuggling into Indonesia and a safe-
haven for revolutionaries.9  
For the colonial authorities, connectedness entailed the monitoring of each 
other’s territories. For the Dutch, outside observation began with the arrival of 
British Commonwealth troops in Indonesia in 1945. Ostensibly, they would see to 
the orderly withdrawal of the surrendered Japanese garrisons, the safeguarding 
of prisoners of war and internees and, initially, prepare for a Dutch return.10 
United Nations-mandated military observers and officers of the Good Offices 
Committee remained in Indonesia throughout most of the conflict. In 1949, for 
example, an anti-Dutch ‘high official’ told a group of Belgian, American and 
British observers that at least in Purwokerto, Central Java, peoples’ fear of Dutch 
soldiers had dissipated, certainly after the guerrillas fighting them had stripped 
their village of food.11  
Observation often degenerated into acrimonious critique. One observer, 
United States Army Lieutenant-Colonel Dixon, in 1947 opined that the aggressive 
stance of the Dutch themselves had galvanized Indonesian sentiments against 
taking a more conciliatory approach vis-à-vis the Dutch.12 ‘[A]ll the friendly’ 
international mediators felt alienated by Dutch administrators. When Dutch 
politicians proposed to collaborate with the British on ‘the “systematic 
suppression” of communism’ in 1948, officers in the British Foreign Office were 
sceptical. The situation in Malaya was straightforward, they reasoned: 
                                                                                                                                                                  
November 1951, REF SSB.1615, CO 1022/46, Colonial Office Records, The National Archives, London. 
9 Mochtaruddin to Vice President, Minister of Defence, 20 June 1948, translated CMI Document No. 5423, 
Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië, 2.13.132/591, Ministerie van Defensie: Strijdkrachten in Nederlands-Indië, The 
National Archives, The Hague; for weapon smuggling and the wider role of Singapore in the Indonesian struggle for 
independence, see: Yong Mun Cheong, The Indonesian Revolution and the Singapore Connection 1945-1949 (Leiden, 
KITLV Press, 2003) and Suryono Darusman, Recollections of Suryono Darusman: Singapore and the Indonesian 
Revolution 1945-1950 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992). 
10 Richard McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia 1945-1946: Britain, the Netherlands and the Indonesian 
Revolution (London: Routledge, 2006), 10. 
11 Uittreksel uit Rapporten van Militaire Waarnemers, St.no.102/49, NL-HaNA, Spoor, 2.21.036.01/38, Collectie 216 S. 
H. Spoor, 1946-1949, 2.21.036.01, The National Archives, The Hague. 
12 Verslag van Bevindingen Inzake het Verblijf van de Amerikaanse Waarnemers te Semarang Gedurende 2, 3, 4 en 5 
October, 7 October 1947, NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering 2.10.14/4989, Algemene Secretarie van de 
Nederlands-Indische Regering en de daarbij gedeponeerde Archieven, The National Archives, The Hague. 
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‘communists had decided to try to seize power by violence’. The Dutch in 
Indonesia, conversely, were countering Indonesian nationalism, not communism 
as such. The British decided on a weapons embargo for the Netherlands.13  
Stung, the Dutch tried to counter such international opprobrium by 
pointing an accusatory finger to British activities in Malaysia from 1948 onwards 
where the British and their local allies fought a communist uprising. The 
difference, one Dutch newspaper bitterly pointed out, was that when the British 
acted violently, ‘the United Nations refrained from […] meddling, […] Australia […] 
actively supported the British and […] socialist England expressed little to no 
criticism now that it concerns part of the British Empire’. If the British could 
have their military action certainly the Dutch had the same right, the paper 
concluded.14 To the Dutch, the British had first shown their proclivity for violence 
in Indonesia. There, incoming officials had complained about how British inaction 
had allowed the situation to deteriorate into ‘a “Wild West”’. Where they did react 
to Indonesian resistance, however, British (Commonwealth) troops had done so 
disproportionately and razed villages. Soon enough reports spoke of ‘a system’ of 
punishments.15 British violence had become the benchmark with which to offset 
and mitigate instances of Dutch (systematic) violence. In 1947, the Attorney 
General, for example, downplayed the impact of Dutch violent terror in South 
Celebes (South Sulawesi), saying that Dutch ‘methods’ at least spared ‘women, 
children and the elderly’. They would not have survived, he claimed, if they had 
been subjected to such ‘shooting and bombardment from the air […] as recently 
                                                 
13 Views of Mr. Reuchlin, Dutch Minister to the United States, on the Dutch Authorities at Batavia and The Hague, 5 
August 1948, F11067/5/62; Dutch Proposal to Issue a Proclamation With a View to the “Systematic Suppression” of 
Communism in Indonesia, 7 August 1948, F11066/5/62; Mr. Mayhew to E. H. Keeling, 7 August 1948, F10854/5/62, 
all in FCO 141/7353, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Predecessors: Records of Former Colonial 
Administrations: Migrated Archives, Malaya, The National Archives, London. 
14 ‘Rode Draad’, Algemeen Dagblad, 4 August 1948, in Federabo 2.20.50/58, Federatie van Verenigingen van 
Bergcultuurondernemingen in Indonesië (FEDERABO), 1913-1981, The National Archives, The Hague. 
15 Helfrich (Bevelhebber der Strijdkrachten in het Oosten) aan De Booy (Minister van Marine), 2 Dec. 1945, in S. L. 
van der Wal, P. J. Drooglever en M. J. B. Schouten, eds., Officiële Bescheiden Betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische 
Betrekkingen 1945-1950 [hereafter NIB] (’s-Gravenhage: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1971), 2, 271; 
Idenburg (Directeur van het Kabinet van de Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal) aan Van Mook (Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal), 20 
dec. 1945, NIB 2, 388, note 1.The British accused the Dutch of the similar disproportionate behaviour: McMillan, The 
British Occupation of Indonesia 1945-1946, 85-88. 
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witnessed in Malacca’.16 
 
Concepts, arguments and structure 
The connections and encounters ignited by colonialism and its corollary, 
decolonization, were, however asymmetrical in nature, transformative. They form 
the thread that weaves through the chapters that follow. Those who interacted 
could not stay the same. Colonial authorities, as we shall see, could not 
necessarily order their indigenous allies about. In turn, local elites were quite 
frustrated that their co-operation with colonial power-brokers always seemed to 
come at a prize.  
In the context of this study, violence, specifically during the transitional 
period into independence constituted a major force that connected, mobilized and 
transformed all parties: the colonial authorities and their local allies, but also the 
anti-colonial factions, politicians and, lastly, local communities and individuals. 
Violence, as defined in this research, is more complicated than mere ‘behaviour 
involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or 
something’.17 Beyond the ‘somatic’, violence served specific ends and has 
properties. It could be invoked to safeguard certain symbols and beliefs and take 
on the guise of ‘cultural violence’.18 Violence is ‘the cause of the difference between 
the potential and the actual’; a means used by one group to thwart another from 
attaining certain interests and force the latter to fall in line with what the former 
wants. Violence, then, was certainly physical, but more importantly in relation to 
the colonial state, it had latent properties—the threat of it was always there. 
Colonial authorities ostensibly possessed this capacity for violence. Violence 
needed no actors: it ‘was built up into the [colonial state] structure’.19  
 Yet, actors did make the colonial state function; just like opposing actors 
                                                 
16 Inzake Zuiveringsactie in Zd.Celebes, Mr. H. W. Felderhof, Procureur Generaal, to Van Mook, 2 August 1948, No. 
4211/GB, NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering 2.10.14/3742, The Hague, Algemene Secretarie van de 
Nederlands-Indische Regering en de daarbij gedeponeerde Archieven, The National Archives, The Hague 
17 Source: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/violence. Last visited on 20 April 2017. 
18 Johan Galtun, ‘Cultural Violence’, Journal of Peace Research, 27, 3 (1990), 291.  
19 Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research, 6, 3 (1969), 168-172. Emphasis 
in the original.   
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implemented the policies of groups poised to destroy it. With that statement, the 
main argument of this thesis is brought to the fore. I argue that if the processes 
of decolonization in Indonesia and Malaysia and their complexities are to be 
charted and understood, the indigenous actors that acting in tandem with or 
against the colonial state and its policies need to be treated as central nodes of 
analysis. More precisely, the actors in question are not the white, European 
administrators, businessmen or planters—although they will receive ample 
attention—but local, colonized elites, their constituents and individuals. This 
thesis is an attempt to identify these indigenous actors in British Malaya and the 
Netherlands East Indies, unearth their interests, make visible what consequences 
such interests had and how those holding these interests tried to attain them—
and at what cost. By dispensing with the more traditional approach of colonial 
studies—that is, to view decolonization as a diplomatic, almost zero-sum 
undertaking largely between colonial powers and (nationalist) ‘insurgents’—this 
thesis seeks to dig underneath that top layer. It argues that decolonization 
involved locals manoeuvring themselves into positions that gave them the biggest 
chances for coping with the violent wars of decolonization. In doing so, we find 
that ‘subjugated’ individuals and communities were connected more closely with 
and played a much more active role in the violence associated with colonial 
insurgency and counter-insurgency than is usually assumed. Contrary to what 
recent currents in colonial studies have suggested, mobilization did not always 
rest on a basis of coercion.  
 With indigenous manoeuvring thus centrally placed, this thesis contributes 
to further exposing another flaw within traditional colonial studies, which has for 
a long time persisted in presenting those living in colonized territories as mere 
subjects. In terms of decolonization, this meant that indigenous peoples, for 
example, were seen as being herded into the colonial security forces in a bid to 
turn the tide against ever-growing popular discontent. The image of these 
‘subjects’ as being powerless and faceless parties to wars being waged in their 
name or against them—from both the perspectives of the authorities the freedom 
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fighters—needs to be redressed. Primarily, the chapters that follow do so by 
challenging the notion of loyalty to both the colonial state and its adversaries. The 
evidence suggests that so-called loyalist elites, the men and women in the 
security forces but also anti-colonial insurgents were not necessarily loyal at all: 
they tried to safeguard their own short- and long-term interests and goals.  
Therefore, most connections between locals and the colonial state or locals 
and opposing, anti-colonial forces were highly volatile and unstable. The thesis 
argues that the very nature of the interests that needed safeguarding made stable 
connections near impossible. To this end, the thesis engages with various, 
indigenous interest. They range from the means to gain access to long-term 
benefits the colonial state offered (citizenship, regional autonomy, 
group/communal rewards) and highly personal, short-term interests (revenge, 
lust) to the pull of family ties and personal development (education, a pension) 
and the most vital interest: survival. All interests, however, proved very 
susceptible to the influence of outside forces. Once territories in which locals 
tried to safeguard their interests became violently contested, people and 
organisations bowed to the power-broker who could maximize the possibilities of 
safeguarding local interests.  
Throughout the thesis, the intricate interplay between transformative 
connections, violence and local interests is paramount. In light of this, the first 
chapter details the conceptual and methodological frameworks of the thesis. Its 
main objective is to explore how a concept of alliance-formation can restore local 
agency and the interests connected to it as central nodes of analysis to 
understand the complexities of decolonization. Before arriving at that conclusion, 
the chapter locates agency by probing the historiography of colonial studies—
spatially and temporally—to explore the various ways in which both colonizers 
and subsequent commentators and historians have dealt with the indigenous.20 
From the perspective of the incoming colonial powers, the co-operation of 
indigenous communities was indispensable to the functioning of colonial states. 
                                                 
20 Aníbal Quijano, ‘Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality’, Cultural Studies, 2, 2-3 (2007), 174. 
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Co-operation on a basis of equity was quickly phased out, however: the nature of 
the foreign colonial project—with its domination, the ubiquitous (threat of) 
violence and economic predation—simply prohibited parity between invasive 
foreigners and autochthonous populations. The establishment of empire therefore 
depended on the active participation of both local elites and security personnel in 
their own subjugation and that of others. What the colonial authorities were 
interested in was the structural suppression of the agency of indigenous 
populations; they wanted acquiescence through subordination.  
The chapter then problematizes the notion that, once subjugated, troops 
developed a sense of loyalty to the colonial state. It presupposes, in addition, that 
histories of empire or decolonization, subsequently, have not necessarily 
challenged or engaged this notion of loyalty. Instead, colonial enforcers are simply 
there. In doing so, local indigenous agency was further removed from sight. By 
problematizing loyalty, the chapter proceeds to bring agency back in. This 
restoration then culminates in the introduction and exploration of alliance-
formation. Colonial relations, specifically in times of strife, are better 
characterized as fluent alliances. Contrary to loyalty—which diminishes local 
agency’s visibility—alliances give weight to the fact that relationships between 
colonial authorise and subjected societies were rather flexible, transformative, 
multi-layered and not without merit for the so-called colonized. The closing 
paragraphs of chapter one will then explain the methodological ramifications of 
the thesis as well as their limits.  
After this conceptual framework, chapter two introduces two indigenous, 
politicized elites—the Partai Rakyat Pasundan and the Malayan Chinese 
Association—to elucidate how, at the highest levels of indigenous society in 
Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively, the wealthy and educated classes sought 
the support of the colonial state to safeguard interests—linked to political 
autonomy—that could possibly carry over into the period after decolonization. 
The Partai Rakyat Pasundan wanted its own state, the Pasundan State, whereas 
the Chinese leaders of the Malayan Chinese Association wanted political power to 
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protect the interests of the Malayan Chinese communities. The analysis 
underlines that with the post-World War Two colonial state largely dismantled, 
indigenous elites could operate with more autonomy than previously possible, 
claim to speak for specific constituencies and through the latter, establish 
themselves as power-brokers situated next to their colonial overseers. Colonial 
officials were willing to take these indigenous objectives into account precisely 
because their wish to re-establish control over society coincided with the local 
elites’ wish to gain influence with the same population. To attain their objectives, 
the colonial authorities and the Partai Rakyat Indonesia and the Malayan 
Chinese Association needed each other to violently counter anti-colonial forces. In 
the Netherlands East Indies, those forces were gathered in the Republik 
Indonesia, whereas in Malaya the Malayan Communist Party took up arms 
against the colonial oppressor. When interests no longer matched properly, 
however, indigenous elites in Indonesia and Malaysia found that the colonial 
authorities could still muster enough pressure to have them fall back in line. 
Whereas chapter two details how members of the local elites tried to gain 
influence with high colonial officialdom and presented themselves as a means for 
the latter to re-establish contact with the population, chapter three maps how 
elites gained influence in a downward direction, towards indigenous society. The 
chapter contends that the alliance with the colonial state required that, in 
exchange for a modicum of power, the Partai Rakyat Pasundan, the Pasundan 
State that followed it and the Malayan Chinese Association had to prove their 
usefulness to the colonial state. In practice, this meant that indigenous elites 
were made to ‘create’ constituencies and pushed to solve an acute post-World 
War Two manpower crisis. They had to find recruits to breathe new life into the 
colonial security apparatus needed to parry the blows of a powerful and violent 
anti-colonial movement. In return, the elites created the circumstances that 
allowed them to speak to and ensconced themselves in the communities they 
claimed to represent.  
The fourth chapter descends one more rung down the colonial hierarchical 
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ladder, into the ranks of colonial security forces. It brings local agency further 
into perspective. The focus lies with how these enforcers of empire navigated 
violent decolonization through recruitment, training and deployment. The object 
of this chapter is to argue that through serving, those in the security forces could 
demand certain rewards from the colonial state. First, it shows that professing 
support for the colonial state—becoming the state’s agent—yielded rewards, such 
as pensions, land titles and education or vocational training. Second, the chapter 
illustrates that as the conflicts of decolonization heated up, it was not a deep-
seated support for the colonial state that engendered indigenous support. 
Instead, violence exerted a mobilizational force that, combined with the need for 
survival (and, to no small extent, state coercion), prompted indigenous women 
and men to join the security forces.  
Lastly, by highlighting the micro-histories of individual fighters, chapter 
four shows that those serving had to alternate between various identities under 
the pressure of mounting violence, which led to oscillating alliances. For example, 
when Indonesian fighters specifically targeted Chinese communities for being 
Chinese, some joined up with Dutch-sponsored, Chinese security forces. 
Underneath ostensibly fixed alliances (to the colonial state, for example), however, 
other identities simultaneously undermined said alliances. Colonial enforcers 
used the violent means given to them by the state to chase their own interests 
that ran quite opposite to what the colonial authorities in Indonesia and Malaysia 
had in mind. 
In doing so, indigenous enforcers interacted with the very indigenous 
populations they had been recruited from. The final chapter has these indigenous 
populations in Indonesia and Malaysia as its core. It tries to understand the 
choices of ‘regular’ people: men, women, youths, tappers or labourers. Naturally, 
the instances of agency under consideration cannot be said to represent all 
communities or individuals. The chapter should be understood as an attempt to 
discern how the unmooring of (rural) society during decolonization combined with 
violence geared towards territorial control. This combination, it will be argued, 
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dictated the range of choices individuals had and how specific alliances were 
created. The chapter is an attempt to disaggregate specific groups of people and 
their agency in the forms of the choices they had under the difficult 
circumstances of decolonization. This is needed as contemporary sources and the 
subsequent studies on the wars in Malaya and Indonesia that followed show a 
strong tendency to lump various communities—Chinese, for example, and 
Indonesians—together.  
Broadly speaking, the analysis deals with three sorts of indigenous actors. 
First, there are indigenous organisations that demanded peoples’ support. Four 
organisations will be identified. Two are the recurrent Partai Rakyat Pasundan 
and the Malayan Chinese Association. Against them stood two anti-colonial 
organisations that vied for the support of the same populations, but for 
diametrically opposed reasons. In Malaya, this was the Min Yuen or Masses 
Organisation. In Indonesia, villagers encountered the Komando2 (Onder) Distrik 
Militer or Military (Sub) District Commandos. These organisations, by their very 
nature, tried to enforce alliances by turning by-standers into participants. In 
doing so, they provided the context wherein people acted. 
The second group of actors was constituted by those who were 
disinterested in the general war and outside the ranks of security forces or their 
opponents. For these people the contest for territorial control meant they had to 
enter in multiple, unwanted alliances in a bid to remain neutral and, in effect, 
escape being subjected to violence. At first glance, it may appear that these 
people, thus subjected to violence, were mere victims. However, their agency lay 
in the fact that by catering to two or multiple power-brokers they could maximize 
their chances on survival. In doing so, they created a live-and-let-live system. The 
last group of indigenous ‘regular’ actors were, in fact, connected to the war, either 
on the side of the colonial authorities or on the insurgents’. On the one hand, 
they, too, benefitted from the live-and-let-live system. For some of these 
participants, on the other hand, the revolutions proved a way to further 
themselves; to, within grander societal changes, alter their personal status quo. 
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To bring out differences in motivation, the chapter will treat men and women 
separately. It will also focus on the Darul Islam. The chapter singles out the Darul 
Islam as highly motivated individuals founded this organisation to break away 
from both the Netherlands East Indies colonial authorities and the Republic 
Indonesia. It tried to do so in West Java, the heartland of both the Dutch colonial 
authorities and the Pasundan State.  
Taken together, the three groups of actors again underline the major tenet 
of the thesis: that decolonization was highly complicated set of processes that, in 
turn, brought into contact organisations, communities and individuals from all 
layers of colonized Indonesia and Malaysia, including their interests, objectives 
and wishes. Only by taking these into account along with the local, indigenous 
agency these wishes generated, can proper weight be given to the complexities of 
decolonization. 
 
A note on sources 
In her book Along the Archival Grain, Ann Stoler has convincingly argued that 
‘sentiments have figured in and mattered to the shaping of [colonial] statecraft’.21 
Those collating, measuring, counting and interpreting the information that 
informed the functioning of colonial states, Stoler claimed, did so under the 
influence of a ‘concern for sentiment’. Officials designed policies—such as 
educational reform or marriage laws—based on what they thought would 
‘produce sensibilities that were fitting, aspirations that were appropriate [and] 
dispositions that would confirm [colonial] truth-claims’, not on realities per se. 
Empires, therefore, ran on ‘distorted forms of knowledge’ connected to an 
assumed understanding of the indigenous.22  
The analyses that follow have been necessarily constructed from flawed 
economic appraisals, personality sketches and intelligence and military-
operational reports, informed by the reductionist tendencies of the colonial 
                                                 
21 Ann L. Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), 62. Emphasis in the original. 
22 Stoler, Along the Archival Grain, 63-64, 71, 247. Emphasis in the original.  
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scribes.23 The projects geared to socially engineer parts of colonial society in 
Malaya or instil appropriate behavioural repertoires in Indonesian militias, for 
example, took little to no stock of what the people subjected to them precisely 
thought or wanted. Perhaps the problem was compounded by the wars of 
decolonization that dominated colonial reporting between 1945 and 1957. Where 
continued colonial domination was threatened or seriously hung in the balance, 
less time could be devoted to probing indigenous inclinations than under 
‘peaceful’ circumstances. For counter-insurgency programs to gain traction, 
assessments, policy designs and their implementation had to be undertaken 
sooner later than later—if policy makers had time to anticipate at all.  
The present research, to tease out the roles of local agency and interests 
and attempt to partially mitigate the distorted nature of archival sources, seeks to 
distance itself from the sources and read between the lines of the incomplete 
information the relevant archives provided. The analyses rely heavily on the 
combination of civil and military archives. For the Netherlands East Indies, the 
main sources are found in the archive of the Algemene Secretarie (the General 
Secretary). This archive contains the papers of the civilian Binnenlands Bestuur 
(Inland Administration) and its police forces. The massive archive that the Armed 
Forces in the Netherlands East Indies have generated represents another major 
source. Combined, the Inland Administration and the Armed Forces’ records were 
particularly valuable for determining the political, economic and social state of 
the population and the various, shifting approaches both civil and military 
authorities took to influencing the population. They were furthermore 
instrumental in understanding the violent framework—including indigenous 
security forces—in which indigenous populations acted and organized and how 
anti-colonial organisations behaved towards both the population and the colonial 
authorities. To similar ends, the records of the Air Ministry and Royal Air Force, 
the War Office, the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Office were similarly 
used to analyse the war in Malaya.   
                                                 
23 Compare: Quijno, Coloniality, 170. 
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To identify and contextualize local agency to the fullest, yet other archives 
and sources were consulted. They included the Netherlands Forces Intelligence 
Service, the British National Army Museum, ego documents and newspapers. 
Various planter records held in the Dutch and British National Archives (and at 
the Incorporated Society of Planters in Kuala Lumpur) at times provided a 
counter-point to those of the government, specifically were they concerned the 
efficacy of the latter’s counter-insurgency policies. In addition, planters interacted 
more closely with locals—and in a different manner—than civilian or military 
representatives. A thesis about Southeast Asia obviously cannot be complete 
without making use of local archives. The Arkib Negara Malaysia and the papers 
of Tan Cheng Lock and Henry Lee Hau Shik, better known as H. S. Lee, (held by 
the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore) proved particularly valuable 
in charting the rise of the Malayan Chinese Association and the role of the 
Chinese in shaping the Malayan Emergency. Lastly, where my limited command 
of Bahasa Indonesia and time have allowed, the Republican archives held in the 
Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia—mostly those of the Sekretariat Negara (State 
Secretary), the Kementerian Pertahanan (Ministry of Defence) and the Kepolisian 
Negara Republik Indonesia (the Police of the Republic of Indonesia) gave depth to 
the information from Dutch sources. 
 Research that relies on official documents alone may be said to be 
incomplete. For this reason, wherever possible, the analysis has been 
supplemented by interviews. In some cases, I have been able to interview people 
directly. Due to time-restrictions and my limited knowledge of Bahasa Indonesia 
and Bahasa Melayu, most interviews used for this project, however, have been 
done by others. As such, the questions asked were not designed towards 
furthering this thesis’s research agenda, but that of someone else.  
 
The Indonesian War for Independence and the Malayan Emergency 
The final pages of this introductions will give a short, simplified chronology of the 
two conflicts under consideration: the Indonesian War for Independence (1945-
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1949) and the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960).  
 The decolonization of the Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya did 
not start with the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Army in August 1945, but 
the power vacuum its soldiers left behind allowed Southeast Asian nationalists to 
think about establishing an independent state. Mere days after the Japanese 
surrender, Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta declared independence on 17 August 
1945 as the first president and vice president, respectively, of the Republic 
Indonesia. If the period between August 1945 and the first months of 1946 is any 
indication, the proclamation of the Republic—with its capital in Yogyakarta, 
Central Java—echoed throughout the archipelago, awakening peoples’ deep-
seated wish for independence. During this period, Indonesians killed tens of 
thousands of Dutch, Indo-European and others perceived to be loyal to the 
Dutch.  
The Netherlands government, in the meantime, refused to negotiate with 
the newly established Republic and scrambled to have its colonial authority 
restored. British forces were sent in as place-holders for the Dutch on the back of 
a formal Anglo-Dutch agreement. This arrangement proved impossible to hold, 
however, because the situation on the ground was unexpectedly violent. The 
British command therefore decided to limit its presence only to ‘key areas’ on 
Java and Sumatra in order to carry out the guarding of Japanese troops and 
evacuation of prisoners of wars and internees. The Dutch were appalled to learn 
that the British recognized the Republic, while the British, in turn, found the 
incoming Dutch troops overtly violent.24 By October 1946, the British had 
managed to bring the Netherlands government to the negation table, have it 
recognize the Republic’s right to self-determination and agree to a cease-fire.  
 For months, negotiations dragged on until the Dutch-Indonesian 
Linggadjati Agreement was signed in March 1947. In reality, the Dutch and the 
                                                 
24 J. A. A. van Doorn, ‘Indië als Koloniaal Project: Een Karakteristiek van de Nederlandse Bemoeienis met Indië in de 
Twintigste Eeuw’, in J. van Goor, ed., The Indonesian Revolution: Papers of the Conference Held in Utrecht 17-20 
June 1986 (Utrecht: Instituut voor Geschiedenis der Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, 1986), 90; H. Th. Bussemaker, 
Bersiap! Opstand in het Paradijs: De Bersiap-periode op Java en Sumatra 1945-1946 (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2005); 
McMillan, The British Occupation, 17-18, 105, 167. 
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Republic had signed two different treaties. Although the Netherlands government 
had recognized the Republic on Java, Sumatra and Madura, it demanded the 
Republic become part of the United States of Indonesia (USI). The Republic, 
conversely, had understood its status as a de facto power would not be 
diminished and certainly not before January 1949, when the USI would have 
been formed. Furthermore, Republicans interpreted the future bond the Dutch 
kingdom as being voluntary.25 After March, mutual distrust mounted as the 
Dutch built up their military footprint. Haunted by visions of empty governmental 
coffers and irreparable damage to the Dutch plantation system, General Simon 
Spoor on 21 July 1947 ordered the first ‘Police Action’. Its object was to capture 
the major communication centres and cities before troops could try their hand at 
‘pacifying’—violently weeding out local resistance—the territories the army could 
not immediately occupy. 
 Dutch troops occupied two-thirds of Java and parts of Sumatra, but on five 
August, pressured by the United Nations, the government in The Hague told them 
to stand down. Riding the wave of success that came with having cut the 
Republic down to size, Lieutenant Governor-General Hubertus van Mook began 
organising the federal states that would constitute the USI. The Partai Rakyat 
Pasundan was created as part of this federal push. On their part, Republican 
troops of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (National Army of Indonesia) and their 
irregulars that had allowed their Dutch adversaries to pass began developing and 
implementing guerrilla tactics. Dutch efforts to ‘pacify’ quickly began stalling, not 
in the least because the territory Dutch and their local enforcers had to cover was 
too large. They could not protect local populations. The steady deterioration of 
Dutch-Indonesian relations and levels local safety prompted the United Nations 
to initiate a new round of negotiations. They concluded aboard an American ship, 
the Renville, where Republican and Dutch representatives signed another 
                                                 
25 H. van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië: De Val van het Nederlandse Imperium in Azië (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2001), 
149, 174, 186, 190-192, 208; George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Itchaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1963), 196; Petra M. H. Groen, Marsroutes en Dwaalsporen: Het Nederlands Militair-strategisch 
Beleid in Indonesië, 1945–1950 (The Hague: SDU, 1991), 78; Jan Bank, Katholieken en de Indonesische Revolutie 
(Baarn: Ambo, 1983), 216-31. 
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agreement in January 1948. Under ‘Renville’, the Republic agreed to pull back its 
troops into Central Java while the Dutch were allowed to start forming a federal 
government.26  
Once again both parties failed to live up to the agreement. On nineteen 
December, Louis Beel, Van Mook’s successor, received The Hague’s permission to 
commence another ‘Police Action’, this time to arrest the Republican leaders in 
Yogyakarta. It lasted until five January 1949. Diplomatically and militarily, this 
military aggression sounded the death knell for the Dutch in Indonesia. The 
United Nations roundly condemned the Netherlands and threatened with 
sanctions and the Dutch were forced to release the Republican government. In 
the course of 1949, Republican forces brought about a military stale-mate though 
intense guerrilla warfare. On seven May 1949 two diplomats, Mohammad Rum 
and Jan Herman van Roijen, came to an agreement that was the lead-in to the 
Round Table Conference that culminated in the transfer of sovereignty to 
Indonesia. On 27 December 1949 Indonesia was finally free.27 
In what in 1945 was British Malaya, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) 
that would claim to fight a war for independence in Malaya—like the Partai 
Nasional Indonesia—had its roots in the years leading up to the Second World 
War.28 Like Sukarno and Hatta, the communists in Malaya gained strength 
during the Japanese occupation. Contrary to Indonesian nationalists, however, 
the MCP’s influence stemmed not from co-operation with the Japanese, but from 
fighting them through the party’s Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (MRLA). 
The MCP’s interpretation of independence further differed from the Republic’s due 
to the fact that whereas the Republic deployed Maoist tactics divested from their 
                                                 
26 Remy Limpach, De Brandende Kampongs van Generaal Spoor (Amsterdam: Boom, 2016), 54-56; R. Cribb, 
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communist agenda, the Malayan communist insurgents wanted to supplant the 
British state with a communist regime.29 After 1945, the Malay communists 
therefore first focussed on infiltrating political parties and labour unions before it 
went underground for fear of a British clamp-down in 1948. Disenfranchised 
Malayan Chinese—distrusted by the Malays—constituted the base of the MCP 
whose ranks were dominated by the Chinese.30  
The British meanwhile sought to bring together the British Settlements of 
Penang and Malacca and the nine other peninsular states of Malaya under a 
Malayan Union. Singapore would become a separate entity. Although the Malay 
Rulers of the individual states had agreed to the Union, popular protest—
organized by Malay leaders in the United Malays National Organisation in May 
1946—made them change their mind. Early 1948, the British, with the Rulers’ 
consent, finally decided on the Federation of Malaya. Although its stipulations 
different little from the Union’s, they did contain the promise of self-government.31 
Chinese leaders were not consulted throughout these constitutional changes. As 
at the same time the British indeed began pressuring the MCP between March to 
May 1948, the communists began organising for conflict expected ‘later that 
year’. It therefore ramped up the frequency of ‘violence and murder in support of 
labour disputes’.  
The British, however, ‘pre-empted communist plans by declaring a state of 
emergency in June 1948’ in response to a string of heinous killings. The MCP 
now organized guerrilla units collectively known as the Malayan National 
Liberation Army (MNLA; later Malayan Races Liberation Army). The British 
opened what became known as the Malayan Emergency with ‘counter-terror’. 
                                                 
29 A classic Moa-inspired revolution knows three phases: (1) guerrilla-type assault attack the incumbent regime when it 
least expects it to create chaos that results in (2) communist safe areas that would eventually link up to build up a 
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1985), 21, 27, 29. 
31 Ongkili, Nation-building in Malaysia, 38, 51, 55, 59; Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The 
Malayan Emergency 1948-1960 (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), 207. 
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This broke up bigger MRLA units into smaller ones, making their attacks more 
precise. At the same time, intelligence started flowing into British hands. After the 
end of 1949, ‘operations on both sides were becoming more organized and 
targeted’. The British then implemented the so-called Briggs plan (named after its 
originator General Sir Harold Briggs) from 1950 onwards. It violently resettled 
more than half a million Chinese into New Villages. This program severely 
obstructed the MCP’s connections with their predominantly Chinese support base 
now held in the villages.32 The British continued—with newly arrived General Sir 
Gerald Templer leading the charge after 1951—to focus their attention on the 
New Villages. On the one hand, collective punishment hit those villages that did 
not cooperate. On the other hand, the colonial government held municipal 
elections and tried to improve living conditions in the villages.33 
To no small extent, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) contributed to 
these developments. This organisation had been founded by affluent, 
‘conservative’ and influential Chinese members of the Malaya’s Federal Council 
and the Chinese Chambers of Commerce. High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney 
had impressed upon them that the Chinese communities in Malaya, pressured as 
they were by the MCP and the distrust of Malays, needed an organisation akin to 
the UMNO to represent their interests. Before long, the MCA gained considerable 
strength, both with the Chinese and the colonial government, by catering to the 
needs of the resettled Chinese.34   
With the forcefield described above directed against it, the Malayan 
Communist Party was slowly being marginalized. It moved back into Malaya’s 
deep jungles; the number of violent incidents its guerrillas staged showed a 
downward trajectory, as did the party’s morale. Mounting numbers of defecting 
soldiers—known as Surrendered Enemy Personnel—further weakened the MCP’s 
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potential for sustained guerrilla warfare. By 1956, the number of MCP fighters 
had dropped to 3,000 from a peak of 8,000-10,000.  
The Malayan Chinese Association’s influence, conversely, was still growing. 
It re-invented itself, transitioning from a social to a political movement. Already in 
January 1952, the UMNO and the MCA joined forces in the Alliance, 
predominantly to combine the influence these organisations had within their 
respective communities. The Alliance was further designed to keep other parties—
mostly the Independence for Malaysia Party (IMP)—from becoming the champions 
of the independence movement and to have the British ‘speed up the time time-
table for self-government’. Various local elections (in which the Alliance was 
successful) were in 1955 followed up by elections for a newly designed Federal 
Council. The body was recast into ‘a partly-elected and partly-nominated 
unicameral legislature’. This ‘first national poll’ took place on 27 July 1955. A 
great number of parties participated: aside from the Alliance, the other parties 
included the Party Negera, the Labour Party of Malaya, the National Association 
of Perak and the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party. The Alliance, joined by Malaysian 
Indian Congress just before the Federal Council elections, won fifty of the fifty-
one seats for elected members.35  
Analogous to the federal elections, the leader of the Alliance, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, suggested to offer amnesty to the ‘terrorists’ still with the ailing MCP in 
an order to finally end the Emergency. After two years of fruitless negotiations, 
the authorities disallowed the MCP to ‘[emerge] into civilian life, free and 
apparently respectable’. According to Anthony Short, the communists themselves 
were ‘not averse to continuing the Emergency’. By ‘very cautious demonstrations 
of military activity’ the MCP believed it could show the rest of Malaya it could not 
be defeated militarily. Abdul Rahman on 31 August 1957 became the first Prime 
Minister of an independent Malaya. Around that time, the Malayan Communist 
Party had moved into southern Thailand from where it staged ineffective forays 
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Co-operation, Loyalty and Alliances: Participation in Colonial Insurgency 
On a hot summer’s day in June 1949, a public prosecutor in the Netherlands 
East Indies was confronted with a rather sensitive case. Four Indonesians who 
stood on trial in Cilincing for suspected subversive anti-Dutch activities had 
declared they were tortured during interrogation. Aside from a sandal and a piece 
of wood to beat the prisoners, electrocution had been used to ‘wring out a 
confession’. Indonesians did the actual interrogating, while their Eurasian or 
Dutch commander—the report does not specify—looked on in tacit agreement.1 
The same mechanism was at work in British Malaya: European officers stood by 
as locally recruited personnel questioned suspects. A Special Branch officer 
working for the Federation of Malaya Police admitted that prisoners were beaten 
‘from time to time’ by his Chinese subordinates. He added that keeping suspects 
awake over extended periods of time—a method later ‘called cruel in Northern 
Ireland’—was quite admissible since ‘all is fair in love and war’.2  
 The two examples illustrate a core aspect of the research at hand. It is that 
indigenous people were clearly implicated in the attempts to sustain empire and 
the wars of decolonization. The sections that follow will analyse this notion 
further. In the process, several questions shall be considered. These questions 
revolve around the relation of indigenous peoples with the foreign colonial powers 
that sought to dominate them. If the functioning of the colonial state was 
predicated on violence, asymmetrical co-operation and the stripping of agency 
from local populations, why did serving and fighting for the colonial state seem 
desirable? Did obedience or loyalty play a determining role, or did indigenous 
men and women have other motives for joining hands with the authorities? Did 
the colonial state offer avenues for social advancement? To address these and 
other questions, the first section of the chapter rules out forms of co-operation on 
                                                 
1 Officier van Justitie Mr. M. Kiverson aan de Procureur-Generaal aan het Hooggerechtshof van Nederlands-Indië, 
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1950, The National Archives, The Hague.  
2 John Sankey, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive [IWMSA], accession number 10300, reel 3. 
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an equal footing between the incoming colonial powers and indigenous 
populations as power-relations were bound to be transformed in the colonizer’s 
favour. Whatever ‘benefits’ the colonized received through colonialism, wrote Ellis 
Cashmore, ‘they inevitably suffered’ as peoples, culturally and socially by the 
introduction of relations of dependence.3 
If locals joined forces with violent foreign conquerors based on asymmetry, 
the next section argues, this should not be mistaken for carefully cultivated 
loyalty. In colonial studies, a measure of loyalty of both troops and indigenous 
elites is often implicated as the factor that made the networks that tied them to 
the colonial state function, but this notion is too rigid and fixed. Loyalty needs to 
be unpacked for two reasons. First, critically engaging with loyalty removes the 
possibility of unproblematically serving up local enforcers as the tools of empire. 
Many historical studies have fallen for this trap, especially those interested in the 
chronological processes of decolonization or its diplomatic or counterinsurgency 
dimensions. Secondly, dispensing with loyalty as an explanation for local 
acquiescence brings back local agency and the influence of indigenous choices. 
The third section explains how the concept of alliance-formation can bring about 
such a restoration. Alliances are flexible, mutually beneficial and, in opposition to 
what loyalty implies, can be abrogated. If indigenous-colonial relations are thus 
conceived, the actions and choices indigenous individuals and communities make 
within the alliance-formation framework, it will be argued, make visual 
indigenous agency.  The sections that follow will further show, by participating in 
various contemporary debates—such as rebellion, violence and 
counterinsurgency—how alliance-formation and agency can explain the efficacy 
of participation on the side of the colonial government.4 The chapter will close by 
indicating what alliance-formation means for the study of the decolonization of 
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the Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya and how the comparative design 
of this project functions.  
 
Co-operation 
The fact that European officers, either in a military or police capacity, had locally 
recruited subordinates do the dirty business of gathering intelligence, is 
symptomatic of the functioning of empire. Before the massive drive for empire 
which characterized the late nineteenth century, small bands of European 
explorers, followed by chartered companies, administrators and troops had rather 
more limited goals. ‘For much of the several centuries of pre-imperial contacts, 
mercantile, consular, and missionary posts were subordinate to local rulers’.5 At 
this junction of initial contact and for some time thereafter, indigenous 
communities could negotiate. This was done predominantly through treaties. In 
encounters between Europeans and indigenous peoples, the former had to 
accommodate the latter’s claims. Local communities could present their 
oppositional claims by adopting European discourses infused with concepts that 
both stemmed from and crossed cultural divides. In this way, indigenous 
counter-claims were validated by the nascent colonial powers.6 Despite coming 
from different worlds, Europeans and autochthonous peoples could find common 
ground upon which to negotiate claims and counter-claims (about sovereignty 
and property) through a shared yet different set of compatible customs that 
functioned in a context that specifically demanded parley. Violent indigenous 
reactions, in this conception, did not necessarily serve to drive off the 
Europeans—peaceful treaty-bound interaction was preferable to war—but to force 
Europeans to recognize valid, local claims, according to Belmessous.7 
 This interpretation has certain limitations. As the scramble for territories to 
be conquered intensified and empires slowly coalesced and became entrenched, 
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the binding nature of treaties suffered. Officials showed increasingly less 
compunction with unilaterally rejecting treaties when doing so proved 
advantageous. The scope of action for indigenous treaty-making diminished 
relative to the gains in power made by colonial authorities. Treaties, arguably, 
were not even about non-European populations but served as markers of defining 
imperial spaces.8 Where settlers introduced themselves, indigenous communities 
suffered further, still. Whereas colonialism promoted severe and violent cultural 
change, it benefited from a continued—if dominated—indigenous presence. 
Settlers, however, could transform cultural destruction into ‘cultural genocide’ 
and initiate an erasure of the indigenous. Settler colonies could ‘[end] up 
establishing independent nations [and] effectively repress, co-opt, and extinguish 
indigenous alterities’.9 Even so, treaty-making did not disappear. The necessities 
of colonial conquest did alter the nature of treaties. Since the burgeoning state 
needed manpower to organize the troops needed for sustained domination and 
demonstrable appropriation of contested colonial territory became ever more 
important, officials now concluded treaties to co-opt former enemies, including 
the latter’s retinue of fighters, in order to steer the state’s gaze unto other 
resisting communities.10 
In Indonesia, a new economic and administrative policy at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century led reformers to banish the Sultan of Bantam (West Java) 
as he was held responsible for social unrest in his sultanate. That the unrest was 
caused by forced heavy labour ordered by the Dutch themselves did not concern 
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the colonial rulers. The fact that the Sultanate and the Dutch had been engaged 
in treaties since the arrival of the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde 
Oostindische Compagnie; VOC) and the Sultanate had agreed to the presence of 
the VOC’s sugar industry in the region was likewise brushed aside.11 The old 
sultan was promptly removed; his successor was clearly told who his masters 
were.  
In Malaysia, too, agents of the British Empire worked with the sultans 
through various treaties from 1874 onward. Despite that European advisers daily 
enforced subordinate relationships on the different Sultans and their 
administrations, the system provided ‛mutual reciprocity’ that allowed for 
‘peaceful settlements of disputes’.12 Malay rulers remained legitimized, yet as the 
British opened Malaya to world trade markets, ‘new client groups of Europeans, 
Chinese, and Indians, had to be supported’. This development changed how the 
British safeguarded their interests.  The traditional system was superseded by a 
centralized bureaucracy that severely limited the Malay Rulers’ influence—even if 
the sovereignty of their sultanates remained untouched.13 The influence of the 
British was such that sultans could be deposed or, if needed, their lines of 
succession altered. 
 Traditional rulers performed a rather ambiguous role. On the one hand, 
they were thoroughly subjugated. On the other hand, they were instrumental in 
maintaining empire and were consequently elevated in social standing. As Ronald 
Robinson has convincingly argued, colonial incursion and expansion relied upon 
finding ‘internal “collaborators” in [the] non-European political economies’ the 
growing empires aimed to penetrate. The governing elites that the colonial agents 
encountered needed to be made to work in tandem with European expansionist 
tendencies. This way, inevitable resistance reflexes could be blunted and subdued 
or even checked by treaty before they flared up uncontrollably. Through 
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collaboration and local consent, the European agents accessed cheap labour, 
extracted valuable resources, broke into local economies and reconfigured power 
relations.14 As the veritable personifications of the keys to the colonial kingdom, 
local rulers and elites were allowed room for manoeuvre. Conversely, the margin 
for autonomy they had was limited and predominantly determined by the 
proximity—and later—the strength of the colonial states.   
 As the short foray into Bantam and the examples that opened this chapter 
have shown, colonies were built upon a foundation of coercion. Although 
authorities could count on the local participation of rulers, there had to be a 
means to control them and the communities they represented in case of 
disturbances. The troops the Dutch sent in to defuse the threatening situation in 
Bantam, however, were largely non-Dutch. Acquiescence was enforced by local 
troops, as the gruesome examples which opened this chapter have already 
illustrated. Cooperation was not limited to rulers and local elites. They shared the 
burden of complicity with indigenous enforcers who actively contributed to 
sustained colonial domination.  
At this juncture, empire’s more coercive and downright violent character 
take centre stage. Whereas traditional leaders may have been allowed to stay in 
place to function as gate-keepers of indigenous political economies, colonial 
authorities everywhere ensured they possessed the tools to rectify any situation 
that may have come close to threatening the hold on the colonial territories. 
Maintenance of empires very much depended on the threat of violence—despite 
the continued importance of treaties and negotiation.15 Partially, the necessity of 
(the threat of) violence can be explained by the fact that from the start of the 
twentieth century officials saw threats to the colonial status quo everywhere. In 
Malaysia and Indonesia communism, Islam and nationalism were very much on 
the minds of the colonial administrators responsible for maintaining order.16 
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Violent, local externalization of individual grievances were easily misconstrued as 
the onset of large-scale political unrest. The distinction between misdemeanour 
and subversion was quite blurred.17  
 An excellent study by Martin Thomas has added to our understanding of 
the function of colonial policing with a very important insight. Many of the violent 
episodes that typified colonial expansion and control were not directly connected 
to frustrating the aspirations and emancipation of colonized minds. Rather, 
maintenance of order stemmed from the consequences of an emerging colonial 
economy. The extraction of valuable resources necessitated continued access to 
cheap, forced labour as indigenous modes of production were altered for the 
transition into a predatory economy. This new order needed to be enforced and 
protected. The resulting security apparatus served two purposes. The first and 
obvious one is that it contained any unrest resulting from the exploitative 
character of the colonial state. Second, it served to protect those interest groups 
that did the actual resource extraction: ‘[p]landing consortia, mining companies 
and other businesses seeking exclusive commercial concessions’. The colonial 
state had to be extremely careful not to upset the smooth functioning of business 
interests; it was the latter’s representatives in the hinterlands who often, by 
means of the vast capitals over which they disposed, exerted more local influence 
than the colonial administrators themselves.18  
 The relationship between business and administration had to be symbiotic, 
not antagonistic. Labour unrest was quick to trigger violent colonial reactions. 
Sending in the state’s police forces safeguarded a sustained flow of resources. 
After all, ‘political priorities and security practices of colonial rule were […] 
attuned to its economic organization’. Based on this troika of security, policy and 
business, then, Thomas concluded that the belief in ‘contrasting styles of 
European colonial policing may be misguided’. Instead, his case studies underline 
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that ‘state repression’ across empires served to uphold local economic structures 
that made the predatory colonial wage economies possible that were co-owned by 
the agents of corporate conglomerates and local settler.19  
 It has been established now why the colonial state needed the ever-present 
threat of violence.20 Indigenous police forces, and in the event of wide-spread 
violence, army conscripts, figured centrally in colonial states. Utilization of local 
draftees and constables was a global phenomenon shared across empires. 
Spanish conquistadores from the sixteenth century onwards relied heavily on 
locally auxiliaries in conjunction with troops from previously-conquered 
territories, ranging from African-born slaves to Iberian-born free men of mixed 
racial ancestry.21 India’s North West Frontier was conquered by a wide array of 
Civil Armed Forces that policed the Indian-Afghani borders. The Indian Army, 
with its oft-romanticized sepoys officered by British men, grew into ‘the strongest 
land force in nineteenth-century Asia’.22 The Indian Army was deemed so 
dependable it was sent to Burma. After its northern provinces were finally 
annexed to India in 1885, it was the Indian Army that continually pacified the 
territory.23 In Cambodia, the French created the garde indigène in the 1880s 
based on earlier experiences with colonial police forces there, the police indigène. 
The pacification of Cambodia was specifically ascribed to the indigenous guard, 
while the regular French army took care of defeating local resistance during the 
various phases of incremental conquest.24  
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 In Annam and Tonkin (modern-day north and central Vietnam), the French 
simultaneously raised tens of thousands of indigenous troops between 1886 and 
1890 divided over various bodies that carried no less than four different names.25 
The Tirailleurs Sénégalais constituted the army fielded to attain domination of 
Senegal since 1857.26 Such was the prevalence of recruitment of local forces 
across French African territories—and their perceived successes—that 
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Mangin conceived of the idea, expounded in his best-
selling book La Force Noire (The Black Force, 1910), to form a 200,000 African 
conscript army. Mangin envisaged that this army would ‘replace French overseas 
forces, and [...] form the front line of defence of France against a European 
army’.27 Imperial Germany in Deutsch-Ostafrika (modern-day Burundi, Rwanda 
and mainland Tanzania), Südwestafrika (Namibia) and, finally, Westafrika (Togo 
and Cameroon) relied on local conscripts to conquer these territories. Most 
notable were the Askaris of East Africa. These soldiers were predominantly taken 
from Zulu and Sudanese communities from 1891-1892 onwards; during the First 
World War, the German colonial army fielded circa 12,000 Askaris.28 The Dutch, 
too, extensively based their power on indigenous forces across their empire to 
conquer more territory or protect the status quo, as did the Belgians in the Congo 
and, after the Germans had been defeated in World War One, in the area now 
known as Rwanda.29  
 Indigenous police forces came to function as the eyes and ears of the 
colonial rulers, allowing them to monitor the daily lives of their subjects and 
correct their behaviour. In colonial Bombay wide-spread urban unrest during the 
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1890s worked together with ‘the rapid growth of a proletarian “secondary 
economy” and culture centred on the street’ to elicit ‘a shift in colonial policing 
strategies there, and ‘a more intrusive approach‘ was substituted for ‘the 
traditional […] strategy of “indirect” control’.30 Simultaneously, police recruits 
served as a funnel through which local grievances could travel upwards: 
individuals could ‘draw upon, appropriate and deploy their personal and social 
caste and kinship connections with the police’.31  
 This depiction of tranquil civil-colonial relations through police mediation 
must not be misconceived to mean that relations were rosy. The colonial troops or 
police forces, i.e. indigenous men fielded against indigenous populations sharing 
the same spatial territory now claimed by the colonizers, allowed the latter to 
invade and subjugate territory, proclaim sovereignty and keep expanding. 
Intervention by police forces frequently translated into confrontations with 
aggrieved communities that quickly turned bloody and brutal. As the United 
States Army tried to subdue the Philippine insurrection at the turn of the 
twentieth century, they enlisted Filipino policemen and scouts. They proved 
efficient in engaging guerrilla bands, but their approach proved too ‘brutal’ for 
their American officers. It was said the Filipinos used blackmail, ‘arbitrarily 
holding people for trial’ and torture.32 Some ten years later in the Netherlands 
East Indies, Europeans, Javanese and Chinese press outlets complained bitterly 
‘about the rough, discriminatory behavior, and the violence, corruption, and 
nepotism of the police force’.33 In Surinam, police in 1919 forces reacted 
‘extraordinarily harsh’ to indigenous dances that the colonial regime deemed 
‘obscene’. On one occasion, a crowd was beaten into dispersal.34 In August 1934, 
tax collection in the Southern Nigerian province of Owerri with armed police 
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present resulted in several deaths and burnt-down houses at the hands of violent 
constables who also flogged suspects.35  
 For all that, the inherent risk of violent excess was one that colonial rulers 
accepted. From a symbolic yet racist perspective, indigenous forces were the 
means ‘to protect the boundaries of civilization from the predatory savages 
beyond’. So-called savages in colonial service were seen as guardians of these 
boundaries. Their ability to take up this duty was maintained, it was thought, if 
indigenous enforcers ‘were at least as ferocious as the [other] savages [...] and 
just as free of civilized inhibitions’.36 They were certainly invited to do so during 
the Aceh War in Indonesia (1873-1914). The Dutch counter-guerrilla sparked 
lively and long-lasting debates due to its brutality.37 ‘The people in Indië against 
we wage war, and especially the Atjehnezen, know no humanity’, said one 
commentator. Respecting the ‘humane [European] rules’ was ‘adequate’, but 
‘philanthropy’ went decidedly too far.38 The violent behaviour they displayed when 
unleashed upon the population in search of insurgents could certainly be used to 
any pacification (to use this highly euphemistic word) program’s advantage. 
Ultimately, native security forces ‘[took] care of the dirty work of empire’, 
participating in ‘activities that soiled their own image and marked them as tools 




The question remains as to why indigenous men became the tools of empire. The 
responsibility for torturing prisoners and dispersing crowds suggests a high 
degree of loyalty among the ranks of the security forces. After all, they used 
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violence against those who, like them, were part of the same subjugated 
populace. This implication had to be part of a trade-off on the part of colonial 
recruits. Through signing up, individuals, and as we shall see, entire 
communities, could accrue advantages that remained out of reach for those who 
chose not to find employment as the state’ policemen or soldiers.40 In line with 
what Michelle Moyd has shown, what follows—here and elsewhere—illustrates 
that a role as proxy oppressor in the name of the colonial state had distinct 
advantages.41 How did this role—with its implied benefits—relate to the notion of 
loyalty?  
At first sight, the issue of colonial loyalty seems rather unproblematic. 
Loyalty was real. This can be easily inferred from the given that colonial 
authorities themselves were very much concerned with the loyalty of their 
indigenous allies and recruits. During the war for independence in the 
Netherlands East Indies, candidates for employment in the Criminal Investigation 
Department of the Field Police were screened for ‘loyalty’.42 The Department of 
Intelligence & Loyalty Inquiries investigated possible indigenous political 
affiliates, probing their pasts for anti-Dutch leanings from the moment the Dutch 
tried to re-establish their power in the archipelago in 1945.43 Colonial subjects, 
conversely, were likewise preoccupied with showing their adherence to certain 
colonial policies. In British Malaya, members of the Chinese minority in the 
1950s demanded citizenship in exchange for their support for the British during 
the Malayan Emergency.44  
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 This section reveals that unquestioning loyalty in the colonial ranks was 
illusory—it hardly existed. In colonial settings, indigenous recruits fought for 
their oppressors largely because of advantages to be obtained through service, as 
shall be discussed. They had to be induced and lured into the recruitment 
camps. That governments in overseas territories were so occupied with screening 
for loyalty belies the fact they never fully trusted their indigenous subjects in the 
security forces or in any other capacity. Even in modern stratified societies—
either racially, such as Apartheid South Africa, or along religious lines, such as 
Israel—policy makers were and still are apprehensive in terms of having what 
they see as untrusted elements—such as minorities—in the ranks.45  
 The existing literature on colonial policing and armies does not engage with 
this issue per se. In fact, local auxiliaries and regulars are figure marginally. After 
having been formed into squads, companies and battalions, to simply appear in 
studies, for colonial military and civil authorities to send out into the field to do 
their bidding.46 ‘[M]obilization [alone] produces deep loyalties’, concluded one 
political scientist in discussing violence against civilians.47 James Corum’s 
Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies 
relates how massive numbers of Malays, and, to a lesser extent, Chinese were 
recruited into the Malayan Police, but there is hardly any consideration for why 
many constables ‘had proven incompetent or corrupt’ and had to be purged from 
the ranks.48 Yet, dealing with questions surrounding the pitfalls of supposing 
loyalty among hastily-recruited, local troops seems rather pertinent considering 
his public.49 Whereas studies on colonial counterinsurgency are not as policy-
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driven as Training Indigenous Forces seems to be, they show the same disregard 
for the complexities of the relationship between indigenous forces and their 
performances. Regarding the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902), to name one 
example, we can read how American officers professed to be ‘deeply divided on 
both the utility and the trustworthiness of the Filipino police and scouts’. Their 
violent behaviour is the only explanation provided for this American distrust.50 In 
2011 David French convincingly showed that counterinsurgency across the 
British Empire was nasty and brutal, but he barely explains how the significant 
role of indigenous, British-sponsored forces could fuel the fires of retribution and 
excess by using their liaison with the British army and police to wage their own 
private wars.51  
 Other studies give attention solely to recruitment policies from the 
authorities’ vantage-point or the strategies colonial authorities employed to bind 
indigenous forces to the broader military and police apparatuses. Social distance 
between security forces and local populations could automatically ensure 
loyalty.52 Certainly, training and instruction did foster strong intra-unit 
connections, but to equate, as one author does, the use of foreign—German—loan 
words by Askaris with loyalty seems too much of a stretch.53 A more fruitful line 
of enquiry brings in sight the ‘martial races’ concept. The colonial state first 
identified what they considered those ‘races’ that had displayed the most prowess 
resisting its representatives. These were then created into specific warlike yet 
imagined castes—complete with myth-making—to compete against each other as 
part of the same colonial army.54 This system of social engineering and internal 
contest for honour and notoriety combined into checks and balances that worked 
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to ensure that not one ‘martial race’ could dominate the army and through it, 
threaten the cohesion of the colonial state. ‘Troops recruited from one area [were] 
used to police another’.55  
 Aside from inculcating them with a belief in the army structure with its 
highly hierarchical foundations and constant training and drilling, conscripts and 
constables came to depend on the security forces. This was achieved by social 
elevation: the placing of indigenous enforcers between the regular population and 
the colonial regime—as embodied by their white officers.56 As one colonial officer 
in Australia argued in 1837, his policemen had to be made ‘useful to society [by] 
weaning them away from their native habits and prejudices [by] habituating them 
to civilized customs’. Impartiality towards native matters was to be achieved.57 
The divide between those co-opted by the colonial state and those outside it 
demanded conspicuous expression. This meant arming the enforcers. More 
important, donning uniforms truly marked their separate status. In Port Phillip, 
in colonial Australia, the Aboriginal police uniform ‘worked probably [...] as the 
most visible sign for all to see, both Aborigine and European alike, the elevated 
state of the police’. Recruits, upon receiving their outfits, spontaneously broke 
their native spears, proclaiming they were no longer ‘blackfellows’.58 Uniforms 
allowed for identification with the colonial; ‘the individual became subjugated to 
the purposes of the collective. In the uniform, the individual is no longer “warrior” 
but a [...] part of a war machine, into which [he], as a part of the machine, must 
be fitted’. The colonial uniform, in this sense, served as a compromise, too: while 
its wearer accepted subjugation to the whole, it allowed him the right to use the 
trappings of colonial power.59  
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 Inducements loom large in explanations for loyalty. Payment, tax 
reductions or the possibilities for plundering defeated enemies’ possessions 
proved enough to attract indigenous warriors.60 Other perks revolved around 
certain concessions on the part of the colonial military institutions. Prior to the 
Indian Rebellion against British rule (1857-1857), for example, the British 
allowed sepoys to visit holy men to seek supernatural guidance. A separate, 
Muslim hierarchy—‘barracks Islam’—existed next to the military hierarchy which 
permitted sepoys to observe both army and local religious norms.61 Other 
compromises concerned the private sphere: Tirailleurs Sénégalais were allowed to 
bring their families on (overseas) campaigns.62 African Askaris could do the same, 
reducing the risk of desertion. Lastly, one historian claims that cannibalism (real 
or not) was ‘institutionalized’—yet only to intimidate foes.63  
 Although tracing training methods does visualize the cultivation of loyalty, 
it hardly tells the whole story. As Ellen Klinkers concluded: ‘What the effect of 
these trainings on the functioning of the police [in Dutch Surinam] was, is 
unknown’.64 Desertion among indigenous ranks, so often an indicator of 
disloyalty, is mentioned, but not explained. Instead, indigenous troops were 
reduced—almost a priori—to being the weakest link in the overall security 
matrix.65 Furthermore, the literature on colonial conscription and actual policing 
mostly deals with limited, localized conflicts—which were relatively easy to 
overcome—or focus on rather tranquil periods which allowed colonial army 
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institutes ample time to raise and control local troops as they saw fit. Loyalty in 
such circumstances proved hardly problematic.  
 From the indigenous perspective, then, colonial conscription had a variety 
of advantages. For one, it provided the means to social advancement. Indigenous 
individuals could use their subordination to the colonial state to re-negotiate 
their position in relation to it to become part of a select group that could unlock 
access to an array of dividends.66 Unmarried men could accumulate enough 
income and other material goods to start a family as the enforcers of colonial 
order.67 (Material gain even made some African levies more prone to looting than 
to fighting.68) Serving in the ranks was about becoming part of a ‘new elite’.69 It 
presented itself as a way to break into the European power structure and into 
modernity.70 In due course, veritable military families evolved that considered the 
military profession an accepted path for advancement for successive 
generations.71 In this respect, the ‘martial races’ approach worked. In exchange 
for these opportunities, ex-Askaris continued to gather intelligence about the 
mood among the people.72 Although former troops functioned as ‘additional 
channels of colonial power’, they did so willingly. According to Marie Fels, offering 
oneself up as recruit expressed, on both communal and individual levels, 
attempts at coming to terms with a changing environment caused by the 
superimposition of a foreign, European power structure. Instead of wholly 
rejecting it, serving was ‘a process of learning to live in two different worlds’, the  
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 cultural adaptation or acculturation, the adding on of something, or the 
 acquisition of another cultural code, not rejection or destruction of the 
 primary code. [It was] an affirmation of being, not a negation.73  
 
The maintenance of colonial security forces required constant bargaining between 
the old and the new. The system, which allowed the needs of the rulers and those 
serving to interact with each other, did seem to have functioned. Colonial 
authorities were able fill their manpower quotas by offering inducement; 
indigenous communities were found willing (yet also forced) to supply the men.74  
 Nevertheless, absolute loyalty did not ensue. For, despite that indigenous 
enforcers ‘effectively bought into’ and helped establish ‘a regimental and 
institutional culture that supported and strengthened the British Empire’, the 
army’s institutional grip never fully undercut ‘regional or local loyalties’ totally.75 
Whereas some groups identified as ‘martial races’ actually internalized this 
moniker into sustained military performance—the Gurkhas spring to mind—there 
existed a gap between the highly normative notions connected to this imagined 
identity and the everyday realities of military life. Indeed, writes Heather Streets 
of Victorian colonial armies, ‘acceptance of a “martial race” ideal may have helped 
mitigate […] soldiers’ frustrations with the frequently dismal and highly 
unglamorous conditions of military service’. At the same time, however, the 
‘martial races’ discourse was so strong that true ‘identities and realities’ were 
pushed far into the background: indigenous security personnel ‘became, in effect, 
the alter ego of British men—the colonized, simple, violent-prone imperial 
subjects who would fight Britain’s battles without question’. This meant that true 
reasons for having signed up (‘economic hardship and lack of viable alternatives’) 
were confused with unshakable loyalty.76 Again, conscripts lived in two worlds, 
they did not destroy the old in favour of a new world.  
                                                 
73 Fels, Good Men and True, 87. 
74 Pesek, Das Ende eines Kolonialreiches, 379.  
75 Streets, Martial Races, 218. 
76 Streets, Martial Races, 217-218, 227. 
40 
 
 As we have seen, research into colonial law enforcement and armies seem 
to suffer from the same confusion; reading loyalty where there was something 
else. Yet, close reading does bring a tacit acknowledgement of the ephemeral 
nature of loyalty to the fore. What could be construed as loyalty was often an 
expression of a lack of alternatives. Many recruits signed on for years; others, 
such as the Askari recruited in Egypt or even Eritrea, were too far from home to 
leave the force.77 When indigenous enforcers fought or even killed anti-colonial 
rebels, it was not uncommon that this happened because those engaged were 
from enemy communities from the conscripts’ point of view, as well as from the 
colony’s—for divide-and-rule to work, rivalling communities had to be pitted 
against each other.78 In any case, indigenous men became implicated in colonial 
violence and therefore suspect in the eyes of the general, colonized masses. Even 
the loyalty that did exist was of a limited nature. It was not linked to the state at 
all. Rather, personal ties between white officers and ‘their’ black troops had 
advanced it.79 These patron-client relationships seemed to have fostered loyalty, 
but it was a personalized kind: to white officers or to the unit.80 It never 
connected to something as abstract as the colonial state; when these 
relationships broke down, disorder and excess violence could occur.81 In fact, for 
the local individuals involved, projecting an image of loyalty was tantamount to 
their survival. When and where the fortunes of war changed, so did the way 
loyalty was constructed and projected. Therefore, this nexus between the fortunes 
of war and supposed loyalty is a primary topic in the chapters that follow. 
 
Alliances  
Charting the depths of loyalty is a fruitless effort. It is an ‘infeasible venture to try 
and comprehend concisely the [colonial troops’] identity and feelings of loyalty’.82 
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We simply do not have the ego documents, nor were their white officers (and the 
colonial authorities) much interested in indigenous fates or motivations. Existing 
evidence strongly hints at the possibility that ties that have been interpreted as 
loyalty towards the colonial state were severely porous. A British memorandum 
on the First World War in Africa noted that ‘some of the best and the most useful 
soldiers in the German service [came from] the [King’s African Rifles]...Conversely, 
in 1918 the new battalion of the K.A.R. included considerable numbers of ex-
German Askaris who had [...] enlisted freely on our side’.83 Askaris themselves 
admitted that loyalty was not a factor in their behaviour a priori. ‘We fight’, one 
Askari said, ‘because the whites tell us to fight. They are the boss [Herren]. Today 
we fight for the Germans, and when tomorrow the British arrive, then we will 
fight for them.84 General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, the Askari commander, 
acknowledged how shifting power-relations influenced loyalty when he asserted 
that ‘[t]he native has a good feeling for when true power [die wirkliche Macht] goes 
from one hand to the other’.85  
 How may this evidence be interpreted? As we have seen, something bound 
indigenous forces to the colonial state and made them perform their duties. If it 
was not loyalty an alternative link must have bound indigenous peoples to the 
colonial administration and its security forces.  
 This research project proposes such an alternative. Instead of ‘loyalty’, it 
will use the formation of alliances to describe the relationships between the 
colonial state, indigenous elites, colonial armies and police constables—and with 
their wider social surroundings. At first sight, alliances constitute a weak 
alternative to loyalties. Kalyvas holds that there is ‘extreme confusion’ in coming 
to grips with popular support either for incumbent regimes and insurgents. There 
is a ‘gap’ between the ‘attitudinal stance’, i.e. popular support in terms of ‘an 
attitude, preference, or allegiance’, and an approach that stresses ‘behavior or 
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action’.86 Ultimately, he dismisses both approaches, saying that the attitudinal 
stances are hardly measurable as ‘preferences are open to manipulations and 
falsification’. Behavioural patterns are similarly elusive on account of being 
‘difficult to observe’ in civil wars.87  
 Yet, what then bound different parties? The argument here proposes that 
an alliance still is the best predicate for what tied one party to the other exactly 
because they were open to manipulations. Colonial power-brokers could coerce 
indigenous communities into siding with them.88 Conversely, the latter tried to 
reduce asymmetries within the relationship and retain a modicum of room for 
manoeuvrability. Regarding this manoeuvrability and instead of interpreting an 
alliance as a fixed preference, alliances—in a non-essentialist way—are assumed 
to have rather flexible and malleable characteristics. Indeed, this is what Kalyvas 
himself hints at when he states that attitudinal preferences can be manipulated: 
he proposes that ‘it is not necessary to assume stable preferences’; ‘There is a 
dynamic dimension to support’.89  
 This is what alliances embody if we assume they are flexible and not 
formal. However, if preferences might be used, why not ‘loyalty’? To begin with, 
the nature of loyalty is too deterministic. It is heavily associated with devotion, 
obedience and dedication—strong emotions that seem inflexible and possibly 
entrenched.90 Such strong ties do not stroke with the evidence presented above. 
Although alliances are related to a modicum of loyalty, the former refers to a 
‘union or association formed for mutual benefit […] based on similarity of 
interest’.91 Alliances will last only as long as parties’ interests converge. When 
they cease to do so, relationships are no longer useful and become unstable; the 
alliance will be broken.  
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The focus on interests within alliances serves multiple purposes. Its fluidity 
allows for several nodes of identification within the minds of those who, despite 
being socially separated from their communities, still interacted with these 
communities in their capacity as colonial enforcers. The objectives of the colonial 
state may not produce the results most sought after by those subjected to the 
former’s actions and vice versa. It was up to those within those security forces to 
navigate between these extremes. Furthermore, alliances and how they are 
made—through a mutual recognition of benefits—restore a certain measure of 
choice into the repertoire of what are, generally speaking, colonial subjects. 
Through the negotiations that are part and parcel of alliances, modes of 
cooperation and resistance to colonial domination can be made visible. Loyalty, 
conversely, leaves much less scope for opposition. Instead, ascribing loyalty to 
indigenous communities obscures their agency. Lastly, alliance-brokering brings 
to light that the European and indigenous agents of the colonial state also had to 
negotiate. Whereas thinking in terms of loyalty hides this—the colonial state 
could simply demand loyalty and the behaviour it implied—the mutual benefits-
cum-alliance approach would demand that the bartering tendencies of the 
colonial governments be analysed as well.  
Another vital property of alliances is that, by their inherent dependency on 
partners sharing interests and benefits, they give both internal and external 
factors the weight they deserve in terms of their bearing upon the stability of the 
alliance in a way loyalty does not. Loyalty largely negates undermining influences 
as it is built upon compliance that borders on obsequiousness. The undermining 
factors our overall argument hinges on, such as violent rivalries, poverty, kinship 
networks or egotism, were brought into the open by warfare. The Japanese 
occupation and the wars of decolonization in the Netherlands East Indies (1945-
1950) and British Malaya (1948-1957) completely changed the way the two 
colonies functioned. Prior to the violent contestation of Indonesia and Malaysia, 
the colonial rulers had, by and large, become the only true power-brokers. The 
conduct of security forces, political elites and the masses, under such 
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circumstances, was unproblematic. There were simply no serious anti-colonial 
forces active that could realistically undermine colonial rule to such an extent 
that colonial conscripts had to choose between various identities. In relation to 
the security forces, for example, officers had ample time to instil the ever-
important esprit de corps into the troops, supported by the trappings of the 
‘martial races’ policies.  
 The onset of a serious threat to the colonial space as a whole, such as 
developed in post-World War Two Malaysia and Indonesia, destroyed all this. 
Both in Indonesia and Malaysia, the Japanese Occupation had torn the lid from 
the depository of grievances that had accumulated over centuries. Enough people 
shared these grievances and proved willing to openly challenge the Dutch and 
British that they opened the door to ‘multiple sovereignty’. Action-minded 
individuals coalesced around the widely-held grudges, found each other, 
organized and eventually ‘[advanced] alternative claims to the control of the 
government’.92 Decolonization war ensued. As a consequence, colonial officials 
could not unequivocally trust indigenous security forces any longer. The same 
applied to the carefully-cultivated indigenous elites.  
 A major argument that will be developed below and advanced throughout is 
that the more the anti-colonial forces proved capable of undermining the colonial 
state, the more they could influence the choices of indigenous elites and enforcers 
alike. In gaining strength and developing their ability to determine the fate of the 
colonial state under duress, anti-colonial forces spoke to those who worked for 
either the Dutch or the British. The latter group was then forced to ponder and 
understand two interrelated things. On the one hand, that their interests would 
not necessarily be looked after by a continued support for the colonial 
authorities. In fact, such a course might prove extremely dangerous. On the other 
hand, they needed to signal to the representatives of the forces aligned against 
the British and the Dutch that they would switch sides or at least show their 
willingness to do so. All the while, there was a constant struggle—within and 
                                                 




without—between the saliency of different identifications: with what the colonial 
regime had to offer, with what its opponents wanted and, lastly, with the need for 
survival and security of those who were subjected to the colonial and anti-colonial 
force-fields. Ultimately, survival depended on the ability of people to play power-
brokers off against each other.  
   
Participation in colonial conflict  
Why do parties to conflict seek ‘asylum’ with others? In this section, the topic is 
the actual alliance-brokering. Relying largely on interpretations of political 
scientists on civil war, violence and counterinsurgency, the most salient reasons 
for joining an alliance will be reviewed. However, since alliance-formation also has 
bearing on individuals—especially as side-switching was often an individual 
choice—personal motivations for rebellion and fighting for the side of incumbent 
government forces shall be considered is well. 
 The first element to note is that power-holders, by their presence, make 
alliances with them seem logical and advantageous. In searching for prospective 
alliance partners, groups or individuals try to determine which party to a given 
conflict is worth joining (or abandoning) based on how they estimate a party’s 
chances of winning consecutive battles and, ultimately, the war. As they do so 
with imperfect information, the distribution of power between different parties—
as it presents itself—becomes an important determinant in choosing sides. For 
the decolonization wars under consideration, this means the following. There 
where one party controlled a territory (i.e. government forces control a group of 
villages) it is quite apparent that this party (for the time being) constitutes the 
safest and therefore obvious alliance-partner.93 When this is the case, alliance-
formation becomes less costly. Government and insurgent forces can set to work 
recruiting people, for example by using friendship or kinship networks.94 
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 The choice becomes complicated when power relations are more balanced 
relative to each other: ‘in these conflicts small changes in a single group’s relative 
power can significantly alter the incentives of other groups to align with it or 
against it’.95 In more platitudinous phrasing, ‘[g]aining control over an area brings 
collaboration, and losing control of an area brings much of that collaboration to 
an end.’ Territorial control and possession remove any possible alternatives in 
terms of alliance-seeking. Actively supporting one group while its representatives 
are not controlling a given territory under such circumstances brings high 
communal and individual costs for whomever actively expounds the virtues of the 
absent group at the hands of the group that does control the area. Second, with 
one party in firm control of an area, its security forces provide the only viable 
avenue for support or livelihood.96 Furthermore, ‘long-lasting control spawns 
robust informational’ policies, meaning that the incumbent power-holder has 
ample time to ‘socialize populations’ to the merits of its presence, for example 
through continued propaganda in favour of its cause.97 Sustained ‘control signals 
credibility’.98 Another function of control in relation to alliance-forging was that it 
brought means of affective manipulation and force projection together in the 
hands of those controlling an area. Although ‘race, language, religion, or ideology 
do not appear to guarantee in any enduring way the formation of alliances’—
identity narratives do not truly influence alliance choices—‘local elites can make 
[…] instrumental use of [these] identity discourses’ to enforce cooperation by 
triggering the ‘psychological and emotional’ reflexes such identities occasion 
within the population or the rank and file.99 Alliance-formation is connected to 
‘relative power’ and not necessarily to identities, yet emotions can become 
‘socially meaningful’ nonetheless. When individuals or communities feel a ‘loss of 
dignity, value, safety or agency and a subsequent inability to 
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flourish...expressions of this pain may come to occupy a central place in the 
language and the practices of a culture’. These experiences of subjugation and 
suffering can, at a certain juncture in time and place, ‘find expression in the 
world of political action’.100  
 It can be argued that the Indonesian and Malaysian revolutions gained 
traction among the population as it did because the Japanese occupation had 
finally given people the possibility to vent the pent-up hurt and grief caused by 
colonial domination—including the Japanese occupation. The Dutch and British 
had systematically closed off most avenues to given expression to these emotions. 
When both territories were aggressively gripped by a breakdown of law and order, 
these negative emotions were transformed into (violent) action by the various 
communities that now had the opportunity to act out to look after their safety 
and advance certain interests. It is for the major anti-colonial contenders and 
power-holders—but also the returning colonial authorities—to harness these 
negative emotions of communities and individuals. ‘[T]here is always a large 
amount of popular frustration and discontent ready to be tapped’; ensnaring this 
anger ‘is a key way of attracting supporters’. Emotions ingrained prior to the 
actual onset of the decolonization wars, however, should not be accorded too 
much weight. As Fearon and Laitin have shown, grievances such as inequality 
and the lack of political rights were not vital to the onset of civil wars, but they 
could be manipulated.101  
 Affective manipulation certainly did not harm control or alliance-seeking, 
especially combined with violence directed at civilians. Territorial domination, 
seen as such, provides the power-holders another means to establish 
cooperation: it allows them to forge ‘an emotional connection with supporters’.102 
The influencing of emotions and the attempts to monopolize them ties in with 
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coercive methods used to have people choose sides. Troops representing either 
the government or the powers that oppose it can apply violence to cow 
populations into cooperation.103 Fear is the overriding emotion invoked through 
coercion.104 Fear-inducing terror causes ‘pessimistic estimates and risk-averse 
choices’.105 This is exactly what the agents of coercion are after. They need 
compliance and inaction, or forced neutrality, through tacit agreement to an 
alliance. Government forces will not hesitate to apply force. ‘[T]hrough [their] use 
of propaganda, […] tactics of arrests, incarceration, and interrogation[,] and its 
strategic placement of informers’ they enforce cooperation.106 Insurgents, too, will 
not shy away from violence against civilians, employing similar tactics. It is 
striking that the traditional counterinsurgency literature stresses that the 
protection of the population has been paramount for both insurgents and 
counter-insurgents, but given their proclivity for violence, visiting seemingly 
indiscriminate violence upon populations had its own merits. Through means of 
violent excess, perpetrators signal to their victims that rival actors cannot protect 
them. By this twisted logic, victims are better off siding with those who have 
attacked them.107  
 With this logic of violence in place in connection to territorial control, 
rivalry and affective influencing, we come to what is considered here the 
overriding concern in alliance forming and breaking: the pursuit of safety. 
Whatever power controls an area and no matter how beneficial it is perceived to 
be, safety will eventually override most other considerations. It becomes key.108 
Unfortunately for both colonial authorities and the insurgents, the pursuit for 
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safety did not cause loyalty; merely temporary alliances—which would never 
become truly stable or lasting. For, as incumbents and challengers fought for 
dominance through violence, coercion and occupation, they created specific 
motivations for joining either side, depending on who was in control where and at 
what time. Violence would initially force communities into declaring support. 
‘[P]otential supporters will join the movement in pursuit of protection from 
random punishment by the state’. Or, rebels could redistribute benefits to joiners 
that otherwise would have been distributed by the state.109 Both incumbents and 
insurgents, in any case, made ‘free-riding’, or attempts to avoid involvement on 
either side, so costly that true neutrality was as elusive as loyalty.110 For those in 
the colonial security forces, a similar interaction was at work. They joined up for 
several reasons: protection from violent insurgent excess (the free rider problem), 
because others in their social networks had already done so, opportunities to 
survive social and economic hardships connected to war, such as hunger and 
poverty, through tax breaks and looting, robbery, racketeering, or extortion.111 
The Home Guards who fought with the British during the Mau Mau rebellion in 
Kenya (1952-1964) did not receive any pecuniary rewards for their pacification 
work, for example, but earned schooling for their children.112  
 At first glance, then, violence, coercion and force could overcome the 
collective action problem and have populations rally to a specific flag. Yet, 
benefits offered by the incumbent power-broker or its competitors will eventually 
diminish sharply as violence becomes more intensive and sustained warfare 
begins to cause ‘a rise in poverty and a reduction of goods available for 
distribution’.113 Civilians and supporters of either side become tired of war: 
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connections and alliances that seemed profitable one way or the other hold less 
and less promise. Instead of addressing the security dilemma for civilians—
determining for them which ‘neighbour[ing] group’ posed a threat to them—
government and insurgent forces created a population that catered to multiple 
power-brokers simultaneously.114 Examples of this are rife across a wide range of 
conflicts. In Mozambique ‘the villagers had little option but to meet the demands 
of each passing group as best they could’. In Nigeria during the Biafran War, in 
Vietnam, Chechnya and Darfur civilians came forth with similar evidence.115 In 
conflicts, only a very small portion of the population was actually ‘actively 
involved in civil wars, either as fighters or supporters’, to begin with.116 As most 
ordinary people tried to maximize their chances of survival—and hopefully to 
further their interests—individuals and the communities they belonged to had to 
construct new or multiple relationships. Different parties to conflict could provide 
them with safety, and it is ‘[t]he most important collective good’ any one of them 
could offer.117 The ability to protect did never translate into true support. Support 
was ‘transitory’ or ‘coerced’; populations were pushed and pulled between two 
parties vying for their attention. In the Ixil towns of Guatemala—‘by reputation at 
least the heart of guerrilla support and resistance to the army’—the population 
did not prove loyal to either the government or to the insurgents of the Ejército 
Guerrillero de los Pobres, The Guerrilla Army of the Poor. Rather, ostensible 
declarations of cooperation ‘were [occasioned by] “the coercive pressures created 
by the blows and counterblows of two military forces, a dilemma [people] typically 
describe as being entre dos fuegos”’.118  
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 Those in the security forces faced a similar dilemma. Although they were 
part of one of the ‘fires’ that burnt civilians, they sought to further their own 
security-related interests as well. Although some enforces in the colonial security 
forces stayed the duration of the conflict—the Algerian Harkis for example—many 
of their number had to serve two masters as well, playing off their own interests 
against those of the colonial government and those of the insurgents. The Kikuyu 
Home Guards again serve as a good case in point. They used the war to settle 
personal scores or earn land distributed by the colonial authorities.119 On 
account of their loyalist stance and the fact that the Mau Mau insurgents were 
defeated, the Home Guard in Kenya and the indigenous political elite they 
represented found legitimization for their stance against the Mau Mau already 
during the decolonization process and especially after independence. They 
inherited Kenya from the British.120 Others who fought on the colonial 
authorities’ side were not so lucky. As their fates had been bound up with the 
fortunes of said authorities, changes in the balance of power affected them 
deeply, either because the colonial authorities lost control over the war or 
because colonial enforcers and civilians operated in heavily contested areas. Such 
sudden changes in the balance of power—on a micro and macro level—forced 
them to rethink where their alliance lay. To maximize their chances of survival, 
they either had to switch sides continually, or, when the control over an area 
changed hands quite clearly, they had to find ways to unequivocally and 
permanently switch. Warfare necessitated social exchange and alliance-
formation.121 War can, then, be interpreted as a ‘complex reconfiguration of 
social, economic, cultural, and political conditions that warscape inhabitants 
confront and contend with in plotting and implementing their everyday social 
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existence’.122 As we shall see, this was not only the object of the colonial 
authorities through an array of coercive and inducement tactics, but also of some 
communities themselves. In this sense, working for either the government or its 
opponents and participating in violence on their part became an affirmation of 
life; violence was a means to creating and reifying identities and boundaries.123 It 
was these people who had to serve two masters; this research is about them and 
the forces that animated their alliance-seeking behaviour.  
 
Alliance-formation in the colonial defence of Indonesia and Malaysia 
The overall argument, then, is that if loyalty did not exist there is a need for an 
alternative element that bound different groups together during conflict. I propose 
to use alliances as a tool to better understand the complexities of taking and 
switching sides. Alliances imply that civilians, local elites and members of 
indigenous security forces at one time or another had to declare support to one of 
the parties engaged in conflict with each other. These alliances might have been 
sustained over longer periods of time, such as those between local elites and the 
colonial state, but that when power shifted in favour of one party to the conflict 
(again this might be temporary, such as the occupation of a village by insurgents, 
or for a much longer period, such as the domination of political life by the 
colonial authorities) support shifted. Support, overall, was fluent and could be 
directed at multiple agents simultaneously, depending on which party could 
provide with safety and security most efficiently. As soon as the interests of the 
alliance-partners diverged (either from internal or external pressures), the 
alliance became untenable.  
 To apply the above to the decolonization of the Netherlands East Indies and 
British Malaya has several implications. Understanding the complexities that 
were connected to alliance-seeking and the shifting of the weight of war and 
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violence will allow for an important shift in the reading of the process of 
decolonization concerning the two case studies. This is timely. Retracing why 
certain communities or elites supported Dutch or British authorities at one point, 
but retracted that support (or were pusillanimous about it) at another, will give 
important insights into the vicissitudes and temporization of the decolonization 
wars themselves. Alliance-shifts furthermore highlight local agency. Especially 
this latter effect has been absent from the literature, even though the search for 
agency has gained much attention in other cases. Daniel Branch, for example, by 
highlighting the role of ‘loyalists’ who sided with the British, has convincingly 
concluded that ‘the Mau Mau war was no simple dispute between colonizer and 
colonized’. Individuals and communities other than the group termed ‘colonizers’ 
had interests in the Mau Mar War that did not dovetail with those of the British. 
These interests proved so vested, however, that those chasing them were willing 
to risk being associated with the violent excess of decolonization warfare by 
fighting on the British side nonetheless. Indigenous communities used the British 
to secure their own interests.124  
 Recent analyses of Indonesia’s war for independence likewise show little 
attention to such insights. They are dominated by a certain preponderance of the 
diplomatic manoeuvrings between and of the Dutch government in The Hague, 
the colonial authorities in Batavia (Jakarta) and the Republic of Indonesia as 
personified by Sukarno, Sutan Sjahrir or Mohammad Hatta.125 Other historians 
have stressed the heavy-handed and aggressive way in which Dutch policy 
makers continued to believe in purely military means—embodied by two ‘Police 
Actions’ in July 1947 and December 1948—to steer decolonization in what they 
perceived to be the right direction. Related to that, much attention has been given 
to how military officers tried to impose their will on civil administration by on 
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administrative territories. These practices severely undercut international support 
for the Dutch.126  
 Relatively little analytical attention, however, has been devoted to the 
overall security situation during the entire time-frame in which decolonization 
took place. This is somewhat striking, as it has been determined some time ago 
that the Dutch had established a ‘state of violence’ that functioned on the 
continued threat of aggression.127 The guerrilla war unleashed against the Dutch 
apparently reinforced the idea that the ramifications of such a state were needed. 
The Dutch could now finally realize ‘a drastic reinforcement of a security 
apparatus which, in earlier times, had been unnecessary or unaffordable’.128 I 
believe it is in the context of the ever-changing levels of security across Java and 
Sumatra that alliance-seeking and breaking occurred most saliently. Most 
research on the decolonization of Indonesia, however, has placed the emphasis 
the action of policy makers at the highest tiers of administrative and military 
establishments, diverting attention away from rural areas.129  
 Research on the Malayan Emergency—like the Dutch Police Action, horribly 
euphemistic in its nomenclature—shows a different tendency which equally 
obscures local interests and agency. As the handling of the Malayan Emergency 
‘is often admiringly cited by Anglophone counterinsurgents as a model to be 
emulated’, its historiography is not overtly focussed on the diplomatic-political 
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side as is the Dutch case—possibly because the Malayan Emergency was never 
fought as ‘publicly’.130 The Emergency was, indeed, more an internal question. 
Nor have historians focussed too much on military matters alone. The British 
approach was fêted exactly because military and civil authorities worked together 
so closely. This fact is reflected in the Emergency’s historiography.  
 However, it cannot be said that this acknowledgement has necessarily 
produced even analyses. Richard Stubbs’s Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: 
The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960 espoused a powerful and therefore lingering 
interpretation that cemented the Emergency as a counterinsurgency operation to 
be studied and emulated. Stubbs managed to sanitize much of the Emergency’s 
violent nature. Despite being a far cry from other, more semi-propagandistic 
literature such as The Password is Love: Inside the New Villages of Malaya—
about projecting the word of god to the New Villages into which Malaysia’s 
Chinese communities were corralled—Stubbs’s reading of these New Villages was  
optimistic.131 Although he acknowledged initial hardships, he came to echo the 
sentiments of earlier interpreters who, writing during the Emergency itself, 
claimed that these villages were sites where people could enjoy ‘supplies of clean 
water, [education in proper] schools, community centres, basic medical care, 
[and] some agricultural land’.132 
 The backlash against the belief in the hearts and minds approach, as 
propagated by Stubbs, has not been too even. From a military perspective, the 
‘myth of British minimum force’ has by now been exposed: ‘alongside the failure 
to practice minimum force in British small wars’ one scholar notes, ‘there is [a] 
total absence of the principle of minimum force from official British guidelines’.133 
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Contemporary scholarship has dramatically re-interpreted the objectives 
associated with the resettlement programs deployed in Malaya (and elsewhere). 
New Villages were, according to them, social engineering factories where 
compliant populations were constructed surrounded by barbed wire and 
subjected to collective punishments.134 These revisionist histories have caused a 
shift in focus towards the violent and coercive, but have not looked too well at 
who were employing the coercive methods that turned violence so often and why 
they chose to cooperate. On another level, domination of coercive or violent 
tactics took away from more incentive approaches.135  
 The turn to the violent in colonial counterinsurgency studies, it can be 
argued, has its own pitfalls. According to Karl Hack, senior scholar on the 
Malayan Emergency, another frame of reference is needed; one that accords 
weight to incentive-based, civic actions programs and coercive methods 
simultaneously. With the adoption of such a point of departure, two important 
facts come into focus. First, inducement and coercion are two sides of the same 
coin. Secondly, violence was not applied in equal measures spatially and 
temporally.136 As I have argued elsewhere, however, this is not enough. One more 
element is needed, which is local agency: individuals and communities within the 
contested colonial spaces of Indonesia and Malaysia that were willing to side with 
the government or the insurgents.137  
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 Here we encounter another line of inquiry for the present research project. 
Was the influence of those willing to side with either the government’s security 
forces, those of the insurgents or with both—‘collaborators’, ‘supporters, or 
‘loyalists’—large enough to be able incumbent or rivals’ to conclude the war in 
their favour? In the least I will show that for local elites and individuals seeking 
security and safety, changes in relative power-positions necessitated shifts in 
alliance. Either these were full shifts or partial shifts; whatever was needed to 
signal to the other party that support might be forthcoming or possibly readily 
given. True loyalty or support did not exist; people were reluctant loyalists or 
‘reluctant guerrillas’.138 
 Lastly, alliance-brokering generated its own violence on multiple levels. 
Security personnel working for the colonial regime were highly visible, as they 
functioned among the people and the insurgents. The same applies to those 
associated with indigenous elites that had thrown in their lot with either the 
Dutch or the British. It is therefore that they were heavily targeted. A third group 
stood out much less; they were the local communities that the agents of 
colonialism looked to for intelligence. These people—peasants, labourers, 
salesmen, smallholders or rubber tappers—themselves were not necessarily 
connected to colonial restoration or counterinsurgency, but were targeted 
nonetheless: in Indonesia and Malaya, insurgents and colonial security forces 
actively sought to suppress and break up real and imagined spy rings. These 
three groups of ‘collaborators’, then, had to cater to both sides of the conflict. 
However, as they were violently targeted, feelings of revenge were engendered and 
with the help of the means given to them the colonial states, they could retaliate. 
This connects with the fact that grievances that drive civil war, such as political 
or economic deprivation, do not necessarily have to originate before the onset of 
war.139  
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 The reverse applied to the insurgents. They were targeted for their 
participation in anti-governmental operations and great force was brought to bear 
on them. When this reached the point of becoming too much, they began to offer 
themselves to the stronger party in the hope of being allowed to re-enter political 
life under the colonial regime. Often, they bought their way back in with blood. 
Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP) in Malaya did so. As such, localized alliance-
formation and its effects tie in with recent research on how local conflicts take 
place within larger ones.140 Guerrilla conflict affected how high-level (military) 
policy was expounded on the ground; different local dynamics influenced 
implementation differently in various locations.141 Colonial governments could 
use these local tensions to their advantage, yet so could the insurgents.  
 
Comparisons and processes  
‘In comparative history’, write Kocka and Haupt, ‘two or more historical 
phenomena are systematically studied for similarities and differences in order to 
contribute to their better description, explanation, and interpretation’.142 The 
present study has this very objective. With a focus on micro and macro-level and 
temporary and sustained alliance-formation in British Malaya and the 
Netherlands East Indies during revolutionary (decolonization) warfare, it hopes to 
generate further understanding of the ‘general patterns’ of the complexities 
connected to alliance-seeking, making and breaking; termed as ‘the 
“universalising type” of historical comparison’.143  
 Methodologically, comparing the Indonesian case with Malaysia will bring 
to light issues that would otherwise have been obscured. As seen above, the 
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Dutch handling of the decolonization of Indonesia has been criticized heavily for 
its violent characteristics. Instead of reading the changing tides, Dutch policy 
makers relied on aggression to impose their version of independence. Conversely, 
the British case stands out as a ‘successful’ case of counterinsurgency, hearts 
and minds programs and transfer of power. Through a comparison of the two 
cases, however, a more nuanced picture shall come to light. Despite Dutch heavy-
handedness and forceful ways, they were not necessarily and unequivocally set 
against power-sharing with local elites. The Dutch did attract others to their 
cause.  
 Furthermore, the British in Malaya did not shun violent tactics themselves. 
This latter insight has become more accepted as different scholars have made this 
point with regards to the British Empire, but the comparison with Indonesia will 
underline that the propensity for escalation also held across different empires.144 
If that is the case, then the Malayan Emergency’s successful conclusion must 
have been due to different causes than simply a better understanding of 
counterinsurgency fighting or more effective methods of attracting supporters. I 
will argue, therefore, that both the Dutch and the British had force and coercion 
as a major component in their attempts to stem the anti-colonial tides. In other 
words, the comparison will prove—based on the questions asked in the analysis—
that nor in Indonesia, nor in Malaysia most hearts and minds were won. 
Violence—for all parties involved—was the mobilizational tool.  
 Related to the question of violence, the comparison will illuminate yet more. 
For example, in 2014 one scholar claimed that excesses or, worse, war crimes 
committed by Dutch War Volunteers—with an original core consisting of 
resistance fighters—in 1946 and beyond in Indonesia could be attributed to the 
brutalizing effects of the German occupation of the Netherlands.145 This neat 
explanation, however, does not necessarily hold up when compared to Malaysia: 
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there, too, excess took place; perpetrated by soldiers who had not felt oppressive 
German occupation. As we shall see, in both Indonesia and Malaysia, the need to 
quell resistance allowed for the registers of violence to be opened without much 
reserve. Furthermore, by treating the Emergency and the Indonesian Question—
as it was called—as equals in relation to the intensity of violence, we can give the 
lie to those who claim that after the Malayan Communist Party’s insurgency had 
run its course, lower numbers of violent incidents led to safety, co-operation with 
the government and trustworthy security forces. By placing Malaysia and 
Indonesia under the same comparative lens of violence, lastly, strengthens our 
case that individuals actively chose to participate in violence in the name of a 
foreign oppressor against their fellow-countrymen and women. They surely had 
motives for doing so.  
 Another yield of the comparative framework is that it shows how similar 
contexts could explain divergent phenomena. Whereas the Sundanese leadership, 
gathered in the Partai Rakyat Pasundan, could ostensibly count on an ethnically 
homogeneous constituency for support, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) 
had to try and bring divided Chinese communities closer together. Once the 
leadership of the MCA had penetrated Chinese society down to the district and 
village levels the association would not be dislodged again. In stark contrast, the 
Negara Pasundan never functioned properly. Such differences, however, lose 
some significance when they are placed in the comparative framework; we see 
that the mechanisms that brought the PRP, the MCA and the colonial 
governments into alliance with each other are rather similar.  
 A second, closely-related function of the comparison lies with the fact that 
it may yield ‘a clear profile to individual cases […] that only become[s] visible in 
comparison’.146 In other words, by comparing Indonesia and Malaysia, 
characteristics that seem connected to all counterinsurgencies or violent 
decolonization may turn out to be specific to either the Indonesian or the 
Malaysian case. The most obvious example here is the kind of violence the British 
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and Dutch perpetrated on communities they did not trust. In both territories 
violence was definitely used to separate possible friends from certain foes. From a 
distance, this violence was applied indiscriminately on both sides of the Strait of 
Malacca. A closer inspection of the New Villages—into which suspect Chinese 
communities were relocated—in Malaya alters this image. We certainly still see 
indiscriminate violence being exerted on these villages, but the 
indiscriminateness was of a lower order than in Indonesia, where the Dutch 
experienced far more trouble distinguishing friend from foe. This is a major point, 
however, as it explains how villagization in Malaya severely impacted the 
communist insurgents’ chances of success. All in all, the proposed comparison 
will not compare nations that are often the object in comparative histories. 
Rather, localities within the colonial territories and between them figure nodes of 
comparison.  
 Seen in this light, the comparison between the immediate post World War II 
conflicts in Indonesia and Malaysia is important in the context of 
counterinsurgency research in general. To begin with, the Indonesian war for 
independence is often insularly studied in an insulated fashion. It is often 
referred to as being dominated by violent excess. Relatively little is known on how 
this conflict compares with against others of its kind. Placing the Indonesian war 
for independence and the Malayan Emergency within the same framework of 
analysis, in this respect, is an obvious choice. ‘Malaya’ stands as out as the 
successful counterinsurgency effort, whereas the Indonesian case does not. This 
given alone may yield two insights. One is that even those counterinsurgency 
programs that were implemented one-sidedly—i.e. with little regard for the 
population, focussed on coercion and without much flexibility—needed some form 
of engagement with indigenous communities and power-brokers to work. 
Comparing Malaya to the Netherlands East Indies, then, reduces the supposedly 
stark contrast between violent, one-sided decolonization (Indonesia) and more 
even-handed and balanced decolonization (Malaya). This would not be so 
apparent if, for example, the Indonesian case were compared to the Boer War—
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where the British, like the Dutch in Indonesia, did relatively little to engage with 
the Boers who were not fighting the war—or the fight against Mau Mau in Kenya, 
another very violent conflict.147 Possibly the British Army was not so successful 
after all in all facets of counterinsurgency, a point others have seem to have 
wanted to gloss over.148 Second, the comparison shows that Malaysia may have 
been more violent not only assumed in terms of British decolonization, but that 
this was also the case in terms of decolonization elsewhere.  
 Lastly, recent literature has pointed out the need to accommodate the fact 
that there is no neat divide between the insurgents and the population, despite 
the continued insistence in counterinsurgency manuals that this is the case.149 
Put differently, supposedly dividing the insurgents from the population is 
eminently possible, as evidenced from the massive efforts throughout 
counterinsurgency history put into resettlement programs. Many scholarly works 
on the Malayan Emergency accept this logic at face value. They seem to argue 
from a perspective that there were, in fact, heterogeneous groups that could be 
locked away and separated from the insurgents. Or that those who accepted 
some form of alliance to the British authorities, such as the Malayan Chinese 
Association, were all squarely on the side of the British. This has a distorting 
effect. The present research seeks to correct this view. By comparing Malaya to 
Indonesia, were at some point in 1949 no less than four different parties vied for 
territory and popular support and, in addition, all interacted with each other 
through different alliances, it shall become clear that in Malaya, too, there were 
no neat groups of people to use as monolithic analytical nodes.  
 Further points also merit a comparative framework that incorporates 
British Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. In both territories, the Chinese were 
very much distrusted for their possible connection to communism in general and 
the Chinese Communist Party that took over China in 1949 specifically. The 
                                                 
147 The number of detainees in Kenya, in absolute numbers was more than seven times higher than in Malaya. In terms 
of overall civilian and insurgent casualties, Kenya tops the list. French, The British Way, 111, 113. 
148 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
149 Gurman, Hearts and Minds, 9. 
63 
 
British with the Malay rulers felt a constant threat from China; they feared that, 
like Japan had done earlier, Chinese forces may come down into Malaya. 
Conversely, the MCP never forgot to remind the Malay and British rulers of this 
possibility; MCP functionaries very much used the Chinese threat as a 
propaganda tool to influence British policies but also to recruit cadre.  
 In Indonesia, the threat of communism from China came only in the last 
year of the conflict. The battle for China that preceded the Chinese Communist 
Party take-over, however, did have bearing on the Indonesian war for 
independence, but the real threat proved internal. The Republic saw (and found) 
communist fifth columns everywhere on Java, trying to undermine its influence. 
The Chinese came under violent attack because of it which, as said before, played 
into Dutch hands. In the Netherlands East Indies, communism functioned on 
another level as well. It split various warring groups into yet smaller groups. 
Republican parties and forces were constantly under threat from individuals who 
together tried to turn the groups they belonged to unto communism. This was 
reflected, for example, in the fact that the Republic could no longer trust its own 
troops. The Madiun Affair—a 1948 communist uprising centred around Madiun, 
East Java—was beaten down with relative ease by Republican troops. 
Nonetheless, communist influences lived on within different fighting 
organizations, supposedly loyal to the Republic. This lead to extensive 
reconfiguring of parties and warring factions that constantly had to renegotiate 
their own position vis-à-vis each other, the Republic and the Netherlands. 
Communism, then, either real or imagined, was seen as a constant threat to most 
parties involved—not in the least as it occasioned many alliance-seeking efforts. It 
will loom large in this study because of it.  
 On a less analytical plane, comparing the war for independence in 
Indonesia to the one in Malaysia makes sense for rather straightforward reasons. 
The contours of both conflicts enmesh on some important issues that fed both 
insurgencies. Ethnic diversities in both territories shaped what course the 
Malayan Emergency took. The Malayan Communist Party that directed the 
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insurgency catered mostly to the Chinese population. This gave the British 
authorities the opportunity to focus their attentions on the same demographic 
group. At various times, both the MCP and the British could use Sino-Malay 
tensions to their advantage.150 Malays, for example, were quite keen to fight the 
Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist Party.  
 Dutch authorities and their opponents, who ostensibly gathered under the 
banner of the Republic Indonesia, gambled on similar stakes. The Dutch tried to 
foster antagonisms between the estimated ten million Sundanese of West Java 
and the Javanese-dominated Republic. Simultaneously, the Dutch exploited 
Chinese fears of being isolated and destroyed as a community in Indonesia.151 
Vast, open spaces in both territories reflected, furthermore, how the Malaysian 
and Indonesian economies were set up. Minerals and oil were extracted from the 
soil by big mining operations, while the colonial agricultural sector demanded 
large, centrally-owned plantations for the production of rubber, rice and sugar 
cane, populated by large, indigenous work forces. The isolation of the plantations 
and mines, with their spread-out villages and enormous gardens, greatly 
facilitated infiltration. The vastness of both territories, the vulnerability of villages 
and the relative ease with which insurgents could initially move which made 
fighting both uprisings such costly affairs. These shared characteristics dictated 
some of the countermeasures civil and military colonial authorities took in both 
territories. 
 Any study on decolonization wars and counterinsurgency should address 
the issue of state-formation. As Charles Tilly has it, ‘[w]ar makes states’; meaning 
that ‘institutes of organized violence have always [...] ultimately been made to 
serve political interests, and hence to run in tandem with the state-making 
                                                 
150 In 1957, of the 6,275,763 living in the Federation of Malaya, roughly half—3,126,706—were Malaysians. 
2,332,936 were Chinese; Indians counted for 695,986 people. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (London, 
Oxford University Press,1965), 227. 
151 In 1930, Indonesians (Javanese, Ambonese, Menadonese, Sundanese, etc.) counted for 59,138,067 out of a total 
population of 60,727,233. Of that total 1,233,214 were Chinese. Alien Easterners accounted for 115,535. Nederlands 
Interdisciplinair Demografisch Instituut, De Demografische Geschiedenis van Indische Nederlanders (Den Haag: NIDI, 
2002), 25; between 1930 and 1962, no census was held in Indonesia.  
65 
 
process’.152 This was no different in the Netherlands East Indies and British 
Malaya. This study focusses not on all state-formation efforts, but engages with 
the most important. In Malaysia, the Malayan Chinese Association must figure 
centrally. The MCA has been studied before, naturally, but mostly from a long-
term political point of view. Invariably, this meant a heavy emphasis on the way 
the association dealt with Sino-Malay tensions, concomitant class issues and the 
MCA’s role with the United Malays National Organisation-dominated Alliance.153 
How the Emergency itself allowed the MCA ingress into Chinese communities 
while functioning as a counterweight to the Malayan Communist Party, however, 
figures less saliently.154  
 In the case of Indonesia, the Partai Rakyat Pasundan and the subsequent 
Pasundan State of West Java take up a central role. Among the large states that 
rose up through the Dutch attempts at Indonesia’s federalization, the smaller 
autonomous territories, or daerahs, such as the Pasundan, receive less attention. 
The rise and fall of the Pasundan State, however, illuminates some of the most 
pressing issues this study deals with. Like the big federal states, such as East 
Indonesia, the Pasundan State struggled to take up a position in relation to the 
Republic. Arguably, the ambiguities that resulted from this positioning were that 
much more decisive in the Pasundan. Due to its proximity to the Republic’s 
centre of power in Central Java and because the Dutch centre of power lay in the 
heart of the Pasundan State, its contested existence forced the state’s leaders to 
constantly placate the Dutch and the Republicans; never quite ruling themselves.  
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 Now that which characteristics will figure in the comparison has been 
established, it needs to be established what shall be compared. For any 
comparative effort, it is important to bring together nodes of analyses that match, 
either to find correspondence or difference between them.155 The present study is 
concerned with finding ‘distinct patterns’; broadly speaking, the strategic and 
tactical puzzles connected to coping with the violent uncertainties brought on by 
violent insurgencies.156 Alliance-seeking, formation and breaking serve as the 
means to make visible the choices involved in the survival in ever-changing 
circumstances of various groups. The comparative framework applied will focus 
on processes: they illuminate how strategic and tactical choices by actors most 
clearly. 
 The present study uses alliance-formation—informed by violence and 
personal interests—to illuminate some of the repertoires of choices possessed by 
people who have for a long time been ‘devoid of history’.157 Although some have 
claimed that giving attention to the colonized and historically dispossessed 
through Western history-writing methods is ‘suspect’ for being ‘part of a colonial 
endeavour’, others, such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, have recognized that these 
methods are indispensable—if inadequate—for analysing non-European 
societies.158 Therefore, the chapters that follow centralize local actors by applying 
precepts associated with Alltagsgeschichte. A principal component of the history 
of everyday is the ‘return of the individual [and] the […] interest in people with 
names and recognizable faces’.159 Through stringing together various 
microhistories connected to individuals (and communities), the history of 
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everyday is able to capture a glimpse of ‘totality in small form’. In other words, 
the stories and narratives of ‘small people’—that, in a colonial setting, included 
indigenous elites—are made important; not just those of ‘masters’. Instead of the 
trials and tribulations of monolithic, nameless masses, Alltagsgeschichte makes 
recognisable the ‘multiple contours of suffering’ as belonging to individuals and 
communities.160  
 Alltagsgeschichte brings hidden histories to the surface. In Germany, 
historians of the everyday laid bare ‘the extent to which most “average people” 
actually clung to the Nazi regime in their concern to survive’ in a way that 
inquiries that solely traced party members’ belief systems could not do. For the 
present study, making use of some of the aspects and objectives of the everyday 
history approach facilitates the understanding of individuals’ choices and the way 
they coped with and manipulated realities imposed by cultural and violent 
colonialities. If, for example, the history of Indonesian paramilitaries or the New 
Villages had been related from an institutional, policy-driven perspective, both 
may have been termed not unsuccessful. However, with the foregrounding of the 
variations of ‘human social practice’, a specific undercurrent is revealed. 
Individual soldiers or New Villagers pursued their own interests that could oppose 
those of the colonial authorities. The history of everyday helps to trace those 
instances wherein subaltern agency—those of inferior rank (within colonial 
society)—can be discerned, even if subaltern voices are not always clearly 
understood.161  
No methodology is perfect.162 The greater the historical distance between 
observer and the subjects of study, the greater the need of having to rely on 
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‘reconstructions after the fact’ when trying to imagine peasants, labourers or 
colonial enforcers. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that colonial reports 
dealt with people who—due to contemporary restrictions in education, for 
example—have had little chance to speak for themselves. ‘[T]he joys and 
sufferings, longings and worries […] have often left little more than a smudged 
imprint on the material sources that remain, or [were] encoded there in cryptic 
form’.163 Perhaps only interviews can correct the bias of official sources, although 
this notion is not uncontested.164 An associated issue lies with flattening. 
Flattening generally occurs when one leg of a comparative framework is based on 
less primary sources and depends more on ‘the fruits of secondary sources’ than 
the other leg(s).165 Arguably, flattering may lead to attributing to all communities 
and individuals the characteristics and peculiarities that in fact corresponded to 
some or only one community or individual. Arguably the combination of these 
issues stand in the way of a forceful application of a history from below 
perspective.  
The study that follows engages sensibly with the above-mentioned, 
inevitable problems in more ways than one. Throughout the chapters, the weight 
of various microhistories and instances of everyday life—even if lived under 
chaotic, violent circumstances—will be combined to come to balanced appraisals 
and conclusions. An assumption that maintains that all indigenous enforcers 
chased personal, violent interests, for example, will not be made. The object of 
this study, after, is to circumvent essentializing specific groups in ways that 
original sources did not as much as possible. Furthermore, the research has been 
based on as much primary source material as possible in to filter out the most 
instances of local agency and interests. This way, evidentiary lacunas in one set 
of sources connected to the Netherlands East Indies can be offset by proof 
generated by sources pertaining to British Malaya and vice versa.  
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Unfortunately, colonial reporters often displaced instances of everyday 
indigenous life in their analyses. Instead, they focussed on military manoeuvres, 
operational results or described very generally the economic, political, military or 
societal forces that exerted their influence on Indonesian and Malaysian 
populations. Under the best circumstances, people’s particularities were lumped 
together under the rubric of ‘the population’. Interrogation reports were not all 
that common. For the research presented here, this meant that a truly bottom-up 
approach to addressing the questions posed throughout this thesis was not 
attainable. Answers still presented themselves, however. By viewing the available 
everyday occurrences through the alliance framework, the latter gave meaning to 
the microhistories that resulted. The framework did so by making visible the 
interaction between local interests and the very colonial and anti-colonial 
forcefields that opened or closed off specific repertoires of behaviour and choices 
that indigenous individuals and communities could to choose from. With the 
shortcomings of evidence and other limitations in mind, however, no historical 










‘Collaboration is a Very Delicate Concept’: The Negara Pasundan and the 
Malayan Chinese Association1 
After Japan was bombed out of the war and its occupation suddenly ended in 
August 1945, the British and Dutch desperately tried to regain their former 
colonies. They found that nothing had remained the same in the power vacuum 
the Japanese surrender had left in its wake. In Malaysia, the Malayan National 
Liberation Army (MNLA; later the Malayan Races Liberation Army, MRLA), the 
army of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) that had fought a guerrilla war 
against the Japanese with the British Force 136, was causing severe tensions 
between Malays and Chinese. The MNLA/MRLA exited the jungles and took their 
revenge on what they deemed to have been collaborators. They unleashed a reign 
of terror in which common bandits, MRLA fighters but also civilians targeted 
anyone they pleased. Predominantly Malays and Indians were publicly trialled 
and executed.2 Dato Mahmud, one of the Pahang District Officers (DO), reported 
in 1946 that he could not recognize his own district. ‘[T]he Chinese towkays 
[businessmen] are afraid to be seen talking to me, the young Chinese regard me 
with suspicion or even hostility’.3 Malay and Indian populations were likewise 
politically agitated.4 Rather drily the DO concluded: ‘We are going to have a lot of 
trouble with these people in the future’.5 Confronted by the return of the British, 
the Malayan Communist Party, mostly Chinese in its composition, took their 
desire for independence into the vast jungles in 1948. The MCP’s goal was to 
violently recast Malaysia into a Communist state and oust the British through a 
Maoist rebellion.     
                                                 
1 Spoor aan Divisie- en Brigade-Commandanten op Java en Troepencommandanten op Sumatra, Behandeling 
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In the Netherlands East Indies, returning Dutch civil and military 
authorities in 1945 encountered the Republic Indonesia whose leaders had 
declared independence on 17 August. Their message of independence could 
ultimately count on wide-reaching support among the population.6 Initially, it was 
not necessarily the Republic who had filled the power vacuum—it was gradually 
established as a political force. Instead, Indonesian youths proclaimed themselves 
the progenitors of independence. In fact, it was these pemuda—‘the youth pledge’, 
i.e. youths fighting for independence—who had forced Sukarno and his second 
man, Mohammad Hatta, who later was one of the signatories of the transfer of 
sovereignty, into declaring independence in the first place.7 The pemuda turned to 
attacking and looting from Europeans and Eurasians and displacing the 
Indonesian ‘Nationalist Police’ and Japanese troops. Roving youth bands took 
over rice stores and occupied major urban centres such as Surabaya, Bandung, 
Malang and Surakarta.8 Dutch reports spoke of a ‘murder and terror campaign, 
directed at the Dutch’ that had been ‘deliberately planned’.9 Sukarno, who 
supposedly approved of the violence, was now unable to stop the excesses: ‘he 
has to make concessions to the radical leaders’, not in the least to ‘keep his 
military leaders’ allegiance’, claimed one Dutch official acidly.10 As in Malaysia, 
tensions between the Dutch and Indonesians, but also between Indonesians 
themselves, flared up. Hastily constituted KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch 
Leger, or Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) units roamed the streets of 
Batavia. ‘Trigger happy Ambonese started firing [...] close to [their] own barracks’, 
reported a British war diary: ‘it is apparent that the Ambonese are completely 
                                                 
6 Cora DuBois, Social Forces in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 52-53. 
7 Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Jakarta: Equinox 
Publishing, 2006, originally published by Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 74. 
8 Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken (Van Kleffens) en van Overzeese Gebiedsdelen (Logemann) aan Luitenant 
Gouverneur-Generaal (Van Mook), 21 okt. 1945, note 4: Luitenant ter Zee 1e Klas. P. G. de Back aan Mountbatten, 21 
september 1945, NIB 1, 487; Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 129. 
9 On the large-scale murders of Europeans, Indo-Europians and Chinese at the hands of Indonesians, see H. Th. 
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irresponsible and are a danger to the lives and property of all nationalities’.11 In 
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, then, ‘[t]hings are not what they were’. 
The ‘old days’ had definitely passed.12    
 This chapter analyses how the disappearance of the old days necessitated a 
somewhat different approach for the colonial authorities. It will argue that to 
quell political unrest, both in terms of insurgency and constitutional changes, 
colonial subjects became the focal point of civil and military authorities. The 
process at work here is the engagement of local elites: how British and Dutch 
rulers engaged them and tried to use their support to their own benefit. The 
mechanism of direct involvement in indigenous affairs had always been part and 
parcel of the colonial state.13 In 1930s Indonesia, suspect associations were 
banned, news outlets were censored and policemen—ever present—could close 
down meetings when they pleased, to arrest and intern transgressors.14 In a 
reaction to perceived communist ‘revolts’ in West Java of 1926, an internment 
camp was built in New Guinea, called Boven Digoel. A violent place where might 
was right, Sukarno was said to be so afraid of being sent there that he pleaded for 
a pardon with the Dutch in exchange for the discontinuation of his political 
work.15 After the sudden collapse of the Japanese Occupation in August 1945, 
however, colonial agents truly had to take into account that circumstances had 
changed so drastically much more leeway had to be given to aspirations and 
wishes emanating from quarters that could be jostled into falling in line earlier. 
Not only did this mean listening to indigenous grievances; it entailed actively 
seeking out those indigenous forces that had been deliberately ignored or 
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suppressed. ‘[T]he Colonial Office for the first time’, wrote Bayly and Harper, ‘was 
making an active bid for the support of the non-Malays’.16    
 I will argue that for the Dutch and British, elites were not so malleable or 
easily suppressed as they used to be. Sundanese and Chinese leaders in West 
Java and Malaysia, respectively, demanded that they chart their own course. It 
was no longer possible to coerce local elites into an asymmetrical alliance that 
would factually co-opt them. Instead, indigenous leaders sought ‘mutuality’ and 
tried to prohibit colonial authorities once more claiming ‘spokespersonship’ over 
them—and largely achieved it.17 This was a direct consequence of the 
insurgencies that threatened the colonial state. They were not free agents 
completely, however. The insurgency forced them, like the colonial authorities, to 
make concessions. In other words: both the leaders of the Partai Rakyat 
Pasundan (PRP) and the Malay Chinese Association had to divide their alliances. 
On the one hand, they had their direct sponsors, the colonial authorities—and in 
the MCA’s case, the Malay sultans—to placate. On the other hand, they had to 
consider the influence of the insurgents and their influence on themselves and 
the people the PRP and the MCA claimed to represent.  
 
Political reconstructions: Federalization in Indonesia and Malaysia 
If indigenous elites were given more leeway concerning their aspirations, it did 
not mean the British and Dutch administrations had any wish to relinquish their 
empire. Hubertus van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor-General for post-war 
Indonesia until October 1948, declared that ‘direct recognition of independence is 
impracticable’ as the territory and, presumably, Indonesia’s possible leaders, 
lacked any and all ‘tools for foreign affairs, foreign economic relations and 
defence’.18 The British displayed more progressive leanings, promising Malayan 
independence early on, but here, too, decolonization had to be an organized 
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affair.19 ‘I am a firm believer in first things first’, said General Gerald Templer who 
acted as supreme civil-military leader in Malaya between 1952 and 1954. ‘Or, to 
put it another way, it is politically unsound and structurally impossible to put the 
roof on a building until the foundations […] are well and truly laid’.20 
 What was at stake was the reconfiguration of colonial rule; supposedly 
accommodating demands for self-rule without truly relinquishing colonial 
dominance. Van Mook wanted to attain this through a federation—the United 
States of Indonesia (USI)—that would engage in an inseparable union with the 
Netherlands. To construct this federation, the Dutch needed to find local leaders 
who would work with them, ‘the best people from Indonesian society’.21 On 16 
July 1946, the Dutch opened the Malino Conference, named after the town on 
South Sulawesi where the conference was held, welcoming the representatives 
from Borneo, the Great East (all islands east of Java and west of New-Guinea; 
later part of the USI as the Negara Indonesia Timur, or State of East Indonesia), 
Billiton and Riau (part of Sumatra).22 Van Mook held before them a dazzling view 
of a future where Indonesia would be self-governing; free ‘to choose its own place 
within the community of peoples [nations]’. Van Mook declared that ‘the colonial 
area was over’.23 All the Indonesians had to do was go through a period of Dutch-
controlled transition. There was no little amount of duplicity to these words, 
especially as the government in The Hague would in the end decide that the USI 
would never be allowed outside the union binding them to the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. The autonomous states that would emerge, in the meantime, were 
to be used to divide the territory of Indonesia against the Republic.24 According to 
the Dutch, nation-building was allowed as the prospective leaders had asked 
Dutch assistance to fulfil the wish for self-rule.  
                                                 
19 Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars, 99-100. 
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 The Malino participants and the Dutch invoked article four of the May 1947 
Linggadjati Agreement, which stipulated that any community had the right of 
self-determination. The Malino states were all erected outside of Java and 
Sumatra. Van Mook, supported by senior policy makers, however, wanted more. 
If new groups could be found to demand self-determination on Java or Sumatra, 
the reasoning went, they could be used to truly hurt the Republic: through 
Linggadjati, the Republic had de facto sovereignty over Java, Sumatra and 
Madura.25 Diminishing the Republic there would force its leaders to honour a 
Dutch version of Linggadjati. The glaring difference between this scheme and 
what Linggadjati stipulated did not bother the Netherlands’ authorities at all. Nor 
did the fact that this course placed indigenous leaders in a difficult position. 
Whereas Republican leaders recognized, for example, East Indonesia as a state, it 
did not extend the same courtesy to the small negaras, or states, in Java or 
Sumatra.26 Federal leaders rightly blamed the Dutch. Anak Agung, East 
Indonesia’s first prime minister, stated that using the federation ‘as a weapon 
against the Republik’ proved ‘a fatal political mistake’. In Republican eyes, ‘small-
federalism’ recast possible viable partners for a future independent, Indonesian 
state into ‘collaborators’ at the head of ‘negara-negara boneka’, or puppet states.27 
Yet, the Dutch created negaras in East Java, South Sumatra and East Sumatra; 
it was under the aegis of this ‘small-federalism’ that the Pasundan State comes 
into view.     
 The British attempt at colonial reconfiguration was much more direct 
initially. On 10 October 1945, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, George Hall, 
told the House of Commons the British government had planned a Malayan 
Union ‘to promote the sense of unity and common citizenship that will develop 
the country’s strength and capacity in due course for self-government within the 
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British Commonwealth’.28 The government simply sent a Special Representative 
to ‘conclude with each Ruler […] a formal agreement by which he will cede full 
jurisdiction to his Majesty in his State’.29 The intent was to secure more control 
over Malaya than the British had ever had. Quickly the signatories, the Malay 
Sultans, objected to the Union and how it had come about. The Sultan of Kedah 
declared that the Special Representative had been ‘polite’ but that the ‘technique 
adopted by His Majesty’s Government appeared to be not unlike the familiar 
Japanese technique of bullying’.30 Second, the Rulers and their states would be 
stripped of sovereignty and superseded by a centralized government residing in 
Kuala Lumpur.31  
More importantly, perhaps, was that the union would strip the Malay 
community of their privileged status it traditionally enjoyed. In 1943, the Colonial 
Office still claimed that British policy in Malaya revolved around the promotion of 
‘the well being and efficiency of the Malay peoples and their educational fitness to 
fill the official Services in their own territories’. The government took Malays’ 
‘legitimate fear’ of being ‘swamped by the more efficient and numerous Chinese 
[and Indians]’ to heart and would continue to protect Malay privileged status.32 A 
mere three years later, the British drove the Malay rulers to accept a citizenship 
programme that would allow the great number of Chinese in Malaya to not only 
become citizens, but give them access to ‘equal political rights’ and ‘positions in 
the public services[,] wider opportunities in the commercial sector and possibly 
even easier means of acquiring landed property’.33 These concessions posed a real 
threat to Malay pre-eminence as in 1957, the Chinese population would rival the 
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Malay population in terms of absolute numbers—2,332,936 Chinese versus 
3,126,706 Malays.34 By April 1946, the House of Commons was informed that all 
Sultans unilaterally abrogated their treaties.35 The British finally relented under 
the concerted pressure of the Malay community; abandoning the Malayan Union. 
 Here we clearly distinguish how the British tried to pressure the Malay 
sultans into one direction—even suspending seven Malay leaders who openly 
attacked the Sultan of Johore for signing—only to fold.36 Instead of the ill-
received Union, the Federation of Malaya was implemented in February 1948. The 
proceedings leading up to its instalment, however, were guided by a 
Constitutional Working Committee that consisted of six British officials, four 
Malay Rulers and two United Malays National Organization functionaries. 
Especially the latter, constituted in May 1946 and led by Dato Onn bin Ja’afar, 
the mentri besar (chief minister) of Johore, earned a lot of Malay support. The 
UMNO, together with the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress from which it sprang, was 
able to become the focal point of anti-union resistance.37 As a concession to the 
reduction of sovereignty of the rulers, the Malay leaders negotiated for and finally 
secured the installation of a Conference of Rulers led not by the High 
Commissioner but by one of their own chosen representatives. Furthermore, 
attainment of citizenship was made more difficult, thus staving off the threat of 
wide-spread Chinese citizenship.38         
While the British were busy placating the Malay community, new problems 
sprang up. Leading up to the promulgation of the federation, non-Malay 
communities, notably the Chinese, found issue with the new constitution of the 
country. Any pro-Chinese sentiments that had directed the Malayan Union 
proposals seemed to have vanished under Malay pressure.39 The Malayan 
Democratic Union (MDU), founded in December 1945, brought together 
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‘Westernized Chinese, Eurasians and Indians’ to criticize the union for its lack of 
universal suffrage, amongst other things.40 Non-Malay voices, however, were only 
truly heard at the end of 1946, when the All-Malaya Council for Joint Action 
(AMCJA) took to the political stage in December. The AMCJA brought together 
birds of different plumage, such as the MDU, the Singapore Federation of Trade 
Unions, the Malayan Democratic Youth League and multiple Women’s 
Federations. Strikingly, the Malay Races Liberation Army was also one of the 
AMCJA’s affiliates.41 Its main program, unsurprisingly, was the need for inclusion 
of non-Malays in the consultative rounds concerning the Malayan Union and the 
Federation of Malayan States—especially since the British had ignored the views 
of the Consultative Committee to hear non-Malay perspectives set up in 1947.42
 Many historians have asserted that the Indian and Chinese Malayans 
showed little interest in the reconstitution of the trappings of colonial rule.43 
Others seemed to questioned whether such statements mattered in the first place 
as ‘it was unclear what a “Malayan” nation might be founded upon’.44 Regardless, 
there was a distinct process at work during the immediate restoration of colonial 
dominance in Malaya and the East Indies after World War Two. Despite attempts 
of colonial officials to impose a certain construction—federalization—and being 
largely successful in their endeavours, they could only do so through sustained 
negotiation that took years. Conversely, indigenous leaders stood up and 
demanded they be heard. Political consciousness, perennially suppressed, could 
now assert itself. In Malaya, the sultans and the UMNO forced the British into 
rethinking their heavy-handed approach. After having substituted the Malayan 
Federation for the union, the British had to constantly heed Dato Onn’s repeated 
statements that the British needed to show they could be trusted again.45 The 
Chinese community, represented predominantly by the AMCJA, proved assertive 
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as well. Even before the Japanese Occupation, Chinese leaders were already 
clamouring for British trust. Tan Cheng Lock, headman of the AMCJA after 1945, 
made this clear to the Eastern Department at the Colonial Office in 1943. The 
Chinese constituted ‘a most loyal and valuable element in the Malayan 
population, willing and able to take a vital part in the defence of Malaya under 
British leadership should an occasion arise in the future [...] if properly and fairly 
treated’, wrote Lock. Support was contingent on British ‘trust’ and ‘Malayan 
citizenship’ for the Chinese. This was the ‘best and wisest course to adopt by way 
of solving the so-called Chinese problem in Malaya’.46     
 Indonesian leaders likewise challenged the Dutch, although they behaved 
more compliant at first. Invited to do so by Van Mook, various community leaders 
across Indonesia set in motion the gears that led to an array of autonomous 
states from 1946 onwards. As they felt their way around the corridors of power, 
they lost their inhibitions. When in the summer of 1948 negotiations between the 
Netherlands and the Republic stalemated again, Anak Agung of the federal state 
of East-Indonesia called together the ‘Governments of the Negara’s […] outside 
the Republic’ to discuss further steps to safeguard ‘our states specifically and 
Indonesia generally’.47 At the meeting that commenced in the second week of July 
1948, Anak Agung exhorted all negara governments and daerah 
administrations—the small states of the federation—to hold on to the date of 
independence set by Dutch-Republican negotiations on 1 January 1949.48 The 
Gathering for Federal Consultation (GFC), as the foremen were called, needed just 
days to complete a resolution. In it, they demanded a ‘Federal Interim-
Government’ (FIR), ‘consisting of Indonesians’, as a precursor to the government 
of the ‘[free and] sovereign United States of Indonesia’ that included the Republic. 
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Dutch officials were not to tamper with the FIR’s largely autonomous 
machinations.49       
The Dutch were furious. The Indonesian Secretary of State for General 
Affairs made a mockery of the resolutions of the GFC. Certainly, indigenous 
leaders may have started to lose their inferiority complex regarding the Republic, 
‘the Netherlands and “the Palace”’. Yet he deprecated the idea of ‘Indonesians, 
who think that the Dutch and the Djocja republicans cannot […] come to an 
agreement’. Of ‘Indonesians, who think to form a third force, the only force, that 
can bring together the [Netherlands and the Republic] along peaceful lines. A 
third force, […] that wants to play the role of mediator’. The resolution was a mere 
‘essay’ that claimed to propose a ‘breakthrough’.50 Van Mook himself thought 
along the same lines. He refused to pass on the proposals to the government in 
The Hague because the FIR would compete with Van Mook’s own Federal 
Provisional Government; the interjection of another provisional body would create 
a dangerous ‘triangle’. In the end, Van Mook was little perturbed. He merely 
concluded—rather paternalistic—that the Indonesian federal leaders simply felt 
impatient with the Dutch government and were fed up with what the federalists 
perceived to be ‘indecisiveness’.51       
 
Forming alliances: The Negara Pasundan and the Malay Chinese Association 
To get a fuller understanding of how alliances with the colonial authorities 
provided both opportunities and enormous risks, a deeper analysis of the 
functioning of these alliances is needed. Such an analysis will also show how 
partners within them had to constantly translate their choices to others. The 
discussion therefore turns to two such alliances: between the Negara Pasundan 
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(NP) and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) on one side and the colonial 
authorities on the other. In doing so, this section lays bare that a clear distinction 
between colonial authorities, their loyal supporters and the anti-colonial forces 
did not exist. Both the Negara Pasundan and the MCA were hugely important for 
providing the colonial authorities with a façade of respectability. Through them, 
the Dutch and British could claim they fought for indigenous communities; not 
for an agenda hinging on continued domination. Both the Pasundan and the MCA 
were cultivated as possessing distinct identities that were to attract those who 
supposedly shared these identities into cooperation with a government—and a 
policy—they did not trust. In other words: through alliances, the colonial state 
could sell its less than palatable practices. For the members of these 
organizations, lastly, the alliance provided a way into securing a place at the table 
of power both during and after decolonization. 
 In both territories, local leaders appeared on the colonial radar voluntarily. 
The Partai Rakyat Pasundan (PRP; Pasundan Peoples Party) was founded on 18 
November 1946. It was led by the Sundanese aristocrat R. A. A. M. M. 
Suriakartalegawa, formerly the regent of Garut, West Java. His party immediately 
came under direct protection of ‘local Dutch and military officials’, like Colonel 
Thomson in Bogor (Buitenzorg), the Resident of the Priangan,52 M. Klaassen, and 
the acting governor of Batavia, C. W. A. Abbenhuis.53 The PRP served as the 
platform to espouse Sundanese interests and the expression of the fact that the 
Sundanese people had been dominated ‘militarily, economically [and] politically 
by their neighbours’, the Javanese, long enough. With the Dutch embroiled with 
the Republic, now was the time to make Sundanese wishes heard. ‘The 
Sundanese race wants to see its language, adat [the collective body of traditional 
Indonesian laws] and culture protected’, a Dutch administrator noted, ‘and be 
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taken up within the Federation of Indonesian States as an autonomous area’.54 
The Sundanese pedigree reached back to pre-colonial times, to the Tanah Sunda 
(Sunda Land) kingdom which had Jakarta, the later seat of Dutch power, as its 
main port until 1527. At the beginning of the twentieth century, indigenous 
communities in Indonesia ‘witnessed a rise in consciousness’ when educated 
elites wished to raise ‘the living conditions of their respective communities’ and to 
promote clear-cut distinctions between themselves and others.55 The Sundanese 
established themselves in the Paguyuban Pasundan (Circle of Pasundan Friends) 
to rekindle the Sundanese culture.56       
 The Malayan Chinese Association, founded in February 1949, also drew on 
pre-World War Two elements. Its leadership did not have aristocratic roots yet 
was elitist nonetheless. It was an amalgam of the leaders of earlier Chinese 
parties like the Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA; founded in 1900 and 
represented in Singapore and Malacca and later Penang), the Kuomintang Malaya 
(KMT-M; formed in 1912, nationalist and focussed on China), the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce and members of traditional associations and secret 
societies. Tan Cheng Lock, who had been the pre-war leader of the SCBA and a 
member of the Settlements’ Legislative council, became MCA’s chairman, 
undoubtedly based on experience as a leader of various bodies, champion for 
various indigenous interests and his constant reiteration of the need for pan-
Chinese organisation.57 Whereas the PRP in Indonesia operated on a program 
that set them apart from the rest of Javanese society, the MCA preached a 
message of inclusion. Lock declared that ‘among the Chinese who have decided to 
make Malaya their permanent home, a consciousness of Malayan unity and 
loyalty’ had to be engendered, that would ‘draw them closer to the other Malayan 
communities’. Malayan Chinese had to be turned away ‘from China and Chinese 
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politics […] to transfer their love […] to Malaya’.58 The MCA stressed—at its 
inauguration, for example—the absolute necessity for ‘co-operation with the 
Government and [Malaya’s] other communities’.59 The MCA played off three sides: 
while signalling to the UMNO and the British government it wanted to help to 
construct a unified Malaya, the association showed its Chinese constituency that 
it had their interests securely at heart.60    
 Both messages of inclusion (MCA) and exclusion (PRP) spoke to the colonial 
authorities. If in Malaya policy makers showed apprehensiveness towards being 
too pro-Chinese earlier, by the time 1948 was well under way the British 
government needed all the support it could muster from the Chinese 
communities.61 In Indonesia, a similar shift took place. The swing towards 
cooperation was forced upon the Dutch and British by the advent of overt conflict 
over colonial restoration. The opening salvoes of the MRLA and the Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia (TNI; the Indonesian National Army) assisted by laskars 
(guerrilla bands) and the colonial reactions to them bore striking similarities. On 
1 June police forces charged 200 Chinese labourers at an estate in the Malaysian 
state of Johore, killing seven strikers. Eleven days later, officials had counted five 
murders: ‘all, save one attempted murder, political in origin’. With the MCP 
stepping up its campaign—or, rather, starting the stage of open warfare—three 
planters were killed at home on June 16 in Perak while elsewhere a Chinese 
foreman and a Chinese labour contractor lost their lives. A day later a band of 12 
Chinese stole a rifle from a police station. ‘From the 18th to the 29th June 
inclusive, fifteen murders and fifteen attempted murders have been reported to 
me’, noted the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who started to discern a 
particular pattern.  
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Violence, meted out by ‘bands of well-armed Chinese’, was directed at 
European and Asian estate personnel, Kuomintang Chinese and those who had 
given evidence in earlier intimidation cases.62 Violence in Indonesia flared up in 
1948 as well. TNI units and laskars began attacking estates, security forces and 
civilians, like in Malaysia. Between five November and six December 1947 an 
official tallied up 19 attacks against plantations during which TNI and guerrilla 
units targeted estate workers and kidnapped their relatives.63 In April 1948 
overall Army Commander General Simon H. Spoor counted 120 ‘incidents’; 30 
more than in March.64    
The reactions of the Dutch and British matched each other closely. Both 
governments accorded themselves a large array of extraordinary powers. Nineteen 
June saw the proclamation of the State of Emergency for the Federation of 
Malaya. Its regulations included ‘reimposing the death penalty for the offence of 
carrying arms’, detention of ‘any person without trial’ and deportation.65 Within 
days, 600 people were rounded up, all suspected communists of various 
organisations like the Malayan Communist Party, the MPAJA Ex-Comrades 
Association (Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army, the forerunner of the MRLA) 
and the New Democratic Youth League. ‘Leading Communists and wanted 
members of killer squads’ remained elusive.66 Just a month later, the first two 
death sentences for illegal arms possession were passed; the suspects 24 and 25 
years old.67 Dutch military authorities also swiftly put the decision over life and 
death into their own hands. The death penalty and life-long (or 20 year) prison 
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terms became real options already in August 1947.68 Worse still, ‘punishment-
execution-without-trial’ did, too. The East Indies laws, the State of War and Siege, 
did not allow this, but since the Republic had the ‘population’ participate in 
‘arson, destruction, mobbing and looting’ along with its official army, ‘[a]ll these 
misdeeds could be chalked up as “combat operations” ergo the safety of [our] 
troops will demand that […] perpetrators shall be put down [neergelegd]’. After 
arrest and interrogation, suspects could still receive a death sentence.69 Carrying 
arms (guns or otherwise) or explosives without permission or their concealment 
became a capital offence. Trials based on weapons possession would be ‘by 
exclusion of any other judge [presided over] by the Temporary Courts-Martial’ but 
with the right to shoot first, there was little chance soldiers would ask for a gun 
carrying permit or make arrests.70 Military (and presumably police) forces were 
now legally covered; they could finally meet terror with ‘contra-terror’.71 As David 
French commented: British unofficial counterinsurgency practices created ‘an 
atmosphere within which […] some elements of the security forces [could] operate 
in ways contrary to the norms laid down in international law’, while 
simultaneously staying within the boundaries of British law.72   
Under these circumstances, overt support by indigenous elites would 
certainly lend some respectability to such practices. The British deemed securing 
Chinese support a paramount ingredient to their campaign against the 
MCP/MRLA because the insurrection they unleashed was ‘never a national 
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rebellion’.73 Rather, the Chinese-dominated MCP vied for support from 
disenfranchised Chinese squatter communities, especially through the MCP’s Min 
Yuen, or Masses Organization, whose total number have been estimated at 
500,000.74 Clearly, the MCA could provide a counterweight to the MCP’s intrusive 
practices. Harnessing the MCA’s membership would greatly help to wean the 
Chinese communities away from falling in line with the communist insurgents, 
especially since MCA membership soared. At the end of 1949, it boasted more 
than 100,000 members. Conscription numbers lay somewhere between 160,000 
and 200,000 in 1951, reaching a maximum of 300,000 later.75 On another level, 
the MCA was well-equipped for espousing anti-MCP rhetoric. Former Kuomintang 
functionaries within its ranks, despite their sympathy for China, were no friends 
of the MCP. Others, wealthy businessmen or members of governmental councils, 
had too much influence to lose to not back the British. The association also 
brought together those Chinese who cared ‘to dispense social welfare and relief 
work for Chinese affected by the Emergency’.76 Naturally, this fit in nicely into the 
British attempts to woo the Chinese population.       
 The MCA’s rise to prominence on Malaya’s political horizon, then, was not 
by accident. Tang Cheng Lock and his compatriots proposed the MCA’s formation 
at the same time the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, was looking for ways 
to get the Chinese into the British-Malay camp. The strained Sino-Malay relations 
needed amelioration. When H. S. Lee, ‘an eminent tin magnate’, proposed the 
High Commissioner to allow the Chinese leaders to form a representative Chinese 
organisation in December 1948, Gurney consented quickly.77 The latter ‘made it 
clear’ to the MCA that ‘unless they provided an alternative standard to which 
loyal Chinese could rally, the Communists would win’.78 The foundation of the 
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MCA conveniently led to the creation of another representative body. In an 
attempt to bring the Chinese and Malay communities closer together during the 
first months of 1949 the Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia was able to 
form what became known as the Communities Liaison Committee.79 Within it, 
Gurney met with six Malay and six Chinese leaders (among them Dato Onn and 
Lock) and representatives of the European, Eurasian, Ceylonese and Indian 
communities. Despite being unofficial in nature, the CLC discussed many 
subjects that would be later covered in official government law, such as national 
citizenship, that much-coveted prize. Ultimately, the CLC ceased to meet as 
Gurney was killed in an MRLA ambush in October 1951 and Dato Onn left the 
UMNO earlier that year.80 The MCA had certainly benefited. Days before his 
unfortunate demise Gurney (privately) praised the association’s efforts: they had 
successfully assisted the government in the massive drives that resettled and 
displaced 573,000 Chinese into what were called the New Villages.81   
 The Partai Rakyat Pasundan that eventually would proclaim a Sundanese 
state, the Negara Pasundan, never managed to shirk so close to their colonial 
handlers. The PRP was haunted by a stigma. Dutch officials may have supported 
the PRP in their quest for a state, but its leaders’ positions stirred feelings of 
grave doubt among the Dutch, more so than MCA leaders did in Malaya.82 
Despite Sundanese leaders having traditionally served in the West Javanese 
Inland Administration before the war, they had shown little acumen in countering 
Javanese influences, officials claimed.83 Van Mook branded the party’s first man, 
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Suriakartalegawa, former resident of Garut, West-Java, as ‘corrupt’.84 Other PRP 
leaders were equally dismissed.85 In all, it was feared the PRP would prove a 
dangerous ally that may very well transform into another ‘revolutionary or violent’ 
entity.86 Indeed, reactions to the PRP were not necessarily positive; possible 
reactionary sentiments were not imaginary. People present at the Pasundan’s 
proclamation or PRP meetings in Bandung’s central square stood aloof, not fully 
understanding what they were exactly witnessing; others were fearfully reminded 
of forced meetings under the Japanese—‘invariably followed by fights or 
massacres’—as Dutch policemen tried to remove Europeans and soldiers from the 
crowd.87  
The need to weaken the Republic in West Java, however, proved so great 
that the PRP was allowed to establish itself officially nonetheless. The PRP 
eventually gathered thousands of signatures, signalling to the Dutch that the 
Sundanese supported the party, at least to some extent.88 The PRP further 
demonstrated their anti-Republican intentions by occupying all ‘republican 
buildings [in Bandung] without bloodshed’.89 The Dutch ignored accusations that 
PRP representatives had adopted some ‘less than “democratic” means of member 
recruitment’ and that ‘the people’ saw Suriakartalegawa as a ‘traitor’ and a 
‘Quisling’ tainted by earlier pro-Japanese leanings. On four May 1947, the PRP 
proclaimed their Negara Pasundan.90 Even if the undertaking were to fail, the 
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Dutch thought the risk should be taken. As the Resident of Priangan wrote in 
December 1946: ‘an eventual breaking away [of the Sundanese] would mean a 
weakening of the Republican front’. The potential was certainly there: according 
to one estimate, some 10,000,000 Sundanese—also living in Republican 
territory—could be influenced by the Pasundan’s rise.91 Mobilizing them against 
the Republic would constitute a major coup.       
              
Strained alliances: The Negara Pasundan versus the Malayan Chinese Association 
As 1948 turned into 1949, the fate of the Pasundan State became precarious. 
This owed much to the Dutch inability to counter the Republican insurgency. 
Important administrative figures started to doubt whether General Spoor handled 
the war properly; the senior advisor to Van Mook accused Spoor of wanting to 
‘flee from reality’ and romanticising supposed military successes, thereby 
eclipsing a worrisome military and political position that needed to be addressed. 
This underestimation, combined with an overestimation of the efficacy of military 
force, had led to a Second Police Action (19 December 1948 – 5 January 1949). 
The Dutch captured the Republican government in Yogyakarta, Central Java, but 
international condemnation finally forced the Dutch to truly negotiate with the 
Republic. The Republican officials were set free and a subsequent political 
agreement complete with cease-fire order from the United Nations Security 
Council—the Van Royen-Rum Agreement of May 1949—forbade further 
‘pacification’.  
 In West Java as elsewhere, the Republic used this deterioration in Dutch 
military prospects and opportunities—which had already set in early 1948—and 
particularly the cease-fire of 1949 to strengthen their hold on the countryside. 
Sundanese policy makers’ positions began to move more openly towards the 
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Republic as Dutch resolve wavered.92 In 1947, the colonial government had been 
the local power-broker—more powerful than the Republic—to give and sustain 
the Sundanese their separate political entity. The Dutch-Sundanese alliance 
proved the way of least resistance. Suriakartalegawa understood as much when 
he cynically concluded that ‘[i]f we [Sundanese] have to choose between the 
Dutch and the Javanese, when it comes to domination it is much better it is done 
by the Dutch’.93 The policy of choice to woe the Republic in 1949, however, was 
not an unambiguous declaration of support; the Sundanese dared not to make a 
complete and resolute alliance-switch. Rather, it took the form of a clear 
expression of open-ended neutrality that furtively leaned towards the Republic 
proportional to the latter’s ascendancy. After all, the Dutch had not been defeated 
completely; they would remain until 31 December 1949, the new date set for the 
transfer of sovereignty.  
 Pro-Republican sentiments had, however, never been absent from 
Pasundan politics. In fact, the Republic and its influence loomed large in all 
indigenous political activity. That Dutch officials had not understood this should 
be attributed to their inability to grasp the Republic’s standing as an anti-colonial 
force; not to any duplicity in indigenous politicians’ actions. Federalist politicians 
had never truly hidden their sympathy for the Republic. Already in September 
1946, months before the Netherlands had ratified the first Dutch-Republican 
agreement, Indonesian leaders willing to work with the Dutch in a federated 
Indonesia declared that ‘Between Malino and the republic no difference in 
objectives exists’.94 These words, spoken at a political congress in Amsterdam, 
came from Sukawati, who was earmarked by the Dutch Ministry of Overseas 
Territories as the Commissioner for the Great East. Ironically, his speech at the 
congress was deemed to have been ‘tinted the most [in favour of the] Dutch’, but 
                                                 
92 Beroordeling van de Toestand in de Periode van 27 Sept. t/m 4 October1949 (nr. 37) van Legercommandant 
(Buurman van Vreeden), NIB 20, 140-141. 
93 Afschrift van een brief van de Regent van Garoet R. A. A. Mochamad Moesa Soeria Karta Legawa, 6 February 1947, 
NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering 2.10.14/2417.   
94 Verslag van het Congres-Indonesië gehouden door de Partij van de Arbeid op 7 Sept. 1946 (Amsterdam: Partij van 
de Arbeid, 1946), 25. 
91 
 
what he had meant was that both the Malino Federalists and the Republic 
wanted freedom; ‘not a return to the colonial relationships’.95   
 Yet, to the Federalists, the latter did not preclude alliance-formation with 
the Dutch (they did want to become part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands), but 
after the second Dutch military expedition in December 1948, pro-Dutch 
comportment became less easy to maintain: the Pasundan’s mask of neutrality 
was increasingly slipping.96 Its leaders were not the only ones to have this 
problem: Anak Agung, President of the Federal State of East-Indonesia, saw the 
need to seek a ‘rapprochement’ with the Republic. After January 1949, he 
deemed such a move necessary as, in his view, the Federalist movement could 
only function by the grace of the Republic.97 The Representative of the Crown 
charged with controlling the Pasundan saw a similar trend: for weeks on end, he 
charged, the Pasundan government had taken no measures to establish ‘order 
and peace’.98 The fact that the Pasundan cabinet fell did not give the Crown 
Representative any reason to think otherwise. Pasundan ministers claimed that 
December’s Police Action had not precipitated it, but the cabinet’s collapse 
conveniently gave the Pasundan the means to plausibly deny any collusion with 
the Dutch vis-à-vis the Republic. According to documents captured in the 
Republican headquarters, Djumhana, Pasundan’s first minister, immediately 
took to conversing about his political line with Mohammad Hatta, the Republican 
Vice Prime Minister, when the Police Action started.99 Secondly, Djumhana 
wanted to use the formation of a new cabinet to implement his ‘Urgency Program’ 
of 7 January 1949. In essence, this program was a final bid to manoeuvre the 
Pasundan and, with it, West Java, as far back into the Republican camp as 
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possible without causing the dissolution of the Pasundan by the Dutch. The 
program called for the immediate restoration of the Republic with its pre-Police 
Action borders intact.100        
 The Dutch reaction came swiftly. On twenty January, four Bandung 
residents, Pasundan leaders linked to the Republic, were arrested for subversive 
activities—an action applauded by some Pasundan politicians as a way of ‘moving 
the Pasundan to a more constructive position’.101 Djumhana was accused of foul 
play; to the Crown Representative to the Pasundan he had declared that the 
Urgency Program was broadly supported despite the fact that the scheme was 
secretly hatched by a minority of what the Dutch called ‘staunch republicans’ 
and then pushed through the cabinet. On another occasion, Djumhana himself 
had declared his own plan a dangerous ploy.102 For these reasons—and the 
Urgency Program’s obvious incompatibility with Dutch plans—the symbolical 
head of the Pasundan, the Wali Negara, was pressured into leaning on Djumhana 
to affect the latter’s resignation. Dutch officials did so by threatening to take over 
the ‘police and administration’ of the Pasundan—they could do so under the 
special rights the colonial administration had accorded itself under the State of 
War and Siege—and removing the Wali Negara from his position of power.103 To 
save himself, the Wali was to advise Djumhana to form a cabinet that was not 
bound by any program to restore the Republic. Put differently, he and the 
Pasundan were to halt, ‘according to the old recipe, working towards to two sides’ 
by keeping both the Republic and the Dutch from taking action against the 
Pasundan. The Wali, after all, should not forget that the Pasundan rested on 
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‘Dutch bayonets’ now that the Republic, at least as Dutch political and military 
minds forced themselves to think, no longer existed.104  
 Eventually, in the words of the Wali Negara, policy makers found 
‘Columbus’s egg’: a new cabinet was formed—by none other than the resilient 
Djumhana—without the Urgency Program. To the chagrin of the Dutch Crown 
Commissioner for the Pasundan, R. W. van Diffelen, however, the reconstituted 
body adopted a resolution that called for ‘Independent, Sovereign United 
Indonesian States’ to which the Republic naturally belonged.105 Furthermore, the 
new Pasundan cabinet was still dependent for support on a parliament in which 
at least three fractions, Indonesia, Demokrasi and Kesatuan, were oriented 
towards the Republic.106 The Crown Representative’s anger reverberated in 
various colonial quarters. High officials continued to express their shock at the 
sustained contacts between the Republic and the Pasundan leaders.107 Dutch 
officials had been taken by surprise when the Pasundan made its more pro-
Republican stance public. The chairman of the Indisch Entrepreneurs 
Association, Sinninghe Damsté, for example, had never grasped the fact that the 
fate of the Republic was closely linked to that of the Federalists, who knew the 
one could not survive without the other. In July 1948 he could therefore write 
that what hindered the Federalist bloc from toeing a more Dutch-oriented line, 
had been that ‘we [the Batavia government] still protect Djocja[.] If we would turn 
our backs on Djocja, resolutely, then the [Federalist] leaders would find the 
freedom for a more positive course’.108 With the arrest of the Republican 
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government during the Second Police Action, this pipe dream had been shattered; 
it became clear that supposedly staunch allies, out of foresight the Dutch 
themselves lacked, had had to change positions.  
 The trajectory of the MCA took a different course. The Pasundan was forced 
to more and more hedge its bets to placate the Republic and the Dutch. 
Conversely, the MCA’s alliance to the British and the UMNO deepened and 
strengthened as the Emergency unfolded. The alliance did not come easily. The 
MCA and its leaders constantly worked hard to remain associated with the anti-
communist campaign. All the while, the MCA had to fight accusations concerning 
the Chinese neutralist leanings. These accusations had been levelled at the 
Chinese before the Emergency’s outbreak.109 With the rise of the MCA, even after 
the CLC meetings, the Chinese remained suspect. The British Advisor for Penang 
told the Malay mentri2 besar (great ministers, each in charge of a state) that 
Chinese ‘small shop-keepers, the owners of small estates [and] kepala’s [heads] of 
labour forces’ must be forced to declare sides ‘by all possible means, naturally 
short of murder and torture’.110 It was these types that Gurney’s successor, 
General Templer, found ‘on the whole an uninspiring lot’ that he wished to 
remove from office through ‘mass sacking’. He could not, however, as ‘it will do 
more harm than good’.111 These extremists were not alone. Malay Rulers 
demanded ‘more severe action, including deportation on a large scale’ taken 
against the Chinese mere weeks after Gurney had been fatally ambushed.112   
 To prove that the MCA truly wanted an alliance with the UMNO and the 
British, it had to show that it could harness Chinese support throughout Malaya. 
This was no mean feat, as the Chinese were politically divided. The Kuomintang 
was split into those supporting the government openly (‘well-to-do traders’) and 
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those who ‘give no offence to the Malayan Government but at the same time […] 
have not openly or strongly denounced the […] MCP’.113 Another group, ‘the 
younger element’ with ‘some Chinese vernacular education’, were anti-Malayan. A 
third category considered themselves Malayan Chinese; they allied with the 
government. The fourth group, the ‘Wind-blown’, comprised of the ‘mass of rural 
Chinese farmers and petty traders’, had ‘no political interest other than that 
required for self-preservation’.114 It was up to Tang Cheng Lock and the rest of the 
MCA to unite these diverging groups. To do so, the MCA itself needed to 
symbolize unity. What was needed was the transformation of the association into 
a ‘disciplined and organized body’—‘our constant worry’, in Tang Cheng Lock’s 
words. Lock therefore set out to shore up the MCA’s organizational capabilities so 
it could penetrate the Chinese communities to destroy the vestiges of the dual 
threats of communism and communalism.115  
 The sources do not make clear whether Lock’s re-organization was 
successful. What is obvious, however, is that the MCA was not unequivocally 
following all directions coming from the Malay or British rulers. As said, alliances 
between the colonial powers and indigenous elites were not a case of the latter 
simply falling in line with the former. The elites tried to attain mutuality with the 
British—in the case of the MCA also with the privileged Malay elites. For the 
MCA, this was difficult for two reasons. First, its influence was by no means 
secure, nor did it pertain to all Chinese communities in Malaya. In some areas, 
such as Trengganu, north-eastern Malaya, the MCA ‘has never appeared of much 
political consequence’.116 The MCA had trouble gaining a foothold and was 
opposed. In Malacca, local Chinese community leaders allied to the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce (that also had members in the MCA) openly decried the 
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MCA’s local office. Through a new inter-communal platform, the Malayan Party, 
they attacked the MCA. The association was publicly exposed as having only 
secured the ‘powers and position of a few’ and done nothing ‘for the Chinese 
politically, economically, or in education’. The average Chinese had ‘been “double-
crossed” and [through supporting the MCA reduced to] merely “yes-men”’.117 Even 
local MCA branches did not always wish to follow political lines set out from MCA 
headquarters. In Penang, the local MCA branch resisted ‘[entering] the political 
field’ for some time. To some Chinese, then, the MCA had implicated itself in the 
Malays’ ‘narrow type of nationalism as well as religious and racial 
discrimination’.118       
 The second reason the MCA found mutuality hard to maintain, was that it 
could not always follow what the British government or the other major Alliance 
partner wanted. The UMNO, to begin with, would never allow the MCA, based on 
the Malays’ political clout with the British and their percentage of the electorate, 
to supersede it in terms of seats in the representative bodies.119 To complicate 
matters further, Malay leaders had different objectives. UMNO could only exist if 
it kept the status quo—its ‘special position’—whereas the MCA was advocating 
that ‘citizenship [should be] the birthright of everybody born in Malaya, provided 
he[/she] regarded the country as his[/her] permanent home and the object of his 
loyalty and allegiance’. Although UMNO would interpret the rights to citizenship 
broader and broader, Malays continued to feel apprehensive about full citizenship 
for the Chinese. The Malayan Indian Congress, which also joined the Alliance, 
looked for its own brand of ‘political development’.120 Simultaneously, the MCA 
could not afford to be too closely associated with British policies; it was such a 
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connection with the colonial administration which had cost other politicians their 
bid for political influence.121 Therefore, the MCA had to be seen as pressuring the 
British into concessions. The association asked the government in Kuala 
Lumpur, for example, to retract the recognition for the Communist People’s Party 
(CCP) in China, arguing that continued recognition would push some Malayan 
Chinese into looking favourable unto the MCP. Recognition, therefore, countered 
the MCA’s own cultivation of anti-MCP and anti-CCP narratives which were 
gaining traction ‘as a result’, in the words of the Acting Deputy Commissioner-
General who had sounded out Chinese opinions, ‘of the wave of executions being 
carried out [...] and also of the effect of land reform in China on the properties 
there of overseas Chinese’.122  
 A third area in which the MCA could chart its own course was related to 
the often harsh policies the British brought to bear upon the Chinese 
communities throughout the Federation. Most importantly, the MCA was 
occupied with the resettlement policies instigated by the British already before 
1950. They entailed resettling 1,2 million people (Chinese, Malays, Aborigines and 
Indians) into New Villages. As shall be discussed in a later chapter, the 
operations displacing entire communities were characterized by violence and 
coercion. The MCA was therefore careful to not support the British Government 
too uncritically in relation to the resettlements. A most prominent example is the 
‘Malayan Scandal’ of October 1951 concerning the Mawai Resettlement Area, the 
first concentration area in Johore.123 Two members of the local MCA branch 
refused to attend any further Mawai Committee meetings in the tail-end of 1951. 
The reason was, they said, that the MCA had not been notified of the 
government’s intentions to evacuate the camp. Aside from accusing the MCA 
branch of driving up prices in the settlement’s shop, the administration simply 
countered that it had, in fact, appraised the MCA fully and that the illegal settlers 
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had been given due notice.124 Insurgents had killed four settlers and ‘carried off 
thirty-four young men as recruits’ the British wanted Mawai closed. The MCA 
took to the press and made the closing of the camp a media spectacle. It counter-
claimed that the attack should be blamed on the Johore State Government; 
Mawai had been built on the jungle’s edge, had remained ‘unfenced’ and therefore 
poorly protected. To the Manchester Guardian it was yet another example of the 
government’s ‘indiscriminate’ methods, negating official narratives that the camps 
made for ‘happy and safe’ lives. A month before the attack, the resettlement 
officer in the camp ‘received warning’ of an imminent attack, ‘but he could obtain 
no extra guards’.125  
 Tan Cheng Lock personally stepped in. First, he and other MCA officials 
met the mentri besar of Johore. Little was to be achieved, however, as the ex-
squatters had already been removed from Mawai. Some to ‘neighbouring estates’ 
to work; others had been offered the fare to relocate to China, which was refused 
by all.126 Lock was furious. Not only had the MCA initially spent $100,000 to 
build the Resettlement Area; it had advised against building Mawai in the first 
place. ‘[T]he ground was poor’, wrote Lock privately to Johore’s mentri besar, and 
‘the district was situated in close proximity to the jungle’. Lastly, complained the 
MCA leader again, the government had provided too little protection. Now, the 
300 households, some 1,200 souls, were forced to move yet a second time.127 
Worse still, from the MCA’s viewpoint, was that it had only heard of the second 
resettlement after the Mawai Chinese had petitioned local MCA officials.128 
 Striking in this case is that whereas the government of Johore claimed 
‘Bandit pressure’ had caused the calamity in Mawai, the MCA, both locally and in 
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the person of Lock, blamed governmental neglect.129 Through Mawai, Lock made 
it very clear to both the Malay rulers and the British that they could not simply 
count on the MCA’s connivance in browbeating defenceless communities. ‘The 
M.C.A is a body which can do much and is doing much to assist the 
Government’, protested Lock, ‘but its efforts in this direction will be entirely 
frustrated if Government acts in this matter, which nullifies the co-operation 
which the Chinese leaders are trying to give Government’. Mawai engendered the 
feeling among Chinese that  
  
 they are being treated like cattle and ordered to move their homes and their 
 crops on a whim  […] which they must think results from Government’s 
 decision to harry them as much as possible because of Government’s ill-will 
 towards them.130  
 
During a ‘fact-finding mission’ to the now deserted camp-site, Lock further 
announced his disappointment. He basically stated that the MCA would have to 
reconsider its position; that ‘the moulding of a stronger policy’, more critical of 
the colonial government, was needed.131  
 The Mawai dispute was cleverly used by the local and central branches of 
the MCA. By engaging himself, Lock had openly and privately signalled to the 
British and Malay rulers that the MCA and by extension the Chinese deserved to 
be considered, but that the association could only reach its constituency—and 
have it behave according to British wishes—if the MCA was treated as a full 
partner. Certainly, they needed the alliance to the government to prove to the 
latter that ordinary Chinese could not be equated with communist ‘bandits’ or 
terrorists. The British should not forget, conversely, that the MCA could be an 
asset to the government in defeating the MCP only if the government and the 
Malay rulers would honour their part of the alliance.  
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Ultimately, the MCA was able to overcome many obstacles.132 In broad strokes, 
this chapter has shown that it managed to become the stalwart for British 
officials seeking to influence the Malayan Chinese quite quickly.133 The MCA’s 
position was massively strengthened by the formation of the UMNO-MCA Alliance 
in February 1953. One year earlier, the UMNO and the MCA had decided to work 
together for the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council elections. They did so primarily 
to keep other political parties from posing an ‘electoral threat’, but the UMNO and 
MCA soon realized that the Alliance could have important advantages for both. 
Working together would answer to the Colonial Secretary’s ‘admonition that 
independence would be granted only when the various races in Malaya had 
demonstrated that they were united’.134 Moreover, the Alliance brought great 
successes in local and state elections in 1954 and 1955. By 1955, the Alliance 
had ‘seized the political initiative from the MCP’.135 For the association itself this 
meant political and social influence which helped the establishing of ‘State 
Branches of the party’, but also exposure to the lower strata of Chinese life in 
Malaysia.136 Naturally, the Alliance alone did not provide the MCA the means to 
grow into a proper alliance partner to both the UMNO and the colonial 
administration. The Korean War (1950-1953) gave the British government the 
revenues needed to revamp its security forces. Expenditures on police forces and 
Emergency operations soared.137  
 Secondly, as we shall see, the resettlement policies would, in fact, greatly 
affect MRLA morale and supplies. To continue the struggle, the MCP changed its 
approach from large-scale units that focussed on coercion into smaller units that 
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were supposed to grow their own food and revert to less violent subversion. This 
change came too late, however; by the time they had trickled down to the lowest 
commanders, the British government, with its allies, had already understood the 
right combination of ‘coercion and kindness’.138 Through constantly bargaining 
with its local branch offices, Chinese outside the MCA, the Malay leaders and, 
lastly, the British colonial administration, the MCA was able to constitute a 
valuable partner in a complicated alliance. The MCA’s ultimate goals had been to 
gain for itself, its leaders and the Malayan Chinese a place within the Malaysia 
that was emerging from British Malaya. Even today, the MCA plays a role in 
Malaysia’s politics. In 2012, the MCA party newspaper, The Guardian, proudly 
looked back to commemorate its role in the Emergency.139 
 The Partai Rakyat Pasundan and the Negara Pasundan were never able to 
establish themselves as a serious partner to Dutch colonial officials. The same 
applied to the Republic’s representatives. The Dutch-PRP alliance proved 
unstable in the limited time it lasted. Again, we see that the context of the war 
was responsible for this. If the British and their allies could keep the MCP at bay 
long enough to have it run out of steam, the anti-colonial forces of the Republic 
were strengthened by the ham-fisted approach of the Dutch. As the latter painted 
themselves into a corner both militarily and politically, the Pasundan, having 
allied itself to the Dutch, became automatically implicated in the latter’s fiasco.  
 This split the Pasundan in two. On the one hand, its leaders were left to try 
and placate the Dutch. They did so unsuccessfully, as the Dutch themselves 
more than once threatened to destroy the Pasundan. The Territorial Commander 
for West Java, for example, in 1949 dangled the imposition a military regime 
before the cowed Sundanese simply to get them in line with Dutch 
‘pacification’.140 On the other hand, republican-minded forces within the Negara 
saw their chance and tried to signal to the Republic their good intentions, as 
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evinced by the Urgency Program. The heavy curtain fell quickly when the Dutch 
negotiated their retreat from Indonesia. Without Dutch ‘bayonets’ to sustain it, 
the Pasundan quickly had to shift its weight.141 Instead of leaning more towards 
the Dutch, the Pasundan’s cabinet saw the need to declare that its objective was 
(and had always been) ‘the attainment of the national objective, i.e. the 
Republican Indonesian Union’.142 It is unclear whether the parties within the 
Negara Pasundan such as the Fraksi Indonesia had operated from the perspective 
that it would re-join the Republic, but it is obvious that even the federalists did 
not aim to marginalize the Republic as much as Dutch officials wanted them to. 
Unfortunately, the Pasundan was not able to the shake the taint of double-
crossing both parties. Dutch officials designated Sundanese parliamentarians 
‘more republican than the [...] rulers of the Republic itself’ and threatened to 
remove the Pasundan altogether.143 The Republic naturally did not want to inherit 
a divided house. As soon as independence had been secured, it fatally 
undermined and dissolved the Pasundan State.144 
 The two cases under consideration have pointed out several important 
elements to colonial alliance-formation. To begin with, the onset of war 
determined that the colonial authorities could no longer dictate. Any restoration 
of colonial power needed the complicity of local elites. In the Netherlands East 
Indies, the Dutch engaged the Sundanese brought together under the banner of 
the Partai Rakyat Pasundan whereas British administrators looked to the 
business leaders of the Malayan Chinese Association. The local power-brokers 
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had had pre-war influence through their associations with the colonial 
administration, but the chaotic context of the war gave them the opportunity to 
achieve more mutuality in their dealings with the colonial administration than 
ever before.    
 Despite the fact that the fate of the PRP and the Negara Pasundan and that 
of the MCA diverged strikingly, the comparison has yielded an array of common 
characteristics. The alliances that for example Suriakartalegawa and Tan Cheng 
Lock engaged in always remained unstable. The Negara Pasundan was constantly 
buffeted by Dutch heavy-handedness that precluded the Pasundan from 
governing autonomously. The Malayan Chinese Association likewise had to 
contend with British policies that did not always stroke with its own program of 
representing the Malayan Chinese. Both the Negara Pasundan and the MCA 
therefore had to perform balancing acts in which their constituents’ interests 
were weighed against those of the colonial regimes. There were, however, limits to 
how far indigenous leaders could chart their own course. They were heavily 
implicated in the excesses brought on by the counterinsurgency efforts of the 
colonial authorities. This, in turn, necessitated another balancing act, especially 
for the PRP. As the fortunes of war clearly shifted in favour of the Republic, the 
Pasundan had to signal to the Republic its benevolent intentions towards it. The 
alliance with the Dutch and role of the PRP in it needed to be shifted towards the 
Republic. For the MCP, there was no true shift towards the insurgents as a 
combination of influences slowly marginalized the MCP’s influence. Still, the MCA 
had to change tactics occasionally. As the example of the Mawai Resettlement 
Area has shown, Tan Cheng Lock could not be caught catering too much to the 
British. Both the Negara Pasundan and the Malayan Chinese Association engaged 








From Loose Sand to Discipline: Alliance-formation, Indigenous Elites and 
the Colonial Security Forces 
Only two days before his untimely—and accidental—death, High Commissioner 
Henry Lovell Gurney, in what some called his political testament, complained 
bitterly that the Chinese had regretfully let Malaya down; their behaviour verged 
on the disingenuous. ‘Leading Chinese’ did not lead, chose a ‘luxury’ life in 
Singapore and criticized the security forces ‘for causing injustices’ among the 
Chinese. Malayan Chinese hardly did anything to extricate themselves from the 
position of having to support the MRLA and its clandestine cells, the Min Yuen—
implying they chose a neutral stance, Gurney protested. If this state of affairs was 
allowed to continue, the ‘enormous’ amassed wealth of the Chinese would be lost.  
To save the Chinese from Communism and themselves, much depended on 
recruiting them as police constables. However, when the call-up came, ‘the cry 
was all for exemptions’. Worse still, 6,000 ‘decamped to Singapore and several 
other thousands to China’. Gurney wanted harsh—a-typical for him—action to 
get the Chinese in line.1 He was frustrated with the fact that the British 
government in Malaya could not access the Chinese communities for recruitment 
in the face of a mounting, Chinese-dominated communist insurrection. He had a 
manpower crisis on his hands. By and large, the Dutch in Indonesia faced a 
similar problem. Since the Dutch had finally allowed the PRP to establish their 
own Pasundan State, it did little to help stem the rising insurrectionist tide in 
West Java. The manpower crisis presented a top-down problem revolving around 
the possibilities of power-related trade-offs. The problem was three-tiered, as it 
influenced the British and Dutch colonial authorities and their agents, 
indigenous leaders and, at the bottom, the individuals and communities that 
actually served.  
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 This chapter, like the preceding one, deals with alliance-formation between 
elites and the colonial government. The contrast, however, lies in the fact that 
here the specific intricacies of solving the security forces manpower problem are 
central. This distinction allows for an analysis of how local elites were able to 
claim they represented the bottom-rung of the colonial ladder, the truly colonized. 
The latter group will be discussed in the next chapter, but by setting the stage for 
the colonized here, I will illustrate how local elites wanted to make themselves 
indispensable in two opposite directions, underlining again that the black and 
white dichotomies between colonizers and colonized are rather unhelpful terms 
for analysis. Overall, it presents a nominal view of the interaction between the 
three groups mentioned above. The first section of this chapter will show the 
exact role of local elites play in accessing manpower from a multi-empire 
perspective. The subsequent sections will analyse how the colonial state and local 
leaders in Indonesia and Malaysia tried to work hand in glove to gain access to 
manpower.  
 Due to the availability of sources, the focus lies with the MCA in Malaya; 
therefore, Malaya and Indonesia are presented separately. Such a course does 
show how the possibilities offered to local elites—and through it, their 
behavioural repertoires—are shaped by endogenous influences; in this case the 
colonial authorities. At stake was perceived loyalty to the colonial state not only 
for the elites, but also for the communities they represented. The central question 
this chapter will answer is: how did local elites convince the colonial state they 
could muster the loyalty of their constituencies in relation to manpower? Or, in 
other words, did the MCA or the Partai Rakyat Pasundan manoeuvre themselves 
into a position of power-sharing with the colonial authorities? Where they 
successful at all in this endeavour and if so, what lay behind their success or 
failure to do so?   
 In terms of the comparative framework, the manpower crisis and the 
subsequent recruitment drives in Malaysia and Indonesia underline that certain 
processes were activated that were found in both colonial territories. The first is 
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that both Dutch and British recruiters did not have much difficulty finding men 
and willing to serve. For Malaysia, this may not come as a surprise as the 
resurrection in Malaya was never truly nationalist. Finding indigenous helpers 
was ‘not difficult at all’, said John Davis, a former civil servant, as the insurgency 
was ‘never a national rebellion’. The Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist 
Party even had difficulty attracting the Chinese population to their cause. The 
ease of Dutch recruitment is more puzzling as—if we are to believe the traditional 
historiographies of the Indonesian revolution—the Dutch heavy-handed, military 
approach precluded support for their cause. Also, if Indonesian political meetings 
in the early days of the revolution, many of which turned into ‘mass’ affairs, 
denoted support for the nascent Republic, then surely Dutch recruitment drives 
should have certainly failed.2 Clearly, another element must have been 
responsible for recruitment. I will argue that despite of the Pasundan’s failures as 
a state—or, conversely, the Dutch unwillingness to have it function as such—the 
Pasundan still attracted Sundanese support. A second process illuminated 
through comparison is that it was not necessarily the colonial governments 
themselves that drove colonial service. Here we clearly find elitist complicity in 
pitting communities against each other. In Indonesia, it was a (cultural-political) 
movement from below lead by (local) leaders as well as the attraction of a distinct 
cultural construct. In Malaysia, the MCA was the driving force behind 
recruitment—for reasons that were to strengthen its own position; not so much 
those of the Chinese it represented. There is one overwhelming process at work: 
the fact that shared interests between colonial authorities and indigenous elite 
groups wanting authority made alliance-partners.  
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The security troika: Authorities, local elites and the security forces 
The use of indigenous troops, as we have seen in chapter one, was conditional to 
the entrenchment of colonial authorities. What is more, conducting operations 
with them spared the lives of metropolitan troops. Their deployment reduced 
financial expenses. Additionally, locally recruited troops knew the terrain and 
proved ‘resistant to the climates and diseases’ that might reduce the effectiveness 
of foreign troops dramatically.3 This section is concerned with the local elites who 
accessed the communities from which the recruits were drawn. Through their 
access, elites signalled to the colonial authorities they were worth supporting. The 
context in which signalling often occurred—calamities and the threat of war—
expedited the shows of support. 
 As Ronald Robinson once quipped, colonial rule was ‘a gimcrack effort run 
by two men and a dog’.4 Colonial administrators therefore ‘enlist[ed] the support 
of large numbers of local collaborators to do much of the work on the ground’.5 
Older, indigenous patron-client relations could not be swept aside: they made 
empire sustainable. Local elites functioned as the ‘hidden linchpins of colonial 
rule’, ‘[bridging] the linguistic and cultural gaps that separated European colonial 
officials from subject populations by managing the collection and distribution of 
information, labor, and funds’.6 Continued indigenous jurisdiction gave local 
chiefs ‘considerable power in rural areas’. Local elites became ‘a significant 
political force’.7 Chiefs who controlled large labour forces proved pivotal for 
recruitment. In the Gold Coast, chiefs guided the recruitment drives that 
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drummed up the 200,000 men who, at the end of the Second World War, had 
served ‘as pioneer labour’ in the armed forces.8 
 An impending external threat gave those who had become part of the 
colonial administration a further chance to cement their standing through 
making ‘strong statements of loyalty and support’.9 In the Netherlands East Indies 
during the First World War, Indonesians from all stations of life—in tandem with 
the Europeans—feared Japanese designs on the region. Leaders of the nationalist 
movement, expressing loyalty to the Dutch, wanted to maintain the status quo. A 
foreign invasion would be a set-back: ‘the huge amount of money which had 
already been spent to teach Dutch to Javanese, the language through which 
Javanese could gain access to modern science, would be wasted’. The Dutch 
were, at least, ‘familiar with the needs of the Javanese’. Nationalist leaders and 
those of the Sarekat Islam, an Islamic political party not predisposed towards 
colonial rule, wanted the Dutch to finish reforms they had started earlier.10 
Indigenous administrators, among them Sundanese civil servants in Bandung, 
scrambled to assure the colonial government their loyalty.11  
 Despite such demonstrations, the threat of invasion in Indonesia ironically 
furthered the nationalists’ call for indigenous freedom and representation as it 
rekindled the old discussion about the pros and cons of a native militia, or 
conscript army.12 While the idea was eventually mooted and discarded, it realized 
another which also originated from the end of the nineteenth century: the need 
for a representative body. Spurred on by the ‘demands of the nationalist 
organizations’, who wanted a parliament before conscription of Javanese could be 
contemplated, the semi-democratically chosen Volksraad (People’s Council) was 
inaugurated in 1918. For local leaders, it underlined that power could be derived 
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from involvement with manpower conscription.13 A decade after its inauguration, 
members of the Boedi Oetomo, Sarekat Islam and other nationalist organizations 
still had seats in the Council.14 While many lamented its lack of real decision-
making power, in the least the Volksraad proved the stage where indigenous 
complaints could be lodged.15  
 Naturally, indigenous leaders never put on fatigues themselves. Tan Chen 
Lock, for instance, had the financial means to sit out the Japanese Occupation of 
Malaysia in India. Still, leaders’ access to manpower did more for them than only 
enhance their standing with the colonial administrators. Placation worked in two 
directions: the connection also gave them influence over their own constituencies, 
represented by those who guarded the empire.16 Through assisting with the 
recruitment into the colonial police, army and various paramilitary forces, leaders 
were handed by the colonial authorities the right to dispense certain ‘prizes’ to 
their followers.  
 Here the indigenous population comes into play as the element to complete 
the colonial security triangle. Although recruitment was not necessarily 
voluntary—drafting was quite common—indigenous men could reap rewards, 
nonetheless. Communities learnt that an alliance with the colonial state could 
give them the means to decide long-standing feuds on favourable terms.17 Other 
rewards took forms that had to do with inclusion and strategic benefits. 
Citizenship—as we shall see—represented seems an important pay-off. Another 
prize was that some communities earned a ‘special status’ within the colonial 
army. The Christianized Ambonese within the Royal Netherlands Indies Army 
received better rations and higher pay; they were perceived to be more ‘loyal’ and 
better officer than their Javanese counterparts.18 Another incentive was that the 
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willingness to lay down one’s life in service of the state for an extended period of 
time—provided the person in question survived—would put the colonial state in 
the serviceman or woman’s debt. The state would be obligated to protect certain 
communities because they took up arms. Furthermore, colonial conscripts could 
earn the right to a pension; in other cases, the colonial government offered 
conscripts plots of land or resettlement. Service lent them and their families 
standing and relative affluence; it made them into ‘local patrons’.19  
 
The manpower problem: Bringing in the troops 
As in other territories, the colonial troika was interdependent in Malaysia and 
Indonesia. The colonial authorities could not always easily gain access to 
manpower locked away in the rural villages without the help of Chinese, 
Sundanese (and Malay) leaders. Conversely, those drafted from the villages and 
towns could not hope to find protection against the freedom fighters without 
collusion with their leaders, who in turn could not access colonial power if they 
did not play by the colonial authorities’ rules. 
 The call for manpower was preceded by a call for loyalty; the two were 
inextricably connected. Past and future loyalties became extremely important 
after 1945. The Japanese Occupation had not removed the infrastructure of the 
colonial administrations and security forces in Indonesia and Malaysia, but it had 
been severely gutted. Chaos ensued. After their surrender in August 1945, 
Japanese troops started to concentrate themselves for ‘self internment’. Japanese 
stationed in Java feared for their lives and were happy to relinquish their tasks 
although the allies later used them for crowd control.20 Chin Peng, the leader of 
the Malayan Communist Party during the Emergency, declared that in various 
Malaysian states the Japanese did not interfere with the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-
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Japanese Army’s post-war assumption of power. Rather, it tried to sound out the 
guerrillas as to the possibility of together defeating the returning British.21 Where 
townspeople found the courage, they shouted abuse as they caught Japanese 
troops moving off.22 Indonesian freedom fighters and the members of the MPAJA 
gladly filled the void. Swift and ugly ‘justice’ followed. Those associated with the 
colonial and the Japanese regimes—however loosely—were victimized. One eye-
witness saw the naked bodies of two Indo-European girls nailed to doors floating 
down the Antjol Canal in Batavia; dead women and children as well as a 
Europeans often ended up in in the Tjiliwung river.23 KNIL soldiers and their 
families were common targets; when one of them, also an Indo-European, found 
his family and his neighbours murdered on his return from Singapore after the 
war, ‘He emptied his machine gun into the neighbouring kampong’.24 In 1947, 
some six mass graves had been found around Batavia.25 A similar ‘post-surrender 
interregnum’ of terror existed in Malaysia.26  
When the Chinese-dominated Anti-Japanese Army, the Malayan Peoples’ 
Anti-Japanese Army, came down from the hills and out of the jungles, they took 
over towns and villages, putting together so-called people’s courts. Malay 
policemen, who had continued to serve under the Japanese, came in for 
particular scrutiny. They were the first victims of MPAJA attempts to weed out 
collaborators.27 Other collaborators targeted—Malays—had served in the Heiho, 
Giyu Gun and Giyu Tai and were therefore associated with the gruesome 
Japanese anti-Chinese policies.28 ‘Suddenly,’ one policeman said later,  
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 people seemed to remember every little wrong I did, even when I did not do 
 them. There was a lot of anger and hatred about. This resulted in people 
 being abducted, beaten, and murdered. Initially, before the violence became 
 racial, even some of our Malay kinsmen believed that the police force was 
 the tali barut (lackey) of the Japanese and had discredited themselves.  
 
Bodies of murdered policemen were ‘being mutilated and their eyes gauged out’.29 
This was not necessarily done without the people’s consent. With the Japanese 
out of reach or unapproachable, the collaborating policemen where conveniently 
close and open to accusation; they now represented the years of torture and 
murder at the hands of the Japanese. ‘It was nothing short of “an eye for an eye, 
and a tooth for a tooth”’, as pent-up rage and humiliation found expression in 
seemingly legitimate and legitimized ways.30 Others simply took the 
opportunity—and certainly this applied to Indonesia as well—to partake in 
personal vendetta’s and score-settling.31 
 When the protective blanket was roughly pulled away, people changed 
sides. Some, who upheld the law under the Japanese, now sought to make 
amends and went over to the MPAJA.32 In Indonesia, members of the Japanese-
initiated security forces, such as the Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air (the 
Voluntary Army for the Defence of the Fatherland), Heiho (auxiliary soldiers), 
Keibodan and former KNIL soldiers amalgamated into the Badan Keamanan 
Rakyat (BKR, or People’s Safety Corps), a pre-cursor to the revolutionary national 
army of the Republic of Indonesia.33 Others chose to form bands of pemuda, 
loosely connected to the BKR, but still very much tied to their own interpretation 
of anti-colonial struggle. Whereas in Malaya having served in Japanese-controlled 
units drove a wedge between Malays and Chinese communities and occasioned 
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much post-occupational ‘bitterness [with] a pronounced racial tinge’, in Indonesia 
previous Japanese militarization was a proof of adherence to the post-war 
revolutionary spirit.34 Participation in post-war violence in both Malaya and the 
Netherlands East Indies embodied the natural transition to revolutionary 
maturity. Participation also signalled the dawning of the independence 
movement, born in violence and cut loose from Japanese patrimony and overlord-
ship. 
 The immediate post-war lawlessness clearly underlines that the forces 
traditionally responsible for security, the police and the military, had melted 
away. Unlike those Malays and Indonesians seeking revenge, however, returning 
foreign, colonial officials were much less sure where the loyalty of the security 
personnel they encountered lay. Nor did they have time to be too scrupulous: 
lawlessness dictated a show of strength. The steady flow of fresh recruits that 
existed in pre-war years had been cut and with it the influx of officer material, 
people who would eventually master local ‘language[s] and […] become well 
acquainted with the ways of life of the people’. These officers guarded the 
professionalism of the indigenous police force that was ‘trusted by the public’. 
These mechanisms were thoroughly disrupted; the police force had to be rebuilt 
together with the colonial intelligence services.35 In Singapore, the British found 
that the police force ‘was completely disorganised and unable to restore law and 
order’. The Special Branch and Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the 
previously ‘impregnable fortress’ were both implicated with the anti-Chinese 
purges of the Japanese secret police, the Kempetei.36 In peninsular Malaya, 
policemen had ‘earned an unsavoury reputation’ due to their involvement with 
the Japanese oppressors and ‘in killing and torturing civilians’. It was no wonder 
that ‘[t]he majority of the population regarded the police with fear’—nor that the 
former Special Branch/CID Headquarters in Singapore had been looted. The 
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police uniform no longer designated those wearing them as envoys of colonial 
authority; with the loss of the policemen’s khaki, many were literally stripped of 
power. The Police Force had come out of the war ill-disciplined and ill-trusted by 
the population. ‘[U]ndesirable elements’, therefore, had to be ‘eliminated’.37 
 General Spoor opposed extending forgiveness to KNIL officers who had 
defiled their officers’ oath to Queen Wilhelmina by switching to the Republicans. 
Besides, he argued, taking these deserters back into the colonial army’s fold 
would undermine those who had remained loyal and risked their lives doing so. 
One Indonesian officer told Spoor matter-of-factly: ‘Deserters should be tried 
before the Court Martial’.38 It is doubtful that this call was heeded in all cases. To 
create a ‘loyal police apparatus’ the Dutch were willing to leave the Republican 
Polisi Negara (State Police) operable, most likely with a view to co-optation.39 This 
alliance, undoubtedly unholy to many, was necessary due to the desire to restore 
‘peace and order’ any way possible. Some 1,330 Republican policemen worked for 
the Dutch.40 The Polisi Negara’s ranks—those that remained—were purged as its 
members were connected to the murder of Europeans and Australian officers, 
kidnapping of Chinese and taking shots at Dutch convoys. On one occasion, Van 
Mook complained to Sjarifuddin—the Republic’s second prime minster—that the 
Polisi Negara in Buitenzorg possessed weapons stolen from Dutch troops.41 The 
purge, however, put more weight on the Dutch police, which, especially after the 
Police Action of 1947, had increasingly more territory to control. Soon the police 
were heavily overstretched: ‘in most places only a hand-full [of] police-men’ 
remained ‘with hardly any cadres left’. Those who had previously worked for the 
Dutch were ‘re-schooled’ and re-activated.42 
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 The net effect of untrustworthy police in both territories was the same. The 
colonial powers faced a manpower problem in reorganizing the security forces and 
for the time being, anyone would be allowed into the ranks. The question of 
loyalty was simply less pressing than having boots on the ground. This question 
did not pertain so much to the armies as they made up of Dutch and British 
soldiers. Nor did loyalty figure as a problem with troops whose dependability had 
been a fixture since early colonial times—despite the imagined nature of this 
unshakable loyalty.43 Ambonese and Menadonse, who had been KNIL soldiers 
before the war—this status made them ‘clean’—signed their names once more in 
the colonial ledgers in various prisoner of war camps in Thailand, Singapore and 
French Indochina.44 If General Spoor had some 30,000 troops at the beginning of 
1946 (War Volunteers from the liberated southern Dutch provinces) formed into 
seventeen battalions, padded with KNIL units, in 1948 he disposed over forty-
seven battalions, totalling some 78,000 operational troops on Java and 
Sumatra.45  
 Malaysia saw the influx of troops from places such as Australia, Fiji and, of 
course, Great Britain itself. Even though thirteen battalions—seven Gurkha, 
three British infantry, one artillery regiment, and two Malay Regiment 
battalions—were on site, they could not initially be counted on to properly fight 
the Emergency. The seven Gurkha battalions were under strength and being 
rebuilt with the majority hardly trained. The same applied to the British units: 
none of them were prepared for jungle operations or counterinsurgency.46 The 
process of troop concentration, then, was a process that led to a massive—for 
many, second—displacement of war-weary and under-nourished men. Troops 
were put into the field immediately. It may have been this lack of preparedness, 
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training and proper instruction as to the nature of the wars they participated in 
that combined into a propensity for violence and excess among the newly 
recruited troops.47 Be that as it may, in March 1950 British and Gurkha troops 
numbered some 11,000 troops, aided by 3,500 men of the Malay Regiment, while 
more Gurkha’s—circa 2,000—were under way from Hong Kong.48 
 It is striking that it was not much harder to find indigenous men for the 
police and paramilitary forces—it was they, after all, who would fight their 
compatriots who happened to fight for another cause. Yet, judging by the tallies of 
the colonial administrators, the numbers suggest that the recruitment drives for 
police and affiliated paramilitaries succeeded spectacularly. The Police of the 
Federation of Malaya grew from a small force of some 10,000 at the end of 1947 
to more than 31,000 constables backed by roughly 20,000 Auxiliary Police. 
Apparently, this number had stood, in 1950, at 100,000 Auxiliaries.49 Many of 
their number (ninety percent) were Malay volunteers and belonged to the 
Kampong Guard, who—as opposed to the Auxiliary Police in the main towns—
protected rural spaces. Chinese did not volunteer in great numbers, despite the 
fact that the Chinese Chambers of Commerce proposed to act as recruiting 
agents.50 In the first half of 1951 it was decided that the Kampong Guard was to 
be amalgamated with another paramilitary police force, the Home Guard. The 
Home Guard in March 1952 had more than 190,000 men (240,000 in 1953) in its 
ranks with a preponderance, again, for Malays—possibly because they also 
dominated the Auxiliary Police. Still, considerable numbers of Chinese (73,610), 
Indians (9,429) and ‘Others’ (4,876) had joined.51 The amalgamation served two 
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goals. The first was that both the Kampong Guard and the Home Guard had 
similar purposes, the ‘enabling of the population to share actively in the defence 
of their homes’.52 With that task came the power of arrest without a warrant of 
anyone suspected of offending the Emergency Regulations. Having both under 
one roof would streamline control held by Civil Defence Officers.53 Secondly, it 
was hoped that the largely armed kampong guards would strengthen the Home 
Guard, who were inexperienced—in relation to the kampong guards—and had 
less arms. 
 The Special Constables (SC), 36,832 in total, completed the ‘278,466 local 
people in arms’.54 The Special Constabulary was conceived as a direct reaction to 
the nature of the violence that precluded and precipitated the Malayan 
Communist Party’s insurrection. It must be borne in mind that the Malayan 
Emergency was as much about toppling the British government as it was about 
the redistribution of economic power; hence much of the violence focussed on the 
rubber plantations and the tin mines. The planters and miners blamed the labour 
unions. ‘[T]he vast majority of Unions’, they claimed, were led by those who 
sacrificed the good of the masses for their own, much narrower political ends. ‘It 
matters not to these men that their gospel is likely to lead to wanton strikes, 
bitter unrest and even bloodshed’. Those riling up the labourers had lost all 
deference for the once mighty planters and simply threatened any estate 
managers attempting ‘to rid themselves of subversive elements’. The planters, 
naturally, looked to their traditional protectors, but ‘[a]ppeals to higher 
authorities’—a complained often heard in Malaysia and Indonesia—‘have 
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apparently fallen on stony ground’. The European business community, in other 
words, felt that their ‘whole existence [was being] threatened’.55  
 The stony ground was more fertile than the estate owners suspected, 
however. The government had noticed that the MCP’s tactics had been shifting 
from ‘fomenting labour disputes’ to ‘picking off managerial staffing’ and robbing 
wages on pay-day from isolated plantations.56 In addition, officials took note of 
the first obituaries for murdered planters—‘Killed by gangsters whilst on duty on 
[their] estate’—that were being published by the planters themselves by the time 
the Emergency proper started.57 Not only did the SC function as a mental support 
to the planter and miner communities; their presence also gave some needed 
breathing space for police and military units who were being tied up to static 
defence duties on mines, plantations and other valuable economic instillations.58 
The initial estimate—characteristically underestimated—for the maximum of SC 
men was set at 9,000 but in 1952, the new Commissioner of Police, Colonel Sir 
Arthur E. Young, coming in from the London Metropolitan Police, determined 
42,000 SC were needed.59   
 Similar fears of being overrun by anti-colonial elements animated the 
discussions concerning the build-up of the security forces in Indonesia, which 
began in earnest at the end of 1947. Planters everywhere saw the security 
situation in rural areas declining at a frightening pace in the wake of the Police 
Action. Surely, this military action had brought much of the estates and 
plantations back under Dutch control—on Java, for example, 70 percent of 
rubber areas and 92 percent of tea areas were occupied—but by the end of the 
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year the resistance had reasserted itself quite vigorously.60 One firm wrote to the 
Minister president in the Netherlands, threatening to abandon their plantations.61 
Overall, the planters blamed a shortage of security forces to protect estate 
personnel and a lack of weapons for the planters’ use.62 As in Malaysia, planters 
were murdered and, as a community, they faulted the Dutch government for not 
having brought the Police Action to its—in their opinion—logical conclusion: the 
occupation of the centre of the Republican resistance, Yogyakarta.63 However, 
beholden to The Hague, Indische civil and military policy-makers were for the 
time being barred from pushing onward. Van Mook and Spoor could not 
accommodate the planters, despite their wish to do so.64 The Ministerial Council 
in the Netherlands had buckled under international pressure from the United 
Nations, agreeing—with the Republic—to implement a cease-fire. The Good 
Offices Commission, an arbitrating, international body, would come to Indonesia 
to bring both parties to the negotiating table once more.65 Spoor was outraged; he 
fumed that ‘to Asian eyes, we have lost the campaign’. ‘[D]oubters will do well to 
maintain their trust in the Republic, because that is what the defeated 
Hollanders do, too’. He could now test the merits of this assumption that Asians 
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only understood force, applying it to the areas the Police Action had brought 
under Dutch control.66 
 The military establishment seemed to undertake this task with some verve 
as it set about establishing various security forces while resurrecting the existing 
police. This was needed; those military units that arrived in the early 
revolutionary days were designated to return home soon. Spoor was to lose part 
of his ‘jungle-wise troops’ and gain those alien to the Indonesian battlefield. To 
add to their misery, incessant patrolling of massive expanses wore down the 
soldiers’ resolve while ‘drastic financial cuts’ would severely limit the army’s up-
keep and its mobility.67 It was under these circumstances, combined with 
resurgent violence that military and police commanders decided to reorganise the 
security forces. Before 1947, as we have seen, police forces operated on a more or 
less ad hoc basis. In North Sumatra police detachments that accompanied 
advancing troops tried to enlist Republican policemen and found them open to 
doing so. These Republican policemen had been slighted: their government had 
given weapons not to them, but to a local laskar (gang) that had threatened to 
burn down the police barracks.68  
 In a high-level meeting at Spoor’s own home in September 1947 military 
and police dignitaries discussed the inward and outward security of Indonesia. 
They decided on a structural approach.69 General and Daerah (local) Police had to 
be re-instated and shored up. More than 10,000 indigenous men had to be found 
to fill the police deficit, although one official estimated that 18,000 were needed 
for Java alone.70 Numbers rose quickly. By March 1947, the General Police 
fielded some 38,604 men of all ranks, including recruits, across Indonesia. The 
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Daerah Police’s numbers stood at 18,345.71 As for the Plantation Guard, 
paramilitaries much akin to Malaya’s Special Constabulary, planters noted that 
they wanted to raise their numbers from 18,500 to 30,000 in the course of 
1949.72 The much-beleaguered Chinese were allowed by Spoor to recruit their 
own men in a specifically Chinese security corps, the Pao An Tui (PAT). The total 
number of operational PAT fighters are unknown. Another security force, 
collectively called the Safety Battalions (SB) was slated to ultimately have some 
17,000 members plus 3,000 cadre.73 Clearly, mass recruitment was unavoidable 
in Malaya and Indonesia.  
 
The call for loyalty in the Pasundan  
The colonial authorities had to offer some form of inducement to the people who 
were supposed to fill out the security forces’ ranks. At the same time, this offer 
had also to attract those who presented themselves as the local leaders. What the 
British and Dutch governments in Kuala Lumpur and Batavia, respectively, were 
willing to share was inclusion. Officials understood that serving had to be repaid 
by rewards. These rewards could be dispensed by the local elites that had 
declared their support to pacification. At the same time, the offer turned into a 
test for the local elites who, in the name of the colonial powers, had to draw in 
the very communities they purported to represent. If they successfully delivered 
recruits or, at the very least, brought their constituencies closer to the 
government, the leaders in the Negara Pasundan and the Malayan Chinese 
Association could greatly enhance their own standing. The analysis that follows 
shall therefore trace the level of involvement with the recruitment drives, whether 
PRP/Pasundan and MCA officials were able to realize inclusion and, lastly, 
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whether they successfully drew recruits. In other words, did local elites need their 
constituencies to solidify their power or, conversely, did colonial authorities need 
the elites to reach indigenous communities? Arguably, based on the gate-keeper 
roles indigenous elites could play, such a devolving of authority would be 
expected. 
 What local elites wanted and what the authorities were willing to finally 
concede, was pure influence and recognition for their organizations and, for their 
constituencies, inclusion in a separate polity or, in the case of the Malaya, as part 
of the citizenry. Influence is what the PRP craved most: to be taken seriously by 
the Dutch as a beacon to which the Sundanese could flock. To its constituents, 
the PRP could hold up their independent state as a means to access, reclaim and 
reinstate their golden past. The Negara Pasundan would then be taken up in the 
United States of Indonesia as an autonomous polity. This statement is based 
mostly on Suriakartalegawa’s writings due to the fact that there is little else to be 
found in the archives in The Hague.  
It is virtually impossible to know what other individuals within the PRP 
leadership envisaged. The problem was that, in his own words, ‘The P.R.P. is 
Soerjakartalegawa, Soerjakartalegawa is the P.R.P.’ Although other officials did 
write tracts and telegrams sparingly, there was some truth to Suriakartalegawa’s 
statement. He wrote the statutes of the PRP as well as its ‘house rules’. ‘[A]ll 
telegrams sent to government authorities and letters’ were his, claimed one 
Indonesian Inland Administration official. Suriakartelagawa’s co-administrators 
in the PRP, such as Sadikin and Machmud, chairman and secretary respectively, 
had had no ‘political education’ and mostly echoed Suriakartelagawa’s fixed party 
line; that the Sundanese needed their own state if their identity and culture were 
to survive.74 This means that we are forced to take Kartalegawa’s words, for now, 
as representative for the PRP as a whole. The Sundanese state was not solely 
Suriakartelagawa’s dream, however; the Pasundan idea was alive in the ante-war 
period. The Sundanese-Javanese rivalry dated back centuries. The Pasundan 
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idea, moreover, was expressed in a Pasundan museum and ‘an attempt to found 
a daily press’ in Sundanese. The idea, however, lived more culturally and not so 
much politically.75 
 At the point where Suriakartalegawa, and with him the PRP, was trying to 
invest himself into the Sundanese community of the Priangan, one of 
Suriakartalegawa’s aims was to ensure he was the prime candidate to lead to 
Sundanese out of the Javanese desert; the Dutch accepted him as such.76 He 
sold himself to the Dutch administrators who would decide on the creation of a 
separate, Sundanese entity: everywhere he went, he said, ‘I get contact, 
everywhere I receive [motions of] trust’. Grandiloquently, he declared he only 
needed a car to more actively spread the pro-Pasundan propaganda.77 The PRP 
foreman spoke to the rural population, receiving their complaints—to some Dutch 
officials’ dismay, ignoring that the Inland Administration should do that—and 
occasionally spreading the word beyond the demarcation lines that supposedly 
separated the Dutch and Republican spheres of influence.78 To drive home the 
point that it was he alone who could make the Sundanese people fall in with the 
Dutch, he gently threatened his benefactors, saying that  
 
 I am sure, that the regents in the Priangan are sceptical about the 
 Nederlandsch-Indische Government’s policy, now that they see, how it 
 treats me. I have become a victim of my faithfulness and loyalty and [it] 
 does  not support me.79   
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If only the Dutch would support him, surely Sundanese leaders would prove their 
alliance to the Dutch. The rapport that the PRP and later the Pasundan State 
established with the Dutch, Suriakartalegawa argued, would certainly be followed 
by support from the common Sundanese.  
 Sadly, there is little evidence that the PRP and the Negara Pasundan were 
directly involved with pressing Sundanese into service, or how this involvement 
exactly influenced their position vis-a-vis the Dutch and the Sundanese 
community. As we shall see later, however, the Partai claimed to represent 
40,000 and later 250,000 members. The Wali Negara did, however, appear in 
public and addressed the uluma—Islamic scholars—and the Sundanese masses 
from mosques and on the radio. Laced with ‘Quran-verses and promises of the 
after-life’ his calls reminded people that Allah willed them to serve the Pasundan. 
Its cabinet planned to draw up a statement in which it ‘finally’ declared to the 
people that the Pasundan Government wholly stood for ‘order and rest’.80 Before 
the Wali’s invocations, Suriakartalegawa clearly stated that nothing could be 
mobilized in the Priangan without (his) initiative from above.81 
 Although this did not mean he was involved with Sundanese recruitment, 
he at least tried to convince his Dutch overseers that the Sundanese had the 
mettle needed to fight. While he bitterly complained about his people having been 
ignored while Borneo and East-Indonesia had been simply ‘gifted’ the status of a 
federal state, Suriakartalegawa asked whether this was due to the Sundanese not 
having enough arms, not being ‘born soldiers’ or to the fact that ‘in colonial times 
only those banned from the desa were willing to sign for the “compagnie” (V.O.C.), 
as Pasoendan stood above the Javanese economically and only a few wanted to 
serve as soldiers for “taken mati” [death tasks]’.82 He seemed to have wanted to 
imply that if only the Sundanese were armed, they could fend for themselves. He 
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may have wanted to prove a point. There was a stubborn rumour floating about 
saying the Sundanese were a ‘race’ less ‘tenacious’ than the Javanese, 
predisposed to ‘Weib und Gesang’ and to the less serious things in life. In the 
immediate post-World War power vacuum, some Sundanese had enjoyed ‘playing 
at being solders, kidnapping and plundering as long as there was little personal 
risk’. Some ‘strong slaps’ by the Japanese put a stop to that, one official noted 
with some satisfaction. The weakness of the Sundanese was illustrated again 
when the revolutionary Javanese Badan Keamanan Rakjat, the People’s Security 
Organization, sent their Sundanese ‘sister organisation’ within Bandung sacks of 
rice flour. An accompanying letter ‘had roughly the following content: “To the 
Ladies in Bandoeng a batch of bedak [flour], if they want to powder 
themselves”’.83  
 In any case, the Pasundan’s official peace and order declaration caused 
ripples which again threatened to tear the cabinet asunder again.84 To many, the 
Wali Negara’s declaration came off as half-hearted. The Dutch found Pasundan’s 
call for Sundanese loyalty wholly insufficient. The Dutch put their foot down and 
demanded loyalty. Djumhana, who would return as Pasundan’s Premier, was 
ordered by Van Diffelen, the High Representative of the Crown in Pasundan, to 
finally engineer and publish that unequivocal declaration to the effect that the 
Pasundan, ‘with all its powers and in narrow cooperation with Army and Police’, 
planned to put an end to the unrest in its territory.85 The Dutch proclamation 
from the pen of the Territorial Commander of West Java, KNIL General-Major E. 
Engles, however, was a tell-tale sign that the Pasundan did not command much 
support from its constituency. Engles’s statement therefore turned the 
thumbscrews even tighter.  
 Referring to the arrest of the Pasundan government officials for being 
Republicans and failing spectacularly at subtlety, General Engles stated that he 
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had withstood the urge to bring down the full might of the ‘Military Authorities’ 
on the Pasundan. Owing to the deterioration in the security situation and the 
negara’s lacklustre response, however, he threatened to take ‘sharper measures 
against whomever, who stands in the way of the execution of my task’. This 
included everyone from the Indonesian civil servants, the Regents, the lurahs 
(village elders) and uluma to the police. Engles did not yet have to make good on 
his threat—assured as he claimed to be of Pasundan support—but the 
proclamation ended on a rather cynical, paternalistic note nevertheless. ‘There is 
no task more beautiful’, it read, ‘than to have this people live free of fear, with the 
certainty of daily labour for the well-being and the happiness of the family’.86 
Arrests that broke up less pliant families were simply part of the process.  
 The archival materials do not reveal what effects General Engles and Van 
Diffelen’s coercive attempts sorted—violence in West Java, as elsewhere, 
continued unabated. Furthermore, no documentation exists to detail exactly how 
many Sundanese decided to report for duty in either the police, the Security 
Battalions or the KNIL—or were forced to do so. Most of the long lists of 
Indonesians who put their name under security forces’ contracts did not contain 
their ethnographic background.  
Much can be reconstructed with incomplete evidence nonetheless. The 
military and probably the police force were aware of the fact that local people 
wanted to serve in local security forces. Such wishes were welcomed as it ensured 
that individuals operated in familiar terrain inhabited by people they knew. The 
‘future federal troops’, the Safety Battalions, were thus bound to the federal state, 
‘according to the loyalty to their region’. Along these lines, SBs were raised in 
Sumatra-Timur, Borneo, the Pasundan and elsewhere.87 With this regional 
functionality in mind, it is safe to assume that the two SBs in West Java, founded 
in February and July 1948 and both having circa 1,230 men, were largely made 
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up of Sundanese.88 Twenty-two of its sergeants had graduated from a four month 
course in August 1948.89 Roughly a year before, the majority of troops recruited 
around Bandung and Cimahi in April 1947 were of Sundanese descent.90 A 
hundred Sundanese had enrolled in a ‘crash course’ for security units. Its alumni 
went to Tasikmalaya and Garut to stop Republican incursions. In August 1947, 
the Barisan Pasundan, the Pasundan Legion, was formed by the Commander of 
the 1st Infantry Brigade; Sundanese had told him they felt their potential went 
untapped. Several hundreds of them who were found trustworthy enough 
received arms.91 Dutch administrators and police functionaries had found this 
move—official recognition of Pasundan units as ‘assistant police’—necessary, as 
‘masked PRP-troops’ had been seen taking matters into their own hands in 
Buitenzorg. Officials had troubles distinguishing between them, insurgents and 
Indonesians ‘with Orange-bands’, apparently belonging to another pro-Dutch 
outfit.92  
More Sundanese could be found in the Guard Battalions by the same logic 
of having local troops in local units. The 5th Guard Battalion, billeted in 
Semarang, for example, received 24 new recruits in the summer of 1948 who had 
voluntarily signed up for the KNIL for one year. Others joined the Military Medical 
Services, such as Mahdjuk, Hadis and Suratja in June 1948. That same day 
sixteen more Sudanese, ‘civilians’, became part of the infantry as Soldier Second 
Class; seven signed for no less than six years; the rest for three. All of them, and 
more, then went to the training depot in Cimahi close to Bandung.93 Lastly, 
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Sundanese may have been among the Field and City Police—both part of the 
General Police—that operated in West Java; already in August 1947, they had 
more than 3,000 constables between them, most of them in urban areas.94  
 The Sundanese elite, beginning with those representing the PRP, seemed to 
have had little interest in involvement with recruitment—as far as archival 
sources allow for such a statement. Suriakartelagawa proved to be primarily 
concerned with establishing the PRP at the centre of Sundanese aspirations for a 
national home within the USI. So were his secondants. Kustomo, one of the PRP’s 
secretaries, for example, said that the Republic should not interfere with the PRP: 
‘The Soendanese lands will have to be cleansed completely [with the assistance of 
Dutch troops]...After the cleansing [of the Republican influence] we will install our 
own administration’.95 What further drew attention away from recruitment drives 
was that the Pasundan Cabinet and Parliament had trouble charting a course 
that was implementable. Due to the complex force-field within the Pasundan 
government, keeping the Pasundan on track was hard enough in itself. 
Ultimately, officials had little scope for manoeuvre. Whatever attention they did 
free up to help establish ‘peace and order’ was deemed too insignificant by the 
Dutch, who acted promptly to try and rectify this lethargy. Handling the police 
and Safety Battalions was the prerogative of the Dutch military. The Pasundan 
State, then, was a decidedly colonial state: its internal issues were handled by 
Indonesians (if that), but matters of defence were the colonial power’s prerogative. 
Still, the PRP and the Negara Pasundan would have a function within the larger 
mobilization of Sundanese manpower, but as we shall see, this had little to do 
with the actions of the Negara and its representatives itself. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
functioned as an internment camp under the Japanese occupation, see J. van Dulm, E. Braches, W. J. Krijgsveld, et al, 
Geïllustreerde Atlas van de Japanse Kampen in Nederlands-Indië 1942-1945 (Voorburg: Asia Maior, 2000), 6-7. 
94 Aanwezige Sterkte Politie-middelen West Java (globale cijfers). 1e. Maandelijks-verslag ddo.medio.Augustus 1947, 
NL-HaNA, Proc.-Gen. Hooggerechtshof Ned.-Ind. 2.10.17/107.  





The call for Chinese loyalty in Malaya 
The Central Queensland Herald on 22 May 1941 published an article simply 
called ‘Malaya’. It portrayed the Chinese as resourceful yet happy to work on the 
‘public defence works’ after having suffering lay-offs previously due to tin and 
rubber slumps. The Malay, alongside the Chinese, had ‘learned new tricks […] 
uncommon for a race [...] who farm their hillsides and kill game with primitive 
blowpipes’. Basically, the journalist said, the Malayan peoples, with values 
different from ‘those of the enlightened West’, cared little for nationalism as long 
as they received their daily bread.96 Had Tan Cheng Lock read this article, these 
words would have sounded deceptive. He would not have recognized the 
harmonious tableau depicted as representing ‘Malaya’. He would use this 
ostensible disinterest for politics and secure a central place for the MCA in post-
war Malaya.  
 The Herald’s interpretation of Chinese political life had a long pedigree. To 
understand why the MCA established itself through activating the Chinese, a 
short historical expose on the Chinese is warranted. As in Indonesia, the Chinese 
in Malaya could have formed ‘a virtual imperium in imperio’ had it not been for the 
fact that the British strictly monitored Chinese activities that incongruently 
clashed with their rule. For one, Secret societies—which originated in China—
controlled the flow of labour unto the Malayan estates and mines. Often they 
caused ‘civil disturbances’ due to escalating rivalries between societies.97 The 
Chinese communities figured largely in the mining industry. 100,789 Chinese 
men and women worked in rubber in the Federated Malay States versus 26,618 
Malays. In the Unfederated States a similar asymmetry applied (61,374 versus 
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34,776).98 In the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States, Chinese 
owned 12,5 per cent of rubber estates.99  
 The Chinese in Malaya roughly belonged to three groups. The first group 
remained connected to China through sustained transnational bonds embodied 
by secret societies or patriotic organisations such as Reading Societies and 
schools. A second community, the ‘realistic majority’, steered clear of any 
(political) activities detrimental to either their family in China or Malaya. Malayan 
nationalists and British Straits Chinese constituted the third group. The smallest 
in number, this perenakan Chinese were born predominantly in the British 
Straits Settlements of Singapore, Penang and Malacca. Marrying into Malay 
families, they largely abandoned their mother tongues and identified with ‘the 
Malay way of life’ before adopting a decidedly British variant at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. When some turned to Christianity, ‘Their alienation from 
the larger Chinese community was usually complete’.100 The overthrow of China’s 
last imperial dynasty in 1911 in favour of a republic enlarged and turned the 
China-oriented community—the sinkeh—further from Malaya. Their number rose 
as ‘literate newcomers’ from China influenced public opinion on China. 
Consequently, the British deported some sinkeh leaders and closed their 
organizations.101 Meanwhile the sinkeh berated the peranakan for being in league 
with the imperialists, while they more gently admonished the neutral Chinese to 
not link up, socially, with the peranakan. The latter in turn distrusted the China-
oriented Chinese and criticized the neutrals for ‘fence-sitting’ and lack of political 
convictions.102  
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 Contacts between the Chinese groups did exist. Before 1942, the 
Kuomintang’s nationalism facilitated such ties, cultivating Chinese values, 
education, attention for political disturbances in China, the boycott of Japanese 
goods, but also a revival of Confucianism.103 The unifying effects of the KMT 
should not be overstated, however.104 In 1913, China’s new president, Yuan Shik 
Kai, trying his hand at imperial restoration, outlawed the KMT. The British 
responded followed suit.105 They banned the KMT in 1925 after the Netherlands 
East Indies had warned that the KMT had become entangled in a Communist plot 
against the Empire in the Far East.106  
 KMT’s black-listing ran analogous to the development of a ‘pro-Malay’ 
policy. British reports concluded that Malays should figure more centrally in the 
government services; European administrators should curb their scepticism 
towards Malays. This and other measures were designed ‘to “restore” to the 
Malays a more active role in the affairs of their own states [and] to fulfil 
obligations seen to have been incurred in the original protectorate agreements’. 
Malays should be spared ‘an existence spent as a peon or a messenger’.107 An 
emerging Malay elite soon decried Malay social and economic ‘backwardness’.108 
The Kesatuan Melayu Singapura (KMS, the Singapore Malay Union) in 1926 
therefore opined that the government—including the Malay Sultans—failed to 
champion Malay interests.109 ‘Can we Malays if born in Shanghai call ourselves 
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the sons of the soil of Shanghai’, asked one Malay commentator, ‘just because we 
want rights and privileges?’110 Around this time Malayan Chinese, in turn, 
claimed loyalty to Malaya. Lim Ching Yan, a Legislative Councillor, asked: ‘Who 
said this is a Malay country’? It was Chinese money that had allowed the 
‘Government […] to open this Country into a civilized one’. ‘This is ours, our 
country’.111 The tensions between Malays and non-Malays finally prompted 
British discussions about the status of non-Malay communities Malaya.112 
Although many Chinese and Indians had adopted Malaya as their home or had 
never been to ‘the land of their origin’ they received no ‘fair treatment’ due to the 
mounting ‘cry of Malaya for the Malays’.113  
 After a decade of slow planning, however, the question of citizenship for 
non-Malay communities came to naught with the Japanese invasion.114 The 
Japanese Occupation had done nothing to bring the Malay, Chinese and British 
communities closer. The Malays, including the Rulers, had been implicated with 
the Japanese.115 Malay emotions, in turn, were severely inflamed by the fear that 
the Chinese would assume a dominant position.116 These anxieties fed on the fact 
that the British had supported, armed and tried to lead the MPAJA against the 
Japanese. The Chinese guerrillas now welcomed the return of the British, 
expecting to play their part in running the country.117  
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 At this juncture, Tang Cheng Lock and the MCA again appearance as the 
establishment of both was caught up with recruitment of Chinese for the security 
forces of Malaya. Whereas the Dutch offered little in terms of citizenship to the 
Chinese—deferring the topic until the Round Table Conference on the eve of 
Indonesian Independence—Chinese leaders in Malaya were instrumental in 
attracting Chinese men for service through inclusion.118 They could perform this 
role as middlemen because the British, with the Malay rulers, kept the question 
of nationality and citizenship alive during and after the Japanese Occupation. 
The British very much pushed for the MCA to play such a role. This coincided 
with Tan Cheng Lock’s own wishes.  
 The citizenship question—and with it, the position of the Chinese—
remained current for several reasons. First, the Anglo-Chinese alliance during the 
war necessitated a reappraisal of the position of the overseas Chinese in Malaya 
towards a more progressive stance.119 Second, influential people within the 
establishment impressed upon the British that a continued pro-Malay stance was 
ill-advised. H. A. L. Luckham, a former Resident in Malaya, opined that 
privileging the Malays hindered the growth of a ‘Malayan consciousness’. A more 
concessionary tone could, conversely, foster ‘a strong spirit of patriotism and 
loyalty to and confidence in the rulers of the country’. Non-Malays would want to 
remain in Malaya, work there and ‘if necessary, defend it’.120 Prominent figures 
within the Malay community shared Luckham’s view.121 Third, the message to 
finally include non-Malays within a Malayan community gained momentum 
because of mounting British distrust regarding the duplicitous role of the Malay 
rulers under the Japanese.122 The KMT and the MCP, in the meantime, with other 
Chinese organizations, had established the anti-Japanese Overseas Chinese 
Mobilization Council.123 Sir Edward Gent, in his capacity as the Head of the 
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Eastern Department in the Colonial Office, in 1944 embraced the idea that the 
‘alleged [British] failure in war time’ had partially been attributable to the lack of 
Chinese support due to the pro-Malay policy. He declared that ‘common 
citizenship’ would prove paramount to any ‘political progress and as a basis for 
linking the various communities in the country’.124  
 The Malayan Chinese Association’s ascendancy was helped by the founding 
of the Malay Union. This union operated on jus soli citizenship, meaning that all 
peoples born in Malaya could apply for citizenship as long as they conformed to 
certain prescribed rules concerning the length of residency and were willing to 
take an oath of allegiance to the government.125 Unfortunately for the Chinese, 
the liberal citizenship rights were lost with the Malayan Union’s abolishment in 
favour of the Federation of Malayan States in 1948. Within the federation, 
citizenship would be harder to acquire. Having been born in Singapore no longer 
granted automatic citizenship for the Federation: Singapore was administratively 
separated from peninsular Malaya. The new law stipulated that non-Malays had 
to have been domiciled in the federation more than ten out of 15 years. Jus soli 
was ‘effectively negated’. In addition, non-Malays were required to speak Malay.126 
That non-Malays, on becoming citizens, were considered ‘subjects of the Sultans’ 
would ‘reassert the theory that Malaya is primarily a “Malay” country’.127 The 
question of elevating Chinese needs on par with indigenous interests (as far as 
Malays were indigenous to Malaya—a point Tan Cheng Lock made himself) was 
put on hold. The British had not forgotten that the ‘Majority of Government 
servants, including Police, are Malays...We can only implement new policy 
successfully with co-operation of Malays’.128  
 Here, however, lay a chance for the Malay Chinese Association. With some 
vehemence, they—mostly Tan Cheng Lock—took up the call that the Chinese 
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should profess their loyalty to Malaya. Active protest was paramount if the MCA 
had any chance of succeeding. Certain Chinese behaviour still rankled with the 
British. That many Chinese still looked to China made the British ‘in Malaya and 
Britain’, but undoubtedly also the Malays, ‘fear that the granting of Malayan 
Citizenship’ to the Chinese would ‘inevitably lead to Malaya one day becoming a 
Chinese province’.129 Mistrust was deepened as the Malay Communist Party was 
mainly Chinese in composition. The MCP’s make-up could not be blamed on the 
Chinese, per se. In 1946, the communists had added Malayanization to its 
programme.130 From October 1951 onwards, the MCP set out to build Malay and 
Indian Departments to build a more inclusive resistance movement.131 The policy 
proved unsuccessful. The all-Malay Tenth Regiment dispersed due to harassment 
by security forces.132 ‘In spite of every effort by the M.C.P. to subvert the Malay 
population as a whole[,] little progress has been made’, the Combined Intelligence 
Staff concluded. Communism did not mesh with ‘extreme’ Malay nationalism 
because Malays feared ‘Chinese political domination’. A mere five percent of the 
total ‘Communist Terrorist Organisation’ was Malay and opportunists at that.133 
Chinese fighters never trusted their Malay counterparts.134  
 With the insurgents and their supporters mostly Chinese, the latter would 
remain suspicious. The British greatly feared that Communist China would 
pursue a policy of aggression in Southeast Asia. While the Chinese business 
leaders would support the Malayan government, officials were less certain about 
less-affluent Chinese communities.135 Overseas Chinese—also those in 
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Indonesia—were seen as ‘a potential Fifth Column’, not unlike ‘the 
Volksdeutsche’ in Europe.136 Communist atrocities in China would not influence 
Malayan Chinese attitudes towards China, officials surmised. China’s ascension, 
the MCP’s composition, supposed Chinese susceptibility to subversion: they 
opened the British to appeasement. Officials wanted to ‘avoid the creation of an 
atmosphere of resentment which could be fanned into racial hatred by subtle 
propaganda or racial satisfaction [‘stratification’—RF] occasioned by Chinese 
military successes’. The ‘emotional appeal of nationalism’ from China needed to 
be exposed as vacuous, bringing ‘disaster and slavery’. However, caution was 
always needed. According to narrow-minded analysts, ‘the Chinese mind is 
schizophrenic and ever subject to the twin stimuli of racialism and self-
interest’.137 
 Whatever their reasoning, the Chinese did not unequivocally side with the 
government, which angered civil servants. Malays, conversely, volunteered for the 
police, the Special Constables and the Malay Regiments in large numbers. To a 
far lesser extent the same applied to Indians. One Non-Commissioned Officer, 
William Spearman, searching Malay kampongs and Indian communities for 
Special Constabulary recruits, found finding Malays and Indians easy; there were 
always enough Indians and Malays ‘not employed out there’.138 The Chinese 
showed little desire to serve. MCA representatives related how the Chinese were 
reluctant to wear songkoks, the traditional Malay head-wear part of the uniform, 
and complained about the lack of Chinese food.139 The Chinese thought the police 
force of the federation, dominated by antipathetic Malays, corrupt. They 
distrusted the police and the administration; its members could not speak none 
of the many Chinese dialects.140 According to one news outlet the Chinese found 
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uniformed police work ‘degrading and underpaid’. The blatantly Orientalist 
conclusion read that instead, the Chinese wanted ‘to be an officer [and] a 
detective—in plain clothes work there is something that gives him a sense of 
power [which] appeals to his subtle mind’.141  
 Such negative images were shared in high office. Gurney and Templer 
agreed about the lack of Chinese support for the government—for divergent 
reasons. In his political testament, Gurney uncharacteristically condemned the 
Chinese for active non-participation, leading to his scathing criticism. Templer’s 
tone was more conciliatory—perhaps also incongruously—but his message was 
the same: the Chinese should help themselves. While in Perak on an inspection 
tour, he exhorted the Chinese youth to join the police force. After having 
displayed his own military prowess—the newspaper article shows him shooting a 
sten gun—he revealed that the police had less than 4,000 Chinese in its ranks. Of 
these, a mere fifth operated in the uniformed branch. Templer wanted 2,000 
additional men. If he was disappointed by Chinese reactions, he did not 
necessarily show it. Instead, Templer told the crowd he thought it ‘ridiculous’ that 
Malays, ‘unable to speak [Chinese and] largely antipathetic to [a] race they 
consider to be alien’, policed more than two million Chinese. Templer averred that 
the preponderance of Malays in the police force led to ‘reprehensible behaviour’ 
on the part of the police, in turn forcing some Chinese to seek protection from the 
‘terrorists’.142  
 What administrators and police and military commanders—but also 
European planters—wanted, in other words, was Chinese participation in the war 
effort. To win, ‘the emergency [should] not be fought in an English way, but in a 
Malayan and Chinese way’.143 Therefore Templer advocated the ‘need to open the 
ranks of the Army to all races’ to ensure that ‘all […] share in the defence of their 
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country’. This development not only ‘reduce[d] as far as possible the commitment 
upon Imperial Forces’ in favour of indigenous forces; it was a logical extension of 
then current thinking which dictated instilling ‘a Malaysian consciousness among 
all races’. The latter could be construed to mean ‘to instil an anti-communist, 
pro-Malaysia attitude’.144  
 That the MCA’s leaders took up Templer’s wish came timely, as Gurney and 
Templer’s opinions on the Chinese were quite moderate. In comparison, the 
atmosphere among other British administrators and the Malay Sultans was 
quickly turning against the Chinese. In October 1951 three mentri besar claimed 
they could only speak freely about what they felt was ‘the complete failure […] of 
the Chinese community to play its proper share in the efforts to end the 
emergency’—‘after all, predominantly a Chinese problem’—unless Chinese leaders 
were not present. Another refused to come to discuss Chinese matters altogether. 
This antagonistic feeling was not limited to a few Malay first ministers; it was 
growing among common Malays and might turn dangerous when ultimately 
expressed. All Malays present at an October 1951 meeting voiced a need for more 
frequently invoking Emergency Regulation 17D (collective punishment in 
particularly badly affected areas), deportation and the ‘sequestration of property’ 
of those Chinese who refused to cooperate with the government—‘for instance, by 
failing to supply information which must have been in their possession’. The 
Attorney-General would look into ‘novel difficulties’ attached to the latter 
suggestion’.145 He was not the only civil servant supportive of 17D operations for 
‘incorrigible’ areas.146 All present agreed that more Chinese constables were 
needed; only they could help foster ‘satisfactory’ relations between the Police 
Force and the Chinese public, tap into the intelligence the Chinese were not 
volunteering and to ‘secure’ the community’s cooperation.147  
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 The Chinese question came down to loyalty. Authorities demanded a signal 
that Chinese communities were finally willing to come in under the government’s 
administrative umbrella. To further entice the Chinese into serving, the British 
and Malay rulers were willing to offer citizenship. Although the attainment of 
citizenship was presented as a gift, a right to be bestowed after having earned it, 
the British basically demanded the Chinese obey. Covering Colonial Secretary 
Lyttelton’s visit in December 1951, The Economist reported that ‘people 
representing all shades of Malayan opinion’ agreed that the Chinese had to be 
made to understand that not only would the government win the war, but also 
that only ‘a victory would mean a satisfactory position for the Chinese in the new 
Malaya’. Up to Lyttelton’s visit, the Chinese had ‘done little to earn’ their 
citizenship—merely paying ‘lip-service to the idea’—and so the situation had 
continued that Malays dominated the police and Communist China—with the 
MCP—supposedly continued to function as a ‘subversive magnet to the local 
Chinese’.148 As Templer’s words already suggested, attainment of citizenship 
through participation—within a Malaysian consciousness—became directly 
linked to signing up for the security forces. The snag, however, was that strong 
government voices still claimed the Chinese refused to budge from their neutral 
stance. Chinese leaders, in turn, continued to dispute such assertions. T. H. Tan, 
for example, stated (to Tan Cheng Lock) that ‘Whether the Chinese are helping to 
the utmost to end the Emergency is a matter of opinion only among the less 
informed’.149  
 Tan Cheng Lock and the MCA took the distance between the government 
and the Chinese to present a huge opportunity to promote the MCA and have it 
transform into a fixture for both the Malayan government and the Chinese. It was 
Tan Cheng Lock who, on numerous occasions, pressed the fact that the Chinese 
deserved the right to be trusted—and to citizenship. The MCA could come to act 
as the mediator to have the Chinese seek the government’s tutelage, Lock said. 
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One such occasion was Lyttelton’s visit, when the MCA submitted to him a 
memorandum on Chinese loyalty and the Emergency. It reminded ‘Malayan 
officialdom’ of its pro-Malay policies and that with the resentful corralling of the 
Chinese into New Villages on the one hand and the targeting of the Chinese by 
the insurgents on the other, for the average Chinese community it was almost 
impossible to assist the authorities. Any goodwill that the Malayan Union’ liberal 
citizenship laws had engendered had dwindled greatly with the adoption of the 
Federation, under whose laws nearly half the population, ‘practically all non-
Malays’, were ‘not entitled to Federal citizenship automatically’. They were 
‘excluded from the constitution and politically disinherited’. Actually, claimed Tan 
Cheng Lock, the British had caused the insurrection in the first place. They had 
empowered the MPAJA by using it as a proxy to reconquer Malaya. Besides, why 
blame the Chinese for Communism which was a ‘world-wide movement […] which 
exists among every race and in every country’?  
 If the British now expected Chinese assistance, they had better change 
their tune. ‘Government authorities and officials at all levels’ had to learn to trust 
the MCA and the overseas Chinese in general.150 In a reaction to Dean Rusk’s 
allegation that they would bend to ‘militant communism’ in Southeast Asia, Lock 
warned that such statements would cause anti-western distrust and resentment 
towards democracy among the ten million overseas Chinese.151 The MCA urged 
the British government to reverse the recognition of Communist China; this only 
enhanced the MCP’s ‘reputation, prestige and morale’. On a less strategic level, 
Chinese communities in Malaya should be represented on the State War 
Executive Committees directing anti-Communist operations. The MCA expected 
‘tangible appreciation’ for Chinese sacrifices towards ending the Emergency plus 
the ‘reduction to a minimum [of] offences committed by the security forces’. Police 
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officials should act less suspiciously towards the Chinese. To ensure against 
Chinese turning Communist the government needed to enfranchise them by 
giving squatters ownership of property and land. As for the security forces, the 
British were in the process of squandering the opportunity to recruit the Chinese. 
Unresolved labour issues—connected to employment after having served—
hindered recruitment. This could be circumvented, partially, if the government 
would bring in a Hong Kong police contingent to form ‘a suitable nucleus of an 
adequate Malayan Police Force’. Their example was sure to change many Chinese 
minds. That the MCA would greatly benefit was obvious, which the memorandum 
roundly acknowledged: only the MCA could ‘secure’ Chinese ‘whole-hearted 
support […] provided that Government really means business and desires to have 
effectual and mutual co-operation with us’.152  
 The MCA’s plan for presenting a good alliance partner, then, was to show 
that MCA’s possible trust in the British was to be conflated with trust in the 
British by Malaya’s Chinese. If the MCA to the British claimed it represented the 
Chinese communities in Malaya, however, it had to offer something those it could 
induce to serve—something the MCA and the authorities could both agree to. As 
stated above, the MCA offered citizenship. This meshed neatly with the signal the 
British and Malay rulers were expecting. In the case of the MCA, too, an alliance 
with the British and Malays meant fostering an alliance with a constituency. 
Naturally, MCA officials could only bestow this gift if the British allowed them 
to—they could do so by proving enough Chinese did support the MCA to begin 
with. As we shall see, the impact of the MCA in Malaysia in terms of recruitment 
proved to be minimal, much the same as was the case with the PRP and the 
Negara Pasundan. Whereas the negara, however, failed to become a power unto 
itself, the MCA did ensconce itself into Chinese society. This achievement, as we 
shall see, cannot be attributed completely to massive support.  
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The first step was to take the government’s message—the Chinese must fall 
in line with Malayan attempts to beat the insurgents—and present it to Malaya’s 
Chinese communities. By becoming the organization that would deliver loyal 
Chinese bodies to serve, the MCA curried favour with the British, removing much 
of the stigma from the Chinese and themselves. Conversely, by becoming the 
champions of conferring rights and offering protection, its leaders courted the 
Chinese constituencies. Through pursuing both approaches, the MCA established 
itself. Tan Cheng Lock began with painting the picture of what fate would befall 
the Chinese if they refused to commit to Malaya some three years before the MCA 
was founded. To undermine the British pro-Malay policy, the Chinese had to 
declare themselves loyal to Malaya and take up permanent residence in Malaya. 
 The British found dual citizenship hard to swallow, Lock reasoned, so the 
Chinese had to choose for Malaya; not in the least because the circa two-thirds of 
the two and a half million Chinese in Malaya were China-born and could not go 
back. As ‘letting things drift […] may be fraught with trouble’, organizing centrally 
was key. This meant, foremost, relinquishing a stance that either proffered 
disinterest in Malayan affairs or an overt leaning towards China’s politics. Instead 
the Chinese had to actively participate in Malay(an) politics and strife for ‘Unity, 
Liberty and Equality’ between all races. To achieve such a state, Lock reasoned, 
Chinese Malayans had to primarily extend a hand to their Malay countrymen and 
women and to ‘help [them] economically and mix with them socially, and to 
understand their viewpoint’. Such a course would simultaneously protect Chinese 
culture, but it would also effect Sino-Malay rapprochement and allay Malay fears. 
Only along this path could self-government be attained and the Chinese allowed 
to exist in Malaya—without the earlier massacres and discrimination Lock saw in 
South Africa. For their loyalty, the Chinese—and the other minorities—would 
have to be ‘ensured equality of citizenship rights and status’.153  
 Lock exhorted the Chinese communities to transform from a ‘sheet of loose 
sand’ into one community that undertook concerted action, to ‘“Wake up & Unite” 
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among ourselves and the Malay and other Communities before it is too late’. ‘The 
good life’, said Lock, was attainable if only the Chinese would shake their 
disinterestedness in politics. They had stood aloof when the Union proposals were 
scuppered; with citizenship just over the horizon, the Chinese had to act.154 
Wherever Lock spoke, he enumerated the various ways in which the Chinese had 
contributed to the establishment of Malaya—turning their gaze inwards—and 
showed his audience the cost of neutrality. ‘We can only rely upon ourselves to 
save ourselves’, he proclaimed at rallies in Taiping and Ipoh. Inaction left the 
Chinese stranded between police brutality and the equally brutal communists. It 
was up to the Chinese to dispel the evils of the federal constitution by acting 
within its confines. Having been ‘framed without consulting and in opposition to 
the feelings [and] aspirations of [Malaya’s] inhabitants as a whole, [it breathed] a 
spirit of distrust and discrimination against the Chinese’. Audiences were 
reminded that becoming a Malayan civilian was exceedingly difficult for Chinese, 
but much had to do with their own ‘political apathy’. And so again Lock drove 
home that the Chinese must participate. However, the government should give 
something in return. The MCA president held that ‘it is all very well issuing 
clarion calls to the squatters, the Chinese, to the Malays and to the Indians, 
asking for more co-operation and information, but these people must feel 
confident of Government’s power to protect them’.155  
 The MCA used this latter point to demand citizenship rights as a form of 
protection. In a bid to make both serving and chasing after citizenship rights 
more palatable to the Chinese, their self-appointed leaders fought to have the one 
awarded for performing the other. Men such as H. S. Lee and Tan Cheng Lock’s 
son asked the British that citizenship be conferred on any Chinese serving for 
three years. ‘[I]t is not right’, they petitioned, ‘to withhold citizenship from [aliens] 
if they were willing to risk their lives for the country’.156 Unlocking citizenship 
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thus would need the amendment of the Federation’s citizenship laws. When 
attained, it would constitute a victory for the MCA. As they stood, the ‘unilateral[,] 
uncompromising[,] undemocratic [and] discriminatory’ citizenship laws were quite 
unpopular—a point Chinese gladly made to successive Secretaries of State for the 
Colonies.157 The association pressed possible followers that it was the MCA that 
fought for their citizenship rights, but the Chinese themselves should accept the 
responsibility to work for a government ‘acceptable to all’.  
 One way was to serve in the Home Guard. Serving was a vote for 
democracy—the antipode being to opt Communism, in which case the MCA would 
advise voluntary repatriation to China.158 Contrary to his own preparatory notes, 
in Ipoh, Tan Chang Lock disclosed the number of Chinese casualties caused by 
the Emergency to shock people into action. (Ironically, it was at this meeting a 
Chinese threw a grenade at Tan Cheng Lock, who survived, but the attack added 
five more wounded to the casualties list.) Clearly, Lock needed the outrage of 
putting the Emergency in terms of Chinese deaths and wounded to shake up his 
crowd. Only Chinese action could stem the continued divide-and-rule that 
polarized the country into Malays and non-Malays; citizens and non-citizens.159  
The appeal for Chinese citizenship was as much an appeal addressed to the 
British to empower the Chinese in Malaya. Therefore, Lock demanded that ‘If we 
intend to make Malaya our homeland and become its citizens enjoying the rights 
and privileges of citizenship and capable of self-rule, we must learn to shoulder 
its duties […] including that of the defence of the country in their hour of its 
peril’. However, no-one should forget that for said service, ‘those who loyally do 
their duty […] must insistently demand the full status of citizenship’.160 
Ultimately, jus soli was aimed for. Without it, non-Malays constituted little more 
than ‘slaves dependent upon the charity of their masters’; ‘resident aliens or 
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semi-aliens tolerated […] on sufferance’ of others. Second-class citizens, however, 
‘cannot build a First Class Nation’, concluded Lock.161  
 Since Chinese leaders in the MCA or elsewhere did not have the ear of the 
British like the Malay Rulers had when they scuttled the Malayan Union, the 
MCA had to sell the idea of citizenship to the British. Tan Cheng Lock did so 
along the following lines: the Chinese would choose sides and the alliance with 
the government as soon as the latter would guarantee their protection in the face 
of rising civilian deaths at the hands of the insurgents (in addition, no doubt, to 
protection from heavy-handed approach of the security forces, who continued to 
view the Chinese with suspicion). Co-operation had to be made ‘practicable’.162 
‘Chinese peasants and squatter farmers’ should be given ‘the right to self-defence 
against attacks by Communist terrorists’. Self-defence meant forming their own 
Home Guards—as opposed to being guarded by Malays—since ‘“The best man to 
catch a Chinese bandit, Communist agent or rebel is a Chinese Policeman”’.163  
Self-defence had to entail more than simply being organized in the Home 
Guard or the Police, however. Home Guards had to be armed. Although this 
course would undoubtedly offend some sensibilities among those ‘not without 
influence’ who doubted Chinese loyalties, H. S. Lee tried to assuage said fears. He 
wrote to the Director of Operations, he explained that if ‘Chinese […] stuck to 
their posts’ in the face of Japanese attacks they would do so yet again—‘whereas 
some members of certain other Race [sic] either watched passively or acted co-
operatively with the invasion’.164 Others argued ‘It was not reasonable to expect a 
man to stand out against armed violence […] with nothing better than an 
armband or a stick’.165 To arm the Chinese was the end the Emergency.166  
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 The MCA’s plea for arming the Chinese came at a precipitous time. Imperial 
interests dovetailed with those of the MCA. The British believed Chinese officials 
could unlock the mostly impenetrable Chinese communities to governance; the 
association confirmed this conception publicly. The MCA, in turn, would gain 
their own entrance into the Chinese communities as a believable protector 
against British intrusion. With the convergence, participation would engender 
citizenship since British policy makers proved willing to trade that commodity for 
three years of service. This trade-off furthered MCA standing, as did the fact that 
the British eventually did arm the Chinese Home Guards that were being formed 
from September 1950 onwards.167 Commissioner General P. C. MacDonald 
himself told a Chinese delegation roughly a year later that the Federation’s 
government understood it had to eschew ‘controversial matters likely to cause 
friction between Malays and non-Malays until the militant communists’ had been 
defeated. The citizenship-for-serving concession was therefore agreeable to both 
the British and ‘responsible Malay opinion’.168 The issue was not immediately 
resolved; some six months later a Select Committee still pored over the 
ramifications of the concession.169 That mattered little to the MCA, however, as it 
became closely connected to the counterinsurgency efforts of the British.  
 Again, these events suited both parties well. By using MCA’s growing 
influence, the British dissipated the responsibility for one particularly onerous—
to many Chinese susceptibilities—piece of policy: involuntary conscription. As the 
first draft commenced in February 1951—the Director of Manpower had ‘absolute 
authority’ in calling up men—propaganda was needed to blunt the shock of 
conscription.170 One pamphlet announcing the call-up assured that the call-up 
for 20,000 men between 18 and 24 merely affected seven Indians, Chinese, 
Indonesians and Eurasians out of every 100. They would be drafted into the 
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regular police and Special Constabulary. Later, men were directed into the Home 
Guard. No posting with the military, the Jungle Squads or outside Malaya was 
possible under the regulations; at most directees served a maximum of three 
years. Afterwards, former employees had to reinstate ex-draftees in their former 
functions or they could re-enrol into the police. The pamphlet concluded that 
those conscripted became ‘a man’ and experienced that the ‘training […] will be of 
lasting value’.171  
 Registration and the following conscription were still quite unpopular. 
Gurney had been partially right in his political testament: Chinese youths flocked 
to the immigration offices. It was estimated that 6,000 of their number had left 
Malaya by April.172 Parents helped their offspring dodge the draft and because 
those writing up the registration lists for review by the selection boards could be 
bought or were ‘prejudiced in favour’ of certain families. Others evaded the call-
up by claiming before the appeal committees that their removal would cause 
severe hardship to their families—evidence substantiated through biased family 
and friends.173 ‘The unhappy memory of [registration during] the Japanese 
occupation’ and the news that 40 per cent of the call-up had to be Chinese  
chased off many.174 The MCP chimed in by warning ‘the public’ against being sent 
into the jungles of Malaya or the trenches of Korea as imperial ‘cannon fodder’. 
Better to join the cadres ‘and help to annihilate the British Imperialists’. In fact, 
the need for conscription proved the British were on the ropes.175 A ‘not 
insignificant number of young Chinese’ heeded the Communist call and 
disappeared into the jungle. The British further needed Chinese manpower as 
State Governments indicated that so many Malays had been recruited kampongs 
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were ‘denuded’ and padi fields remained uncultivated.176 Needless to say, Chinese 
recruitment did not go smoothly—even the more than 70,000 Chinese of the 
Home Guard in 1952 was not necessarily a success: as inhabitants of the New 
Villages, they had less of a choice. At the end of 1951, only ‘a handful’, 1,800, 
had been conscripted into the regular police.177  
 Despite grass-roots resistance to conscription, Lock whole-heartedly 
supported the scheme: he tried to make the MCA indispensable to the 
government. From the moment the call-up was implemented, MCA branches 
organized meetings to ‘educate the people’ on the regulations.178 When in 1952 
another 2,000 Chinese policemen were needed, the British turned to the MCA. 
The Chief Secretary and Tan Cheng Lock agreed on the following ‘weapon’ to be 
used: the MCA would help with finding these men or renewed conscription would 
be implemented. With MCA complicity in further recruitment, public umbrage 
could be circumvented.179 During the coming year, police recruitment teams set 
out across Malaya to find 175 recruits per month. MCA officers would prepare 
their arrival locally with ‘suitable propaganda’.180 Tan Cheng Lock himself in 
Selangor said that if, among the 400,000 Chinese living there, 400 recruits could 
not be found, he would be ‘humiliated and ashamed’.181  
 MCA branch activity did not, however, translate into large numbers of 
Chinese recruits. The Malayan Mirror, MCA’s newsletter, may have reported that 
at the end of 1952 the association had delivered on its promise to mobilize 2,000 
recruits, but only 862 had been accepted based on screening and medical and 
educational standards. In June 1953, another 206 were accepted out of 600 
applicants.182 From the perspective of the individual states, numbers of those 
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interested never ran high. A ‘Special Drive’ in Perak yielded 125 interested men, 
but of the 75 accepted only 52 turned up at the training depot. Compared to the 
tens of thousands of members the MCA had in Perak, recruitment numbers 
proved paltry. As much as the associations members blamed stringent British 
screening and rejection of quantity in favour of quality, they could not hide that 
their constituency simply was not keen. In Selangor, where Lock had earlier 
implored his audience, only 17 people applied in the five months following 
January 1952.183 Not for nothing were manpower regulations tightened to 
preclude dodging.184 
 The MCA was probably not so concerned with how many recruits were 
finally drafted. Leverage was more important. Involvement on the side of 
unpopular governmental policies allowed Chinese leaders to demand to be put ‘in 
[a] position of influence, if not of power’ and to ‘impress on the Police and District 
Officers the absolute [...] importance of consulting the local Chinese Leaders at all 
levels’. Where the British reneged on prior agreements with Chinese leaders, both 
they and the British would lose face, the latter explained.185 Recruitment provided 
Lock with another chance to point out that aiding Malaya ‘in its hour of danger’ 
must translate into citizenship rights, opening the possibility to create the 
national consciousness he was after. He could, in fact, make common cause with 
the Malayan Indian Congress seeking the same exchange.186  
 Between Gurney’s displeasure with what he saw as Chinese leaders’ failure 
to truly act as MCP’s counterweight, Templer’s call to coax the Chinese into 
choosing the government’s side and the Chief Secretary’s turning to them for 
extra recruits, it is safe to say the MCA had become the spokesmen for the 
British. And so the MCA established itself. The president of its Kluang branch 
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received a British Empire Medal.187 Local members of the MCA sat in on the 
various State and District War Executive Councils and worked closely with 
them—a prerequisite Chinese leaders had had to ask for in 1951.188 Less than 
three years after the MCA’s founding it had established (sub-)branches in seven 
states and Singapore. Ideally, ‘every M.C.A. centre throughout the country’ 
functioned as a conduit for the government.189   
 Such a statement should not be misconstrued. The association was not 
particularly well-organized. It kept fighting accusations (for example by officers 
commanding police districts) that local MCA leaders had ‘little following among 
their community in the smaller towns, Resettlement areas and estates’. Some 
wasted ‘valuable time’ by ignoring calls for co-operation.190 Tan Cheng Lock told 
MCA members to observe discipline and proper organization. Pushed by Gurney 
himself, Lock aimed to professionalize the MCA by installing a Central Office and 
appointing paid agents in charge of ‘State or Settlement Branch Office[s]’ as ‘vital 
link[s] between the local Branches and the Central Office’. ‘A system of “Voluntary 
Block Visitors” whose duties would be to visit members in their homes and at 
local meetings’ would give the association more local presence still. Acting as 
‘collectors of information, views and grievances’ the block visitors connected the 
upper echelons of the MCA with its members throughout Malaya. What Lock 
envisioned for the MCA was the transformation from its narrow origins—‘meeting 
the emergency’ and ‘providing an alternative standard to which loyal Chinese can 
rally’—into a veritable political, democratic party that would ‘survive’ the 
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Emergency. As they continued the MCA’s ‘social welfare and cultural work’, 
members needed to ‘play a part in the Malaya of the future’.191  
 They would do just that. The association was gaining traction with the 
Chinese masses. There lay another reason for the Chinese leaders to attach 
themselves to actual recruitment: it created a presence for itself throughout 
peninsular Malaya. MCA agents were hard to miss: where recruitment drives 
started, they hung banners across the streets, distributed flyers and pamphlets 
while newspapers covered their activities, ‘cinema slides’ visualized and mobile 
propaganda units swooped in to draw in Chinese youth.192 In Perak, MCA officials 
addressed a ‘large gathering’ about recruitment leading up to a ‘cinema show’, 
speaking about the glorious careers worth pursuing in the police. The Malacca 
branch was lauded for its ‘Emergency work’ and recruitment efforts.193 They 
fought hard against ‘an age-old [Chinese] saying that “good boys would not 
become soldiers”’.194 One MCA branch held a ‘send-off party’ for recruits heading 
for training in Kuala Lumpur.195 Of course, more Chinese organisations recruited, 
such as the Perak Chinese Grocers’ Association and various Chinese guilds, but 
the MCA became known as ‘the one important anti-Communist Chinese 
organisation’.196 The presence of the association became a matter of public 
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knowledge and discourse in Malaya. New branches were reported in the 
papers.197  
 Another area where the MCA busied itself was brokering better 
circumstances for security personnel. The MCA tried to negotiate more payment 
for the Home Guard, not just when a guardsman would do ten hours of 
‘continuous duty on operations’. Surely, the set-up would benefit the MCA and 
the British: a paid Home Guard would ‘break the Chinese in gently to the art of 
war without passive disobedience’. Lock saw payment as a means to remove the 
compulsory element to the manpower issue; garnering actual support from the 
‘mass of the people’. Salaried guards would obviate claims of hardship, obviating 
the need for exemptions. Payment would make the Home Guard a desired 
occupation—or so Lock implied. He furthermore strongly pushed the idea that the 
Home Guard should be a local affair. This way, guards could still ‘take part in the 
family agriculture and shop-keeping etc. while off-duty’. Conscription, he said, 
was ‘a Western notion’ whereas the Chinese had a ‘moral pre-occupation with the 
family, the clan, and local affairs’. A successful Home Guard system, then, 
functioned on ‘loyalty to family and locality’. Contrary to what he espoused in 
terms of creating Malaya-ness, regarding the security forces Lock propagated 
locality, not ‘ideals such as loyalty to the nation […] which are not yet generally 
held by the Malayan Chinese’.198 On another occasion, Lock proposed paying ‘a 
substantial Bounty to the family for each recruit signing up for service’ and 
another after completion, allowing them to ‘set up a business’.199  
 What then of the MCA’s role with the attainment of citizenship and its 
connection with recruitment? Despite the three years’ service in exchange for 
citizenship in place, concerning the regular police it is hard to maintain that the 
MCA and citizenship played a large role in boosting recruitment numbers. In 
March 1952 there were roughly 5,500 Chinese in the Regular Police, Special 
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Constables and the Auxiliary Police together—a number not much higher than 
the number of Indians serving in those forces. Only in the Home Guard did 
Chinese play a considerable part—73,610 in total—but they were not necessarily 
drawn in by the MCA’s efforts. Still, the MCA grew into a bulwark for Chinese to 
turn to for citizenship. In this area, too, the MCA’s alliance with the British 
allowed it to grow into an intermediary between the Chinese and the government. 
Already in 1949 Tan Siew, Chairman of the MCA Publicity Sub-committee, let 
readers of the Straits Times know that the ‘nearest M.C.A. branch’ would be more 
than happy to assist anyone with their citizenship application.200 Although it is 
untraceable how many Chinese sought the MCA for their applications—at points, 
there was a ‘rush’—at the end of the first half of 1953, more than four million 
persons had become citizens of which 1,157,000 Chinese. Another 433,000 
‘possessed the birth qualifications necessary to acquire the status [of citizen or 
state national] through registration’.201 Despite MCA official’s continued 
lamentations that the government still refused jus soli, Lock felt confident enough 
to declare to his constituencies that ‘If there is anything you do not understand 
then ask your local M.C.A leader, or someone in authority’.202 
 
Conclusion 
This last quotation—with its implied confidence—summarizes what this chapter 
has captured. If chapter one broadly showed the connectedness between the PRP 
and MCA from the perspective of the returning colonial authorities, their 
restorative whims—their need for local support—and the unstable nature of 
colonial alliances, the previous sections have analysed, by somewhat shifting 
focus away from the authorities, how these local elites actively pursued their own 
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brand of influence. They yearned to become authorities in their own right. This 
influence was bi-directional. Both the PRP and the MCA needed to become 
(further) established with the Dutch and the British, respectively, but also 
connect with possible indigenous supporters. 
 The aim has been to take the manpower crisis of the colonial governments 
as a starting point. Within the context of insurrection, providing manpower for 
the colonial security forces offered a good avenue to explore and chart how elites 
set off on their quest for power. They could attract men who may have been wary 
of governmental control or attention, act as a cultural-social beacon for possible 
constituencies to flock to and thus win the colonizer’s trust. In Indonesia and 
Malaya, the PRP and the MCA certainly were set on this course. With the post-
war power vacuum quickly filled by anti-colonial elements and personal score-
settling, they became connected to the colonial authorities’ attempts at tempering 
anti-colonial violence. As we have seen, the internal strength of the 
PRP/Pasundan and the MCA—but also the mettle of their leadership—determined 
the manoeuvring room these bodies had.  
 The approach of colonial authorities, however, proved more decisive still. 
The PRP and the Negara Pasundan struggled to gain a foothold on the ground in 
what they claimed as the Negara Pasundan. The Dutch, concerned by PRP’s 
appeal and later the Negara Pasundan’s internal divisions hardly yielded any 
room for the Sundanese leadership to develop ways to attract recruits, despite 
Sundanese signing up to protect ‘their’ state. (As we shall see in the following 
chapter, however, it is more likely that other, more personal motivations lay 
behind joining Dutch-sponsored security forces.) The Dutch dictated how the 
Sundanese leaders concerned themselves with counterinsurgency and 
recruitment. They took responsibilities from the Pasundan leadership, in fact. 
This example showed that self-assertion could only go as far as indigenous 
leaders were allowed to by exogenous forces exerted on them.  
 In theory the same restrictions applied to the MCA. The appeal to others its 
leaders exuded and the MCA’s intrinsic message, however, were valued highly by 
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the British. Contrary to the Pasundan’s fortunes, the MCA benefited from outside 
influences. First, the British were ready to rid themselves of the pro-Malay policy 
and second, they needed Chinese recruits—only accessible through the MCA—to 
combat those Chinese fighting on the side of the communist insurrectionists. As 
MCA members were able to strike a chord with the Chinese as well as with the 
British, the association inserted itself quickly into the Chinese communities with 
British approval. More importantly, British endorsement resulted in 
manoeuvrability. The MCA used the recruitment to simultaneously move closer to 
the government and, if needed, distance itself from colonial policies. If the MCA 
would not have attained the 2,000 recruits mark, Tan Cheng Lock would have 
claimed it was ‘the government’—not the MCA—that had ‘compel[led] the Chinese 
to join’.203 An element of instability always characterized colonial alliance-
formation—specifically in a context of inter and intra-communal strife. Like the 
Partai Rakyat Pasundan, the MCA faced limitations. Citizenship did not attract 
many Chinese into the ranks or the MCA. Both Malays, along with British 
officials, continued to eye the Chinese masses with distrust.204 Two Legislative 
Councillors in 1954 still fought off accusations that only 2,059 Chinese served in 
the regular police, claiming that ‘anything that takes Chinese away from their 
family, he shies away from’. The British hardly sped along the transition into the 
colonial ranks; there was little to induce people. The Home Guard and Auxiliary 
Police did not pay enough to keep ‘body and soul together’. Many recruits 
complained about being ‘pushed around’.205 
                                                 
203 ‘Chinese as Police’, The Northern Miner, 25 September 1952, 1. 
204 Mohamed Ali bin Mohamed to the Secretary for Defence, 8 August 1949, FCO 141/7395 
205 ‘One Reason Police Pay isn’t Enough to Keep Body and Soul Together. Two Councillors Rise to Defend “Men Who 




Training the Troops: Loyalty in Theory and Practice 
On 20 July 1948, as evening fell on the large tea gardens of the isolated 
‘Goalpara’ plantation, close to Sukabumi in West Java, something was astir. One 
by one, coming through the tea bushes, men formed a gang. Slowly, they made 
their way across the narrow path that intersected the gardens. Leading the gang 
was Soestina, a local lieutenant of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia. Hiding in at 
the outer edges of the garden, Soetisna gave a signal. Moments later, three 
Plantation Guards made their way over. They were Aming, Darsa and Ibrahim—
that evening’s guard leader, with whom their commander, ex-KNIL soldier 
Offerbeek, had just spoken.1 The plan was simple: capture the plantation’s 
weapons. To that effect, Aming and Darsa went to disarm Offerbeek and Van 
Maarseveen, a Dutch staff member, collecting a hand grenade, a Lee Enfield rifle, 
a machete and a revolver. The four of them then went to Baidenmann, the 
German administrator, who gave himself up—having rung the police post 
nearby—after an exchange of shots.2 Suddenly, more shots were heard coming 
from the direction of planters Luyning and Jansz’s quarters. ‘Whereas the 
gentlemen Maarseveen and Offerbeek surrendered without a fight’, a police report 
later concluded, with ‘Jansz and Luyning things went less simple’.3 When 
Soetisna summoned the planters outside they refused: Luyning was dragged from 
his rooms and fatally shot. Jansz opened fire and killed Soetisna. Jansz 
surrendered once Offerbeek, who had arrived on the scene with Ibrahim, called to 
say they were surrounded by some 300 men.4 Ibrahim, superciliously reassuring 
everybody that they could go to sleep ‘as nothing further would happen’, 
                                                 
1 Proces Verbaal, opgetekend door Van Spronsen, Inspecteur van Politie II, 28 July 1948, NL-HaNA, 
Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/3937. 
2 Verklaring de heer Baidenmann; Verklaring heer v.Maarseveen; Verklaring heer Offerbeek, annexes to Report by 
Major R. Hauer, de C.-1-8-R.V.A., 21 July1948, NL-HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/3937. 
3 Luitenant-Kolonel H. E. M. Bakhuys, de Commandant Korps Militaire Politie, to Z.E. de Legercommandant, 24 
August 1948, No. 501/010114/82d, NL-HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/3937. 
4 Interview with Roosebrand, April 2009; Verklaring de hr. Jansz.A.E.F., annex to Report by Major R. Hauer, de C.-1-8-
R.V.A., 21 July 1948, NL-HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/3937. 
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disappeared with the rest of the gang.5 Finally, as military units arrived at 
Goalpara, the raid was definitely over. 
 The ‘mutiny’, as the attack on Goalpara became known, brought to a climax 
the ongoing discussion on the use of indigenous troops in Indonesia. The 
planters, staunch supporters of harsh methods to defeat the insurgents, sought 
the sympathetic ear of the press to lambaste military and civilian authorities for 
their lack of interest in planter safety and their hardships.6 Lieutenant-General 
Spoor, Commander of the Army in the Netherlands East Indies, commissioned a 
fact-finding mission to account for the massive failure of the Plantation Guard.7 
Spoor’s order came in the wake of a slew of other inquiries by the Royal Field 
Artillery, the General Police, the Daerah Police, the Plantation Guards Inspection 
Service and, lastly, the Guard Grenadiers stationed at Sukabumi.8 Of all possible 
inquirers, only the Military Police was kept outside the fray.9  
 All that inquiries yielded was a condemnation of the weak-willed 
performance of Goalpara’s security detail in combination with all-round finger 
pointing as to who had missed the Guard’s treacherous infiltration. In short, the 
Plantation Guard had been poorly led by their European masters and their 
lackadaisical behaviour had opened the ranks to subversion from both within 
and without. Planters insisted that the army’s lack of control was at fault. What 
lay at the heart of the Goalpara débâcle was given less attention: namely, that 
                                                 
5 Verklaring heer v.Maarseveen, annex to Report by Major R. Hauer, de C.-1-8-R.V.A., 21 July1948, NL-HaNA, 
Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/3937. 
6 Bedreigd Pionierswerk der Teruggekeerde Planters. Terreur Tegen het Economische Herbouwwerk in Indonesië –
Volkswelvaart en Deviezenbronnen in Gevaar –Een Trieste Lijst van Moorden en Vernielingen, artikel van Jhr. Mr. W.J. 
de Jonge in het ‘Algemeen Handelsblad’, dd. 31 juli 1948., annex to Uit Mailoverzicht Nr. 23 dd 10 augustus 1948. Nr. 
F. 1904/L.36., Federabo 2.20.50/59, Federatie van Verenigingen van Bergcultuurondernemingen in Indonesië 
(FEDERABO), 1913-1981, The National Archives, The Hague.  
7 De Luitenant-Generaal, Legercommandant, S. H. Spoor, aan de Zijne Excellentie den Luitenant-Gouverneur-Generaal 
van Nederlands-Indië, 2 August 1948, No. Kab./1765/16400, NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie 2.10.14/3463. 
8 Rapport opgesteld door Majoor R. Hauer, de C.-1-8-R.V.A., 21 July 1948; Proces Verbaal, opgetekend door Van 
Spronsen, Inspecteur van Politie II, 28 July 1948; No. 266/R/Geh., Perkara: Penboenoehan terhadap. S Luyning dan 
perampasan 30 sendjata api. dari Onderneming Goalpara, Rapport Politie, Watakoesoemah, Chef Daerah Politie 
Kaboepaten, 24 July 1948; Uittreksel uit: Reisverslag. Buitenzorg en ondernemingen Tjikanere en Goalpara d.d. 21 juli 
1948; Elt. W.M. de Bruyn, Rapport en aanvullingen daarop van I.V.D.-3G.R.G. inzake muiterij op Goalpara, Bat. I.V.D.-
3-G.R.G., 6 Augustus 1948, NL-HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/3937. 
9 H. J. Lieneman, Kapitein Koninklijke Marechaussee, aan de Commandant M.P. I Bandoeng, 23 July 1948, No. 888, 
Ondernemingswachten, NL-HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/3937. 
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familial ties had proven stronger than the loyalty to the plantation, but also that, 
paradoxically, the conspirators had to be coerced into their subversive behaviour, 
as well. Taken together, the rest of the guard had chosen the way of least 
resistance; members complied to save themselves.  
 The mutiny on that isolated tea plantation near Sukabumi was emblematic 
of a wider crisis; one that plagued not only policy makers in the Netherlands East 
Indies but also in British Malaya. Across the board, security forces were not doing 
what they were supposed to do. Those who looked—mostly after the damage had 
been done—found that indigenous policemen, guardsmen of different varieties 
and soldiers could not always be trusted. To be sure, many of them were not all 
so openly untrustworthy as some of the men who were supposed to guard the 
valuable Goalpara tea leaves. But if we consider actual subversive behaviour to lie 
at one end of a spectrum and, say, information sharing with the so-called enemy 
at the other, this chapter aims to chart the different repertoires those in the 
security forces had to signal that their sympathies were not particularly one-
dimensional. In other words, they tried to navigate between the colonial 
government and its enemies, who both tried to curry favour—a euphemistic 
phrase—with the members of the security forces. In addition, local men and 
women in the security forces also had their own interests. As will become clear, 
these interests did not always dovetail with what the colonial government—for 
which the security personnel ostensibly worked—wanted and needed.  
 Other questions arise regarding personal interests. What prompted the men 
and women in the security forces in the first place to join? We have seen that 
much depended on conscription, but many Malays, for example, volunteered. As 
far as those in the predominantly Chinese Home Guard sections were forced, they 
still may have had reasons to not flee these recruitment drives—they could, after 
all, join the insurgents—or, at least, after conscription, even sign up to prolonged 
periods under arms. The process at work here is, then, that service gave security 
forces access to certain rights—citizenship rights among them—and a certain 
standing. By shedding their blood, local communities could have the brittle 
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colonial state—needing all the assistance it could muster—suspend the lingering 
distrust it continued to harbour for the populations it claimed to govern. The 
colonial state, violent as it may have been, could be very forgiving at times. 
 This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it examines how the colonial troops 
were prepared to perform their new role as guardians of empire. Comparing the 
various security forces provides an insight into expectations of their loyalty. Then, 
we see how the troops behaved in the field.  
The chapter will investigate the discrepancy between the normative call for 
loyalty and realities on the ground. Did security forces perform the loyalty the 
colonial authorities intended and the local elites promised? If not, why? 
Tentatively, we can say that service had seemed attractive at the point of 
recruitment. Service activated the right—for both elites and individuals—to 
demand from a state that was ordinarily more or less deaf to requests. Having 
recourse to state-owned arms provided individuals the means to take care of their 
own problems; issues that perhaps had little to do with the interests of the state. 
Yet, under the chaotic and violent circumstances occasioned by the war, the state 
would look the other way. Indigenous enforcers were not afraid to use their 
weapons. Ironically, it had been European officers who had taught them this 
behaviour was permissible. This section discusses the function of alliance-
formation within the security forces: through the reactions of the insurgents on 
the indigenous security forces and the pressures they unleashed unto them, I 
argue that colonial security forces performed their duties only as long as they 
themselves were protected by the Dutch. As soon as the resistance became too 
powerful, colonial troops had, to survive, to signal their readiness to desert. 
Dichotomies such as ‘friends’ and ‘foes’ did not really exist. 
 
Training the troops and performing loyalty 
The Pasundan State and the MCP were forced—one more than the other—to 
share the responsibility for recruitment or at least for symbolizing a landmark for 
possible recruits; to, at minimum, speak out clearly in favour of ‘pacification’. 
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Once in the training camps, however, indigenous men were turned over to the 
colonial armies, the police and the planters; it mattered little where they had 
come from, what party they supported or what their thoughts about what 
historians would later call ‘decolonization’ were in the first place. This image fits 
nicely with what some theories of colonial violence illuminate; that the colonial 
state was solely interested in its own survival through transforming into a police 
state. The true colonial state of violence, then, had an overinflated security 
apparatus allowed to forcefully peek in every nook and crannies of colonial life.10 
 Those organizing the mammoth process of recruitment and training, 
however, shared a common fear: that placing weapons in the hands of indigenous 
men may prove to be a risky undertaking. On numerous occasions, soldiers in 
Indonesia decried the loss of weapons taken from paramilitary units. New recruits 
were not trusted to take their weapons off-base.11 For this reason, leaders like H. 
S. Lee had to remind the British that the Chinese had supposedly stayed at their 
posts in the face of the invading Japanese. The danger lay with the fact that 
arming certain groups—aside from losing weapons to the opposite side—may 
create spheres of influence that could challenge the incumbent colonial one. The 
MCA was not allowed to pay recruitment fees to directees, lest they become 
confused and the British would receive ‘complaint[s] that the recruits are serving 
two masters’.12 This was important to the British, who feared the MCA would 
create their own sphere of influence, in which ‘recruits might regard the M.C.A. 
rather than the Government, as his employer’.13 The last thing they wanted was a 
state within a state diluting the sources of authority. Spoor’s ideas on indigenous 
recruitment closely echoed that sentiment. He had his doubts about using 
‘coolies’ for security purposes; he warned that the PAT ‘may be used for the 
protection of Chinese lives and possessions’ but that these protectors ‘certainly’ 
                                                 
10 Darwin, ‘What Was the Late Colonial State?’, 73-82. 
11 Verlies van Wapens in Gebruik bij Niet Militairen. Kab./1079, 15 April 1949, NL-HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten 
Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/654; Verzamelrapport Veiligheidsgroep (18 t/m 24-3-47), Nr. 1806/MV1, 31 Maart 1947, NL-
HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/224. 
12 Dato Sir Tang Cheng Lock to M. V. del Tufo, Conscription of Chinese Into the Police Force, 30 January 1952, 
ISEAS, TCL 1.30.   
13 Note of a Meeting held at King’s House on the 28th October 1951, TNA, CO 1022/148. 
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were not meant to ‘create a foreign army unit’ in Indonesia. The Dutch Chief of 
the General Staff confessed he ‘worried about the weapons, which will be given to 
these people’.14 If anything, paramilitaries were to be dissolved as soon as ‘peace 
and order’ were sufficiently guaranteed.15  
 Until such time, the police-force and army ranks would have to be 
reinvigorated and bolstered up with new, indigenous recruits. To them were 
added completely new groups that largely started out as ad hoc paramilitary 
groups. In the previous chapter these security troops have been named, mostly in 
the context of the manpower problem. Here they will be passing the revue in 
terms of how they were trained to minimize the risk of the above-mentioned 
issues. In Malaya and Indonesia, the police were a major priority. ‘[P]ublic order, 
peace and safety’ were guaranteed by police visibility as it ensured the protection 
of ‘people and goods’, respect for ‘legal regulations’ and civil obedience.16 The 
police led the charge combating insurrection. ‘[T]he Army is in aid of the civil 
power, and the other way around’ the fixed adagio ran in Malaya.17 Van Mook in 
Indonesia knew enough about counterinsurgency to note down the same idea. He 
had to concede, however, that the military was rather over-represented in policing 
due to the extraordinary situation caused by Indonesia’s war for independence. 
Naturally, he never called it that.18  
 The Dutch treated the ‘police question’ in earnest from September 1947 
onwards, two full years after they had returned. During one of the first meetings, 
held in General Spoor’s house, security policy makers decided the regular police 
force would consist of numerous entities. Aside from the City Police and the 
‘dessa’ or village police, the General Police (Algemene Politie) was re-instituted, re-
armed and retrained and with that a semblance of the pre-war police presence 
                                                 
14 Notulen van de Bespreking Gehouden ten Huize van de Legercommandant op Vrijdag 19 september 1947 NL-HaNA, 
Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/303. Emphasis in the original. 
15 Generaal Majoor D. C. Buurman van Vreeden aan alle TrC./TpnCs, Chineesche Veiligheidskorpsen Pao An Tui, 
No.:/5474 1GS08, no date, NL-HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/303. 
16 Richtlijnen inzake de Recruten-opleiding der te Vormen “Daerah-Politie”. 
17 Donald MacGillivray to Malcolm MacDonald, DEF.TS.107/1.Vol.III, 8 March 1955, TNA, FO 1091/28. 




was to be restored. Before 1942, the General Police branch comprised of city, 
administrative and field police; it also functioned as a regional Criminal 
Investigation Department.19 Simultaneously, the Daerah Police or local 
‘gendarmerie’, was created to support the General Police. This particular branch 
possessed ‘powers closely approximating the army’s’: its police education was 
limited to the ‘most elementary’ aspects for the duration of the conflict. At the 
same time, it had to take over police tasks traditionally reserved for the KNIL.20 
 The pace of recruitment was to be gruelling. Each six weeks, 1,800 General 
Police recruits could be pushed through four separate training centres across 
Java.21 Daerah constables would likewise have approximately six weeks of 
training.22 The ceiling for the Daerah Police was set at 5,000 for Central Java 
alone, with 500 recruits readied every two months. Other centres, in Jember and 
Cimahi, serviced the Daerah Police as well. With 10,000 General and more than 
5,000 Daerah Policemen needed, it was only logical that recruits received 
‘emergency-training’ that was heavily ‘truncated’ and ‘summary’.23 All recruits 
had more military than police training. A glimpse at the training schedule betrays 
that little time was spent on pure police work or showcasing the government’s 
good works. The six weeks were mostly passed de-activating mines and booby 
traps, shooting (thirty hours), weapons training (22 hours) and the ‘surrounding 
and searching of houses [and] kampongs’.24 The British applied the same quick 
pace of training. Local training depots had to retrain the police force, slowly 
                                                 
19 M. Bloembergen, ‘Koloniale Staat, Politiestaat? Politieke Politie en het Rode Fantoom in Nederlands-Indië, 1918-
1927’, Leidschrift, 21, 2 (2006), 72-73; Notulen van de Bespreking Gehouden ten Huize van de Legercommandant op 
Vrijdag 19 september 1947; Legerverstrekking Wapens ten Behoeve van Algemeene Politie, 10 Maart 1947, no. 
2927/GS 04, both in NL-HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/303. 
20 Notulen van de Bespreking Gehouden ten Huize van de Legercommandant op Vrijdag 19 september 1947; 
Richtlijnen Inzake de Recruten-opleiding der te vormen “Daerah-Politie”, undated, both in NL-HaNA, 
Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/303; Aantekening van den Luitenant Gouverneur-generaal, 24 februari 
1948, NL-HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/392. 
21 Notulen van de Bespreking Gehouden ten Huize van de Legercommandant op Vrijdag 19 september 1947, NL-
HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/303; Wd. lt.gouverneur-generaal (Idenburg) aan lt.gouverneur-
generaal (Van Mook), 6 sept. 1947, NIB 11, 43. 
22 Richtlijnen inzake de Recruten-opleiding der te Vormen “Daerah-Politie”. 
23 Richtlijnen inzake de Recruten-opleiding der te Vormen “Daerah-Politie”; Margadant, ‘De Politieorganisatie in het 
Nieuwe Bestel’, 191. 
24 Richtlijnen voor de Opleiding van Politie-recruten; Oefenschema Politie-troepen, both in NL-HaNA, 
Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/303. 
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changing static sentries into mobile unites ready for ‘active antiterrorist duties’. 
Ostensibly. This included the Jungle Companies, some 3,500 strong, that roamed 
the forests. These companies were paraded as the units where Chinese, Malays, 
Indians, Eurasians and Europeans worked for a common goal. Special 
Constables, the paramilitary force akin to the Plantation Guard, had to do a two-
week refresher course, ‘potential [Non-Commissioned Officers]’ received two 
months training, as did ‘new intake’. Depots processed some 2,600 men per 
rotation.25 In total, some 60,000 policemen were to be retrained in a year.26 
 With an eye for the near future—provided the Dutch had their way—Spoor 
recognized that the coming United States of Indonesia would need outward 
defences. To this effect, he designed the Safety Battalions (SBs). For the time 
being, these would serve, however, as the security forces attached to each 
individual federal state that the Dutch were founding with indigenous help.27 
Spoor—a prolific writer of long-winded memos—presented the SBs as a gift to the 
forming federal states. With them in place, the federalists could answer their own 
call for ‘awareness and the striving for independence’ by sharing the burden of 
destroying the Republic. Spoor saw ‘yearning for the creation of [the federalists] 
own military forces’ in the growing number of SBs.28 In the eyes of historians, Van 
Mook has often been charged with fomenting the federalism pitting Indonesians 
against each other politically, but obviously, Spoor did so militarily. Spoor 
moreover sanctioned yet another security force dominated by military 
functioning. Regardless of Spoor’s assurance the SBs would transform into 
outwardly defensive units—protecting Indonesia’s borders—the battalions would 
be used as another counterinsurgency tool. They would take over patrolling from 
Dutch troops that would rotate home. Therefore, the battalions needed to become 
                                                 
25 Paper on Malaya reporting Progress, 16 January 1952, TNA, CO 1022/22; Sir Arthur Young, “Malaya 1952: 
Narrative Report, 1967”; Young to Hugh Fraser, 22 December 1951, both quoted in Corum, Tale, 15-17; 
Reorganisation of Police Force, Extract from Lord [illegible] Brief for House of Lords Debate, 27 February 1952; CO 
1022/168; ‘Spotlight on Federal Jungle Companies’, Extract from Magazine “Police”, TNA, CO 1022/38. 
26 ‘60,000 Police to be Retrained’, Exrtact from Straits Budget, 17 April 1952, TNA, CO 1022/165. 
27 Memorandum Betreffende de Instelling van het Instituut van “Veiligheidsbataljons”, 22 October 1947, no. 
Kab./1513, NL-HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/367.   
28 Memorandum Betreffende de Instelling van het Instituut van “Veiligheidsbataljons”. 
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operable as soon as possible in the course of 1948.29 The 17,000 recruits plus the 
constant expansion of number of battalions proved again that the manpower 
crisis was badly felt.30 
 The Dutch and British authorities also took responsibilities for the para-
police forces. The British police operated the Kampong Guard—formed in 1949 in 
Malay Villages and armed with shot-guns—and, from September 1950 onwards, 
Chinese Home Guards.31 Lock complained that the scheme was ‘a farce’ as long 
as Chinese ‘lives were not safe’, yet the government steamed ahead anyway.32 As 
said before, the Kampong and Home Guard were amalgamated in 1951 as they 
served the same, mostly static purposes. For our discussion here, it is important 
to note that Home Guards received more powers over time. Once established into 
villages, the sector headman would take charge of the village’s protection. In stage 
two, the HG took on a more active role supporting the police. A fully trusted 
phase three home guard operated—in the village at least—independently and 
permanently armed.33  
 In Indonesia, the Plantation Guard was an important paramilitary force.34 
These guards started as spontaneous measures taken by planters being targeted 
by insurgents. As they felt their government did not support them enough—this 
was admitted by officials—planters started installing (at first unarmed) guards 
who, as in periods of local unrest roughly around the turn of the twentieth 
century, patrolled the plantations.35 From the end 1947 onward, the Plantation 
                                                 
29 Memorandum Betreffende de Instelling van het Instituut van “Veiligheidsbataljons”; Uitbreiding aantal Inf.V.Bn., Nr. 
427/DCO 500.03, 2 Juni 1948, NL-HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/392; Naschrift van CGS, no. 
131/G.S. 15, 4 februari 1948, NL-HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/367. 
30 See NL-HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/392. 
31 Director of Operations Malaya, Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957, 12 September 
1957, TNA, AIR 20/10377. 
32 Press Statement by Tan Cheng Lock on Home Guards and Protection of Resettled Villages. Published in the Straits 
Times on 9 February 1952. 
33 H. R. Briggs, Director of Operations, Directive No. 17 Protection of Concentrated Villages and Resettlement Areas, 
Ref: CSY. 18/A/50, 12 October 1951, ISEAS, TCL 24.3a; Director of Operations Malaya Directive No. 2 (New Series), 
The Control of Operations Against Communist Terrorists, Malaya Emergency Directives (1953 series), 24 August 
1953, ISEAS, TCL 56.25. See also:  D.Inf.7/60/160(Emerg) Appendix E The Home Guard during the Emergency, 
ANM Commerce & Industry Tourist Promotion Section, 95/T. 
34 Another was Her Majesty’s Unregulated Troops, or HAMOT, which shall be dealt with below. 
35 Roel Frakking, ‘“Who Wants to Cover Everything, Covers Nothing”’: The Organization of Indigenous Security 
Forces in Indonesia, 1945-1950, Journal of Genocide Research 14, 3-4 (2012), 343; Verslag West-Java van 
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Guard grew into an official extension of Dutch-sponsored security forces, 
regulated by various sets of (local) ordinances that determined the planters 
‘owned’ the Plantation Guard. They were assisted in performing this task by the 
General Police.36 Commanders-PG would be assigned if planters could find proper 
leaders. In June 1948, the commanders and sub-commanders in charge of any 
PG were given police powers, meaning that the Plantation Guard was now ready 
to perform its duties.37 
 A second major—in terms of how much the police and military discussed 
them—were the Chinese security units, collectively known as the Pao An Tui—or, 
to some, the Tentara Cina.38 The PAT was a true grass-roots organization from 
Medan, Sumatra. In a reaction to the refusal of the British to protect the Chinese 
from Indonesian violence and the Dutch or Chinese governments unable to do so, 
in December 1945 the Hua Ch’iao Chung Hui (HCCH), representative of some 48 
organizations, issued a manifesto calling for the protection of Chinese lives. From 
this manifesto, the PAT emerged. Local Chinese immediately sought to secure 300 
men.39 The British proved rather sceptical but ultimately condoned the PAT after 
months of inaction. The Dutch Directorate of Central Training (Directoraat 
Centrale Opleidingen) later militarized and trained PAT cadre.40 Making ample use 
of the command structure of Medan’s PAT and the men’s experience, the Dutch 
allowed the PAT’s Head Committee in Batavia—conveniently close to Dutch 
                                                                                                                                                                  
regeringscommissaris voor bestuursaangelegenheden West-Java (Abdulkadir Widjojoamodjo) over september 1947, 
NIB 11, 201. 
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37 Uit Resumé Nr. 21, dd. 8 juni 1948, NL-HaNA, Federabo 2.20.50/67. 
38 Sulardi, Pao An Tui, 1947-1949: Tentara Cina Jakarta (Depok: Masup Jakarta, 2015). 
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Betreffende Politieaangelegenheden, NL-HaNA, Defensie/Strijdkrachten Ned.-Indië 2.13.132/392. 
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authorities—to train other units across Sumatra and Java for the protection of 
Chinese people, property, refugee camps and interests. Naturally, Military 
Authorities scrambled to regularize the Chinese Corps by subordinating it to its 
Territorial Commanders.41 The PAT was forbidden to participate in any police or 
military action, leave their assigned posts to make arrests or search houses 
outside their designated areas. In 1948 total numbers had reached 5,000.42  
 How, then, did authorities make sure these various forces performed? To 
begin with, all of them were kept under close surveillance. Spoor designed several 
organizations to this effect. The Directorate for Inland Security (DIS) was 
installed. This Directorate, led by Colonel (KNIL) Suria Santoso, was the Governor 
General’s responsibility and predominantly civil in composition; it would oversee 
the regular police as well as the PG and the PAT. The DIS also coordinated with 
the Inspection Safety Battalions and Police Affairs (ISPA) and the Inspection-
Plantation Guard (I-PG).43 As its title presupposes, the ISPA dealt with the raising 
and upkeep of the SBs, but it also inspected the PAT and the Plantation Guard. 
Colonel De Vries, ISPA’s head, acted, in fact, as a liaison between the police, the 
military and those communities connected to the counterinsurgency efforts.44 The 
General Police monitored—with military assistance—the PG.45 A chore actually 
also undertaken by the I-PG.46 The planters, of course, added another layer: they 
appointed one of their number, Van Deventer, to liaise between the police and the 
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planter community.47 The quip that the British fought the MCP ‘by committee’ 
certainly applied to Indonesia, as well.48  
 In federated Malaya, the running of the Emergency similarly proved a 
convoluted affair. Twelve governments (Federal Government, nine State and two 
Settlement governments) caused ‘executive action [to be] inevitably delayed and 
implementation of measures to deal with the emergency [were] rendered difficult’. 
At least one person, the then-Director of Operations Sir Robert Lockhart, 
wondered in late 1951 whether the governments could not be ‘induced to give up 
their powers’ to the federal government for the duration of the Emergency.49 
Presumably those in charge of the various governing bodies baulked at this idea. 
Lockhart’s successor, retired General Briggs, was bought in as Director of 
Operations ‘in a civilian capacity’ to coordinate military and police operations. 
After 1949, he had organized State/Settlement and District War Executive 
Committees and tied them to a chain of command that ran up to the Federal War 
Executive Committee. The committees would continue to exist throughout the 
Emergency. 
 They were populated by ‘members of the Administrators, Police and Army’ 
and supported by advisory committees comprised of ‘influential members of local 
communities and associations’. As such, representatives of the Malay Rulers’ 
Conference, Malays and Chinese and Planters rounded out the various panels. 
After Henry Gurney’s death, General Templer was appointed both High 
Commissioner and Director of Operations in February 1952, gathering 
‘responsibilities for all Government activities including the conduct of the 
Emergency’. He presided over the Director of Operations Committee that included 
the Director of Intelligence while the Federal War Council was abolished. In 
March 1955, Tunku Abdul Rahman, as Minister of Internal Defence and Security 
(and also Chief Minister) took over as chairman of the Executive Council, which 
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functioned as a cabinet for Emergency Affairs.50 Serving on one of the numerous 
committees was considered yet one more mode of exhibiting alliance. ‘Every 
Federal, State and Settlement Governmental department in Malaya is committed 
to the struggle against Communism’, one directive read, ‘and every loyal person 
has a part to play’. Men such as H. S. Lee clearly understood: he served on the 
Emergency Operations Council under Rahman.51  
 As different states were given their own competencies, so too the security 
forces. The Special Constabulary was separated from the regular police and 
formed into Area Security Units (ASU) to release police and military for their 
‘proper’ roles. The ASUs would still perform static duties but where possible, they 
were to patrol.52 This diffusion of autonomy reflected Commissioner of Police 
Arthur E. Young’s worries that his office had become too much concerned with 
‘day to day details’. Police Head Quarter’s capacity was ‘suited only for 
comparatively small peace-time police strength and the present numerical 
establishment […] has far outgrown it’. Young wanted one more Deputy (Field) 
Commissioner to ensure better communication with HQ as well as additional 
Chief Police Officers in the field, who should all be elevated in rank to match their 
responsibilities.53 The Home Guard, too, became its own enterprise. Inspector-
General E. B. de Fonblanque became its head under the Ministry of Defence. The 
Inspector General, helped by State and Assistant State Home Guard Officers, 
would bear responsibility for HG organisation and training, both static and 
mobile.54  
 Appointments like Templer, De Fonblanque, Santoso and De Vries’s and 
the organisations they led were part of continuous attempts to professionalize 
security forces. The object, aside from ensuring proper conduct of personnel and 
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instilling discipline, was to inscribe unto those serving that they had become 
instruments of the colonial state. These markings ensured that soldiers, 
policemen and paramilitaries attained a separate status, perched above the 
masses. Firstly, markings were of a spatial type. Inductees were placed into extra-
societal environs that, like the Askari fortresses in German Africa earlier, 
signalled colonial power to passers-by.55 The British built ‘probably the largest 
training centre in the world’ for the ‘new police’ in Kuala Lumpur.56 The 
Indonesian Daerah Police had their own training grounds in, among other places, 
Cimahi (West Java), Ambarawa (Central Java; shared with the General Police) and 
Jember (East Java).57 Plantation Guards joined them in Ambarawa and Cimahi 
while the planter communities managed to convinced both the Directorate of 
Agriculture and Fisheries and the Head of the General Police to build further 
training depots in Tasikmalaya in West Java and in Sumatra.58 Plantation Guard 
Commanders underwent refreshing courses in Bandung where instructors would 
simultaneously train ordinary guards into Assistant Commanders.59 Guards 
received training and inspection locally from twelve-men teams of the Inspection-
Plantation Guard that had organized itself into instruction battalions.60 Of 
course, on-going counterinsurgency demanded that enforcers lived among the 
population and so their presence was made known in temporary and permanent 
police posts that dotted the countryside. November 1949 alone saw the opening of 
75 police posts in the Federation in addition to a ‘considerable number of 
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temporary police posts and stations’.61 After the second Police Action, the Dutch 
immediately populated the newly occupied territories (mostly in Central Java) 
with combined Daerah and General Police posts to try and re-establish and 
project control.62 Plantation Managers in 1948 started furnishing their 
emplacements with ‘marching bivouacs’ to invite military presence unto the 
plantations.63  
 Secondly, inscription took shape mentally by allowing the newly minted 
recruits to physically assert themselves as official pacification forces. Assertion 
was helped by the familiarization of the paramilitary enforcers with the 
necessities of pacification laid down in the various official guidelines.64 Both 
Indonesian and Malayan paramilitaries struck out on their own more frequently, 
effectively becoming less bound to kampongs, villages or plantations. The 
Malayan Home Guard were made to feel more and more important through the 
phasing out of control they had to endure from their overseers in the regular 
police. During Phase One, rudimentary exercises such as shooting, guarding, 
patrolling and the changing of the guard as well as alarm practices were 
monitored heavily. Once made into routine, Home Guard units would assume a 
more active role in local defence in Phase Two. Finally, the police would only 
support and sometimes inspect the Home Guard that would now be largely 
autonomously protect their village.65 Some Home Guard units were split off into 
operational sections entrusted with taking over where ‘security forces are few’ as 
part of the Area Security Units.66  
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 Planters in Indonesia supported by police functionaries in 1948 pressured 
the government into giving managers and guard commanders police powers. 
Against some policy makers’ initial wishes, a governmental committee ultimately 
permitted Plantation Guard units to protect convoys to and from plantations, 
search kampongs situated on the estates and patrol not only the massive 
gardens, but also ‘enclaves in between and on roads’ linking those enclaves—
although later, these prerogatives were disputed.67 Paramilitary self-assertion was 
always meant to remain limited. Spoor made sure ample control stayed in place. 
Although he relegated the responsibility for paramilitary forces to the General 
Police and regional Government Commissioners in April 1948, due to the police’s 
poor condition and track record the Armed Forces’ role continued to be 
paramount. Spoor’s men kept an eye on the development of both the police and 
the paramilitaries—despite that the military’s supervisory role had initially been 
‘born out of necessity’.68 Regardless of their own responsibilities, the military was 
bound to assist with ‘loyalty checks’ and ‘weapons training’.69 
 Lastly, mental imprinting was combined with impressions on the body to 
project power. Uniforms—or, to a lesser extent, armbands—set aside security 
personnel from the population, much like the camps and police posts in which 
they lived. Van Deventer, the planter who liaised with colonial officials, discovered 
caches of uniforms at the Department of Sea Shipping, including shorts and 
short-sleeved shirts. Along with 10,000 towels and 5,500 mosquito nets, they 
were distributed to the Plantation Guard—although Van Deventer feared the 
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police may demand its share.70 Further physical attributes finalized the visible 
detachment of security forces from greater society. Singapore policemen started 
traversing the road networks in a ‘fleet of 30 Super Snipe station wagons’. The 
Indonesian General Police aimed at a speedy transformation from having a 
‘preventive task’ into a ‘repressive’ stance with an attention to intelligence 
gathering. To expedite this change, the search was on for ‘transport, [among 
others] bicycles’.71  
 Local leaders’ demands for armaments were finally met to complete the 
vision of an enforcer of the state who could engender ‘full restoration of public 
morale and confidence in the maintenance of law and order’ and open registers of 
violence if needed. Just over a month after the Emergency’s proclamation, more 
than 9,000 rifles were being distributed over the Federation of Malaya for the 
Special Constables’ use.72 European overseers on the Indonesian plantations 
secured thousands of pistols and carbines for themselves and the guards. In 
October, Javanese and Sumatran planter syndicates contentedly reported a one 
to one armament ratio with still thousands of carbines coming in.73 As the 
paramilitary Plantation Guard kept growing during 1949 they needed more 
weapons, among them sub-machine guns and another 25,500 carbines.74  
 On paper, without exogenous influences, little stood in the way of a matrix 
of functioning, reliable security forces in both British Malaya and the Dutch East 
Indies. They were ready to cause ‘silence, fear and awe among the subject 
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populations’.75 What planters, policemen and military functionaries with the 
assistance of local elites had done was to gather massive numbers of enforcers 
who were inducted into the rather distinct caste allowed to wield the colonial 
state’s ample violent instruments—to become such an instrument. Following a 
lineage that stretched back centuries, inductees were elevated from the 
indigenous through drilling and the use of ambushes and arms while being 
trained for guarding, patrolling and liaising with their counterparts in various 
other security units. This happened in delineated areas off-limits to the general 
public. The issuing of uniforms, armbands and weapons finalized security forces 
caste membership.    
 In practice security forces’ functioning as well corresponded to what 
numbers of uniforms, weapons and police posts suggested. Reports started 
coming in that detailed the exploits of the various forces. Several Indonesian 
examples suffice to mark their actions. The Commissioner of the General Police in 
August 1949—the height of the guerrilla war—wrote to the Prosecutor General in 
Surakarta, Central Java, to commend the bravery of several policemen during 
‘intense fights’ in Solo. Hadiprotomo countered ‘better-armed opponents, who had 
almost entered the courtyard of the slaughterhouse’ where he and his band of 
‘largely untrained officers and several KNIL Soldiers’ had been posted. They had 
been holding out for months, weathering ‘tens of attacks’, ‘mostly without Military 
assistance’. Palip Prawidodirdjo proved particularly collected under attack. When 
fighters fired at his Dutch officers’ convoy he covered their retreat into a nearby 
building. One vehicle’s driver then ‘simply [and] with great danger to his own life’ 
drove the car out of the line of fire. Iljas and Sudarto, during another shoot-out, 
‘coolly took up position’ to cover the recovery of two wounded colleagues and a 
killed civilian.76 Palip, Iljas and Sudarto were promoted and received a ‘monetary 
reward’. Aside from dying at the hands of their fellow Indonesians, police officers 
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found that standard law and order tasks largely coincided with 
counterinsurgency. When policemen interrupted the ‘clandestine’ slaughtering of 
a cow in a tiny hamlet, they happened upon resistance fighters, were shot at and 
retrieved ‘Guerilla-pamphlets’.77 On a different occasion, the Daerah Police 
organized a large party to celebrate their successful co-operation with the General 
Police but more importantly, they showcased the police’s generosity to the local 
population by serving ketoprak, a traditional Indonesian dish.78 The planters’ 
archives likewise detail many instances of Plantation Guards fending off ever-
larger bands of attackers.79 S. J. Sinninghe Damsté, chairman of a massive 
conglomerate of planter interest groups, expressed the opinion that the coming of 
the Plantation Guards would ‘enhance the safety situation considerably’ despite  
several lingering problems.80 
 Security Forces in Malaya, too, stood their ground against ubiquitous 
attacks. Initially, before the raising of great numbers of irregular troops, the 
police bore the brunt.81 The Home Guard quickly was dragged into the violent 
maelstrom after its inception. When a unit based in the Muar District repelled an 
attack, their action was quickly said to ‘[reflect] the progress being made in the 
formation of Chinese home guard units to help in the campaign against the 
bandits’.82 One of their number elsewhere declared with some conviction that the 
Liberation Army would ‘leave our families alone now that they realize that the 
fathers, brothers and sons in the camp are determined to fight for their families—
and on equal terms too’—the latter reflecting the distribution of long-awaited 
arms.83  
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 The exploits of the police and irregulars—and the loyalty their resistance 
implied—became the source of myth-making. The attack on the police station of 
kampong Bukit Kepong, also in the Muar Police District in Johore, in February 
1950, remains the most vital and enduring example. The raid is remembered for 
both the valiant actions of the policemen and the unscrupulousness of the 
attackers.84 The Malay Mail, dubbing the episode ‘one of most gallant defences of 
the emergency’, reported that circa 200 ‘terrorists’ attacked the ‘lonely, isolated 
police station’ in the morning of the 23rd. After three hours of fighting (or five, 
according to the Malay Mail), the ‘small force of intrepid Regular Police 
Constables, Auxiliary Police and Kampong Guards’ had been decimated. Nineteen 
constables and guards, three women and one child had been killed along with a 
Chinese shopkeeper. Only one person left the scene unscathed. Naturally, the 
defenders were cast in the dazzling light befitting heroes of the nation: sparing 
female combatants they counter-attacked with knives when ammunition had run 
out. A captured policeman’s wife refused to be forced into calling out to the 
defenders to surrender. Conversely, so articles ran, the communists had no 
compunction killing men and women ‘in cold blood’ and throwing a child into the 
burning police station. This willingness to perpetrate atrocities would become a 
frequent trope in describing the acts of the communist insurrectionists.  
 The enduring legacy of Bukit Kepong’s defence to this day continues to stir 
up emotions and spark the imagination. In 2007, Azlas Ja’afar, daughter of 
Ja’afar Hassan, one of the constables killed at Bukit Kepong, sued Mohamad 
Sabu, the deputy president of the All-Malaysian Muslim Party (Parti Islam Se-
Malaysia; PAS). Sabu had smeared her father’s status as hero; Azlas Ja’afar 
called him a ‘traitor’ for it. She was not alone. Mohamad faced an ‘alternative 
charge’ lodged by ‘ex-policemen associations, individuals and [NGOs]’ for 
‘defaming Marine Constable Abu Bakar Daud, Constable […] Yussof Rono and 
their families’. Azlas had not herself heard Mohamad’s exact words. Yet, mere 
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hearsay proved enough to incense her considerably: the deputy president had 
had the gall to claim that ‘the communists led by Ahmad Indera […] were the true 
independence fighters in the Bukit Incident’.85 
 
A ‘debt of gratitude’: Joining the ranks 
The risks attached to exposing one’s body to (anti-)colonial violence and, if one 
survived, possibly ending up on the wrong side of history after decolonization—an 
increasingly real threat—were quite pressing. Why then, did great numbers of 
non-elite men and women decide to fight for (or resist) interests that were not 
necessarily theirs, for colonial powers and their agents in territories named the 
Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya? This is a question that historians 
have hardly grappled with. Instead, they have focussed on what they considered 
more worthy issues: the assertion of nationalist agendas in the face of colonial 
pressure, the violent turn in decolonization studies, or so-called hearts and mind 
approaches they trundle out with great frequency.  
Political scientists, by contrast, have poured over motivations animating 
behaviours. Unfortunately, they tend towards econometric explanations that 
reduce agency into measurable variables that leave little room for individual 
narratives. The reduction of ‘poverty’ and terrain ‘elevation’ to being ‘positively 
associated with an increased hazard rate’ has limited value in and of itself.86 For 
all their quantifying, political scientists are still unable to agree on which set of 
variables is paramount. To illustrate: studies regarding participation in rebellion 
cannot decide whether grievances cause insurgencies or whether they are so 
common ‘across most at-risk countries’ that ‘even the most extreme grievances 
                                                 
85 ‘Bukit Kepong: Policeman’s Daughter says Mat Sabu is a Traitor’, The Sun Daily, 14 December 2014. For a 
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paper presented at ‘Order, Conflict, and Violence’, seminar held at Yale University, February 2008, 23. 
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will be insufficient to generate civil war’ unless rebels harnessing them mount a 
continuously ‘economically viable’ campaign during their bid for power.87  
 Clearly, such explanations leave room for the historian not in the least 
because she does not need to determine variable hierarchies per se and can bring 
different ones together. The remainder of this chapter is uninterested in the 
weight of variables—nor in the precise military performance of the security forces. 
Rather, the argument is that certain behaviour was mistaken of loyalty; what was 
on display was behaviour generated under a direct threat to ensure survival and 
selfish interests attainment. The following reconstructs, as far as sources allow, 
how various communities and individuals decided for which side to take up arms, 
starting with the colonial troops. The focus lies with those who made choices 
during the wars of independence; those who stood with or against the Indonesian 
and Malayan insurgents are vital. As Karl Hack has stressed: ‘Such history must 
be not only about those people but from their perspective’ and, we may add, in 
their own voices.88 In this endeavour, variables that determine participation (in 
violence, mobilization, collaboration or desertion) still are of great value as nodes 
of analysis and will be used to reflect individuals or communities’ choices.  
 We recall those variables and mechanisms that a preceding chapter 
identified as most pertinent to those choices, while adding different ones in the 
process. They will all feature in this or the next chapter. Regardless of how they 
are defined (‘structural inequality’, deprivation or ‘the gap between expectations 
and achievements’), grievances play a major role in (the onset of) civil strife.89 
Grievances related to stunted economic possibilities have considerable influence. 
By making themselves visible to the colonial state, participants in violence—
including, paradoxically, anti-colonial violence—could make claims on a more 
equitable distribution of state resources in various forms. Related closely to the 
                                                 
87 For the role of grievances across various studies, see Regan and Norton, ‘Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in 
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88 Karl Hack, ‘Malaya—Between Two Terrors: “People’s History” and The Malayan Emergency’, in Hannah Gurman, 
ed., Hearts and Minds: A People’s History of Counterinsurgency (New York: The New Press, 2013), 17. Emphasis in 
the original. 
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individual is their circle of trust.90 Individuals are more able to empathise with 
those they recognize as non-others; hence their existence within communities. 
Therefore, individuals are likely to mimic the actions of others within that circle. 
The empathy-circle has a limited radius so the more close-knit communities are 
more likely to come to shared decisions, mutual ‘social support for participation 
and [raise] the social costs of nonparticipation’.91 For that reason, kin and 
friendship networks, but also—I would like to argue—ethnic relations are highly 
conducive to mobilization. In addition, people with a (shared) record of prior 
activism proved more likely to go through with their intentions than those who 
had never participated. Research shows, for example, that those who withdrew 
had close ties to others who withdrew.92  
 Another variable to participation is the relatively young age of possible 
participants. As Prince Faisal said to a fuming Lawrence of Arabia after the 
Ottoman Empire’s collapse and the taking Damascus in the eponymous 1962 
blockbuster: ‘There is nothing further here for a warrior. We [politicians] drive 
bargains. Old men’s work. Young men make wars and the virtues of war are the 
virtues of young men. Courage and hope for the future’.93 The over-representation 
of youths often combined with closed avenues of social advancement. In 
Indonesia and Malaya the ravages of war barred a generation from normal 
advancement—however limited in the colonial setting to begin with. Youth after 
the Japanese Occupation possessed the ‘biographical availability’ needed to 
participate in ‘high cost/risk’ undertakings associated with forms of more 
extreme activism.94  
This brings two external influences into scope that add another layer to 
behavioural repertoires: territorial control and violence. As both Fotini and 
                                                 
90 Stephen Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: A History of Violence and Humanity (London: Penguin, 2011), 653. 
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Kalyvas have stressed, territorial control equals trust equals making visible and 
attracting those who are willing or forced to co-operate to yield manpower, 
intelligence and the overall support.95 Such control comes at a heavy price for all 
concerned. Those seeking to dominate an unresponsive or reticent population 
must often subjugate it violently. Those exposed to violence must participate in it 
to signal their subjugation in the form of loyalty. Exposing people to violence, 
however, makes imminent sense. Coercion serves to overcome the collective 
action dilemma, making free-riding (i.e. non-participation/neutrality) so costly 
that participation/recruitment necessarily becomes a viable option.96 With 
neutrality largely out of the question, the contested nature of localities where 
violence reigns or is highly likely gives rise to zero sum games that force people to 
serve any party that comes calling. What ties all of the above together, therefore, 
is again the central argument that adherence to any form of fixed, bilateral 
alliance-formation was impossible. Peoples’ survival dictated.97  
 The repertoire of choices for participation in colonial defence was quite 
limited from the outlook of governments officials. Along with men like Tan Cheng 
Lock, they saw joining as a grand-scale exercise in state-building. Partaking of 
violence exposed the participants to the transformative effects that violence 
possesses.98 Baptism by fire made visible whose side the troops were on, while 
opening up state-condoned avenues of reward-claiming. Visibility meant the 
onset of makeable loyalty. As we have seen, Indonesian policemen could earn 
accolades, money and promotions. In Malaya serving in the Home Guard had 
metamorphic qualities: Malay, Chinese and Indians were part of the same 
organisation ‘To develop among […] all races a real sense that they share with the 
police and military forces the responsibility for the security of their area’. Chinese 
                                                 
95 Fotini, Alliance Formation in Civil War and Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War.  
96 Kalyvas and Kochler, ‘How “Free” is Free Riding in Civil Wars?’, 179. 
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98 For violence and state-formation, see, for example, Sunil Purushotham, ‘Internal Violence: The “Police Action” in 
Hyderabad’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 57, 2 (2015), 435, 441. 
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who joined where hailed as ‘our brothers’ taking a ‘test of sincerity’.99 Special 
Constables, like all policemen, swore an oath of loyalty.100  
 The worth of pledging seems dubious. Keeping in mind the premium British 
and Dutch government functionaries and planters placed on security, there is 
reason to assume many were simply appointed. The bar was not set particularly 
high: some physical exercises, a little reading and background screening was all 
it took. The search was for ex-volunteers or ex-policemen, but government 
employees, peons, labourers or anyone else was fine, too.101 Dutch planters made 
the distinction between permanent guards deemed to possess some martial 
qualities—to become policemen later—and those who truly were ad hoc 
appointees and therefore continued as part-time labourers.102 Malaya had a call-
up to direct young adults into the ranks. The British did not quite ask the 
Chinese to become guards: they implemented a pre-set plan for recruitment.103 
Former Auxiliary Policeman Sheah from Perak said that every ‘shophouse’ had to 
send a ‘male member of the family’.104 District Officers or the local Chief Police 
Officer would present themselves in kampongs and ‘select one or two men of good 
repute and integrity and preferably with some prior military training and on his 
advice [they] will be enrolled’ as Special Constable.105  
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 Volunteers did not sign up for high-flying goals either, having more 
pedestrian, selfish motivations. The Japanese Occupation and the subsequent 
weak post-war economy and pervasive violence played their disruptive parts in 
favour of recruitment. In East Java, rice prices soared and centralised food 
collection proved slow due to ‘subversive activities in rural areas’.106 Youth signed 
up for police duties as they were too old to go to school and the pay was good.107 
Malay villagers lived in such fear that they left fields untended. No-one dared step 
outside kampong Miku’s police post perimeter in which people had erected make-
shift shelters.108 Sheah related how ‘everyone lived in fear of the communists 
during the Emergency Period. Chaos broke out’.109 Signing up became a viable 
means to physical security, guaranteed food and shelter.110 Former army 
personnel rented out their expertise as commanders and instructors to Plantation 
Guards.111 Planters certainly felt the financial strain of their guards’ higher wages 
(to instil authority versus the labourers) and tried constantly, through their 
powerful interest groups, to have the government carry the burden.112 The 
connection between recruitment and economic fluctuations was quite real. When 
rubber prices were low, Home Guards earned (slightly) more than rubber tappers; 
when ‘unskilled labour’ wages rose, recruitment slumped and men anxiously 
asked permission to leave.113 So it was that of the more than fifteen thousand 
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SCs recruited in 1953, the large majority had volunteered against 2,168 having 
been directed.114 
  The combination of a lack of income, poor social prospects and an ongoing 
shooting war made a specific demographic particularly available: youth. In 
Tampin, for example, five young Malay adults aged twenty through thirty-two 
volunteered as Specials.115 This range was the standard in both Malaya and 
Indonesia—with a preponderance of those in their twenties.116 The Chinese the 
High Commissioner called upon to join the police in 1952 had to be those aged 
eighteen to twenty-five. The draw was that the ‘Select Committee considering the 
Federal Citizenship Bill’ had decided that Federal Citizenship should be granted 
to anyone serving for three years—an often-overlooked nexus.117 Unsurprisingly, 
that same year a campaign encouraged 1,5 million Chinese and Indians to apply 
for citizenship.118 300,000 were naturalized by 1952. Some 385,000 had already 
been naturalized by law in 1949.119 The demand for youth was acute. Local 
contractors in North Kedah complained that ‘They are losing their young, more 
energetic labourers’. Chan Wah’s painting business felt the crunch. His ‘older 
painters’ were too slow. Furniture maker Soon Cheong lost four able-bodied men 
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while seven left him ‘to avoid being drafted’. Drafting and volunteering clearly 
divided people: ‘for every man called up at least two others disappear[ed]—
possibly to join the bandits’, North Kedah’s Chief Engineer concluded.120 
 A thirst for adventure and rewards fed youth into the security forces. ‘Most 
had never before been so far from their home village’.121 Leong Chee Woh saw his 
intelligence work, including killing opponents, as a ‘challenge’. ‘Ah’, he exclaimed, 
it ‘was something new, let’s go and whack the fellas’.122 The search for Gurney’s 
killers in 1951 saw a surge of retaliatory fervour among Raub Home Guards who 
ached to discharge their weapons in earnest. Many were turned away. Inche Abu 
Bakar bin Imam, a former penghulu and fervent insurgent hunter himself, led the 
charge of 250 Guards. All ages were represented but the youngest, a seventeen-
year-old, ‘said simply: “I like this kind of work”’. Inche’s men reputedly 
constituted Malaya’s ‘champion civilian bandit killers’, notching up twelve kills—a 
quarter of Raub’s ‘score’.123 Newspapers took to such blood-thirsty rhetoric, 
reporting that the notorious and fiercely anti-Communist Pahang HG’s special 
‘killer squads’ would ‘take the […] fight even further’. The men in Raub had shot 
their way into earning $40,000 in rewards ‘for kills and information’. Receiving 
money in exchange for taking lives became a spectacle on its own; a rite of 
passage.  Commissioner of Police William N. Gray once travelled sixty miles on a 
weekend just to ‘congratulate and reward group of Home Guards who had drawn 
first blood’. The Malay bentri besar completed the cast by personally handing 
almost $3,000 to the guards ‘who had brought up the score […] to two killed’ in 
Ulu Kelantan.124 
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 Serving made claims on the state possible. State-formation demands  
visible subjects; legibility allows the state to assess, control and ameliorate.125 In 
the colonial cosmos, however, the state did not necessarily show interest in the 
reciprocity of feedback. The colonized understood this and, unless grievances 
were too much to bear, tried to stay ‘ungoverned’ or stage minor forms of 
‘everyday resistance’—activities reflecting continued re-negotiating of visibility 
and power relations.126 In one area—serving the state—the relationship did work 
bi-directional. Having shed blood allowed non-elite, colonial subjects to lay claims 
on the state’s doorstep, to exchange personal and communal gains, however 
incremental or ephemeral, for violent experiences.127 They used that other realm 
of dialogue, petition writing, and made ‘the imposition of the use of the rulers’ 
own patterns of expression’ work in their favour.128 
Through petitioning, policemen and paramilitaries made their very 
identities as guardians of empire visible. In responding, the colonial state 
furthered its own self-enforcing myth that perpetuated it as the protector of the 
masses against themselves and anti-colonial machinations.129 The interplay thus 
generated another form of state-formation drawing administrators and 
indigenous scribes into a sphere of mutual legitimization where the politicised—
and therefore risky—act of ventilation was condoned.130 What follows is based on 
Malaysian sources. The reason is that Indonesians reading the movement of the 
tide against the Dutch had no interest in showcasing their ante-independence 
deeds. In the words of an Attorney-General’s representative from 1949: ‘Seeing 
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that the possibility cannot be discounted, that [policemen] could have problems 
[with their medals] afterwards, [such a] reward should be discouraged’.131 Jalhay, 
formerly of the battalion ‘Andjing-NICA’, put it differently: making enemies, even 
for a soldier, was dangerous, as ‘you never know, who will be the boss here 
later’.132 
 Petitioning in Malaya stemmed from personal tragedy. Commonly widows or 
orphans did the unsavoury honours.133 For Chong Yok and Yong Nam You, Home 
Guards, the Solicitor-General filled out the papers. Both had been ambushed in 
South Johore, possibly by insurgents, who took 1,800 Malayan Dollar from Yok’s 
body along with personal effects.134 When a commander and his wife were slain, 
the son who had found his parents amongst the rubber acted as witness. 
Although Lim Seh Hoon and her husband were killed tapping, the British decided 
to place more than three thousand dollars in a trust fund for the son since Mr. 
Chak was murdered for being a Home Guard. 6,400 Malayan Dollar was put on 
the heads of the assailants.135 Friendly fire during an ambush yielded another 
successful claim. Not every petition warranted recompense. Ismail bin Japir shot 
himself tripping over his carbine, but was denied.136 A badminton-related eye 
injury sustained during a round one unlucky Special was ‘bound by discipline’ to 
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play likewise resulted in refusal.137 Many petitions attested to economic 
motivations, concerning back-pay after redundancy measures.138 Sickness and 
dismissal left at least one family destitute while another complained about an 
abusive planter.139 An impertinent ex-Special wanted three months’ wages despite 
having been in detention. ‘I am quite innocent’, he wrote on the eve of his 
deportation to Indonesia. Guards were peeved when passed over for promotions—
especially when a Chinese was put in charge of Malays.140 Bin Tadir’s reaction 
was wholly typical, although the District Officer’s less so: Why, Bin Tadir 
wondered, ‘are new men recruited […] whereas a man, in my case, who already 
had the training was rejected’? Unperturbed, the DO replied that the man was 
‘completely useless’.141  
 The British understood well the ‘debt of gratitude’ they incurred.142 
Simultaneously, large groups of demobilised men familiar with weapons ‘might, if 
unemployed, constitute an additional danger to security’.143 This was not 
unthinkable as 18,000 Specials had served their time in 1953 and some used 
their position to rack up debts.144 Post-service initiatives abounded, ranging from 
vocational training, personal loans and repatriation to transfers to Police or 
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Armed Forces.145 The Specials needed the support. Recession caused 
unemployment, made preferred jobs like watchman scarce and many were 
unskilled.146 Ex-Specials received titles to state land. The majority chose 
individual settlement; others to live in communes.147 The largest site in Kuala 
Selangor, named Trail, housed a maximum of 300 ex-Specials and their families. 
Soon children were born, a women’s organisation was founded nearby and the 
newly-settled took tentative steps towards becoming coffee planters. Despite 
initial grievances—need for schooling, debts to the government—headway was 
being made. Tellingly, inhabitants rechristened their settlement ‘Jaya Setia’: 
‘Loyal and Faithful’.148  
 Zooming in again on the Indonesia—and specifically, the Pasundan and the 
Chinese communities—makes a strong case for specific violence and territorial 
control—not innate loyalty—meeting locally to solve the collective action 
conundrum. In other words, violence activated alliance-seeking and formation. 
Dutch hopes of the negara drawing in anyone ‘of Sundanese descent’ proved 
ambitious. Statehood elicited myriad reactions as the nation fell into different 
camps. Long-serving KNIL soldiers proved loathe to risk their pension for a 
possible ‘Sundanese State Army’. Unless the Dutch suppressed the negara they 
                                                 
145 Report on Special Constabulary. Rehabilitation of the Special Constabulary for 1953. Extract from the Notes of the 
Conference of Mentri Mentri Besar, Resident Commissioners and British Advisers with the High Commissioner held on 
Monday, 13th July, 1953, ANM, LAB.M.No: 12/1954 Part I; Report on Special Constabulary Rehabilitation of the 
Special Constabulary for 1953; N.S. 120/53 S.J.26 Memorandum of Charge in Respect of E.M.R. 2135 Executed by 
Che’ Ahmad bin Mat Akit, Ex-Special Constable of Permatang Pasir, Port Dickson; Disposal of Time-expired Special 
Constables (CSO.27/10), ANM, Sel. Sec. 346A/1952 Re-absorption of Special Constables into Civilian Employment; 
Rehabilitation - Special Constabulary 1954 Survey First Options 127/19/3 Sel. Sec. 27A I/1953 87A, ANM, Sel. 
Secretariat No. 27 I/1953 Land Settlement for Time-expired Special Constables. 
146 No. (94) in ACL. Klang Conf.862/49 10th October 1953 Rehabilitation of Special Constables, J. C. S. Mackie MCS 
Assistant Commissioner for Labour, Klang, to Deputy Commissioner for Labour, Selangor, ANM, Sel. Sec. 346A/1952 
Self-absorption of Special Constables into Civilian Employment. 
147 Appendix I Figures showing the Number of Men Who applied for the Various Benefits-in-kind and the Number 
Who were Rehabilitated in the Year 1953, Annex to LAB.M.No: 12/1954; D.Inf. 8/55/5 (INF) Cultivator Karim, Ex-
Circus-Hand-Cum-Policeman, Builds own House, by Warner Vanter, Sunday Papers, August 7, 1955, ANM, B.A. Sel. 
132/1953 Committee for the Rehabilitation of Demobilised Special Constables, State of Selangor. 
148ANM, LAB.M.No: 12/1954 Part I; E. E. Pengilley Commissioner for the Resettlement of Special Constables in 
Civilian Life to State Secretariat Selangor, 6 September, 1954; No.(11) in CRSC.66/53. Sel, ANM, Selangor Secretariat 
498/G Report of Inspections by the Commissioner for the Resettlement of Special Constables -Kuala Selangor District; 
Sel. Sec. 346A/52 Precis Rehabilitation of Demobilised Special Constables, ANM, Sel. Sec. 346A/1952 Re-absorption 
of Special Constables into Civilian Employment. 
188 
 
would not desert and combat ‘terrorists’ under the KNIL, they said.149 Conversely, 
many Republican administrators in Buitenzorg ‘came over to the Pasoendan’. 
Bantam in Java’s western tip was also ‘ripe for Pasoendan’ but because of the 
Sultan’s separatist motivations, not his attachment to Sundanese Indonesians.150 
Elsewhere, hundreds of Sundanese ignored the PRP, turning unto a path leading 
into nascent guerrilla movements or the TNI.151 Local Islamic leader Haji Abdulah 
captured the decisive nature of the Pasundan well. Its leaders, ‘porters, grass 
cutters [and] coolies’, could never unite the different Sundanese communities. 
Ultimately, the kiaj said, the Dutch planned to have Sundanese under their 
control fight those supporting the Republic. ‘Certainly [they] want to again 
colonize us’.152 The Linggadjati Agreement of March 1947 crushed many 
Sundanese spirits. The ‘little man’ feared that with Republican sovereignty over 
Java (and Sumatra and Madura) Dutch protection would fall away and ‘that they 
will pay for their loyal stance’ towards the Dutch.153 Uncertainty encouraged 
alliance-switching. The local Republican Polisi Tentara used Sundanese agents to 
encourage desertions: 36 Sundanese crossed the Citarum river into Republican 
territory.154  
 The ‘Police Action’ mere months after Linggadjati’s ratification changed 
matters. Police recruiters noted that willingness emerged where Dutch power was 
unchallenged and visible.155 Territorial control likewise emboldened local 
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Sundanese. Whereas the Pasundan’s political leadership was treading water on a 
state level, in some places the Sundanese came together. The Pasundan 
Information Service reported people felt ‘liberated from the terror’ of the Republic 
and now dared to demand the removal of gangs and desa leaders who ‘condone 
terrorism or encourage it’.156 This activism was likely animated by repositories of 
pent-up resentment being unleashed.157 There was plenty to be tapped into: 
between October and December 960 cases of PRP-specific cases of murder, 
kidnap, arson, looting and displacement took place.158 The coming together of 
control and the possibility of safety from violence activated risk-taking behaviour 
and peoples’ identity as Sundanese. In desa Pagelaran, Krawang Regency, Bapa 
Koné proposed to form a central PRP post that, supported by Dutch soldiers, 
would patrol neighbouring villages, ‘hunt and report gang members’ and expose 
‘terror-plans’. A list with twenty-seven names of suspects suddenly surfaced. It 
named various insurgent groups and their plans to burn kampongs, collect guns 
and murder soldiers of the Royal Army, KNIL and collaborators.159 
 The Pao An Tui’s origins were predicated on the same process of violence 
acting as activism facilitator. The Chinese formed one of the main targets for the 
nationalist uprising: it brought long-standing Sino-Indonesian frictions out in the 
open. To explain this, a short foray is needed into the Indonesian Chinese 
community. As in Malaya, it constituted a minority. By the 1930s, successive 
migratory waves and subsequent settling had resulted in 1,2 million Chinese in 
the archipelago divided into sinkeh Chinese and their Indonesian-born offspring, 
peranakan Chinese.160 In Indonesia, too, some Chinese communities adopted 
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Western modes of living and the Malay or Dutch language. Like in Malaya, they 
are referred to as peranakan. Sinkeh Chinese remained less sedentary and self-
employed and held on to their original languages.161 Chinese organizations in 
Indonesia reflected this divide. The Tiong Hua Kui Koan in 1900 dabbled in 
Chinese nationalism whereas the Chung Hua Hui some twenty years later 
strongly associated with the Dutch.162 Although some Chinese and early 
Indonesian nationalists took heart and copied each other’s activities, the Chinese 
remained foreign bodies.163 The Chinese stood out further as China’s government 
meddled in overseas education and citizenship issues. Chambers of Commerce 
could act as China’s consulates while businessmen spread Kuomintang 
nationalism.164 The Serikat Islam, Indonesia’s first mass movement, party 
established itself to interrupt economic ‘competitive pressure of the Chinese’. 
When the Dutch Ethical Police of 1901 broke Chinese opium selling and revenue 
farming monopolies for injuring indigenous prospects, anti-Chinese rioting broke 
out in 1912 and 1918.165 Indonesians continued to see the Chinese communities 
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as a privileged layer protected injected between them and the Dutch.166 That the 
Dutch gave the Chinese Dutch citizenship and a European legal status severely 
aggrieved Indonesians further.167 The bridge between the two communities finally 
collapsed under the weight of Japanese occupation since many Chinese had 
collaborated with the Japanese. Some did so for ‘profit’, surmised the resident of 
Banjumas; others for ‘fear of looting [...] after the Dutch power had 
disappeared’.168 That the Japanese murdered scores of Chinese for their Anti-
Japanese support to China was conveniently ignored.169 
 The returning colonial government had little problems with previous 
collaboration. The Chinese fitted well the twin policies of finding allies against the 
Republic and economic restoration.170 Many Indonesians did take issue. 
According to the Federation of Chinese Associations (Chung Hua Tsung Hui, 
CHTH) anti-Chinese violence was stayed until after the bersiap period during 
which Eurasians and Dutch people were slaughtered en masse.171 Indonesians 
after August 1945 ‘suddenly assumed a conciliatory attitude’, believing China 
and the Allies would not tolerate any ‘molesting’ of Chinese.172 The CHTH was 
likely mistaken, however: in 1948 ‘long-disappeared Chinese’ were discovered in 
two mass graves.173 Regardless, Indonesian hesitations soon gave way to large-
scale maltreatment and killings. During the famous Battle for Surabaya (19-26 
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November 1946) an estimated 1,000 Chinese lost their lives.174 In Salatiga, large 
numbers of Chinese were held captive.175 Spoor in 1949 acknowledged that anti-
Chinese violence continued unabated while the one Chinese organisation counted 
some 60,000 Chinese victims during the first Police Action and another 30,000 
during the second. ‘Of these, Republican and sometimes Dutch forces had killed 
several hundred’.176 One particularly heinous episode was the massacre in 
Tangerang, outside Jakarta, in May and June 1946. The Seng Ie Red Cross tallied 
653 murdered Chinese including 136 women and 36 children who had perished 
as Dutch and Indonesians fought for possession of the town. 25,000 refugees 
streamed into the capital fleeing the sea of fire that consumed their houses. A 
September atrocity saw thousands of Republican Naval Forces, police and TNI kill 
some two hundred Chinese and besiege the town when ‘survivors resisted’. Two 
thousand Chinese fled Indonesia altogether, to Malacca.177  
 While the Republican Minister for Information grossly downplayed 
Tangerang, the orgy of violence (featuring forced circumcision and rape), 
impressed the lesson on Chinese leaders that their stance of neutrality was ill-
advised.178 On this notion the Pao An Tui was built. As we recall, it was allowed in 
December 1945 by the British and then recognized and organized by the Dutch in 
the course of the following years. ‘[T]he “right of self-defence” […] could not with 
good conscience be denied [a] group, that finds itself in direct danger—and 
practically unprotected by Government’, police authorities opined. The Chinese 
practically pushed the Dutch into accepting this conclusion: they had dragged a 
dead, shot-up Chinese through the streets to make their point in North 
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Sumatra.179 To the planters, arming the PAT was relatively safe yet ‘adventurous’ 
seeing the atmosphere in ‘Malakka’. After all, ‘the Chinese would not cross to the 
other party […] because they cannot mingle enough with’ the Republic.180 As the 
Sundanese in Krawang, Dutch protection afforded the Chinese a choice and so 
PAT units sprung up everywhere.181 Again, as in Krawang, (the threat of) specific 
violence, however, had to be dissipated by Dutch control because ‘where [Dutch] 
troops could not advance quickly enough’ Chinese stood little chance: murder, 
arson, rampok or the ‘removal of women and children’ ensued forcing the Chinese 
to keep their heads down.182 Explaining why the PAT was founded, Pouw Kiou An 
loudly declared: ‘Our possessions up in smoke, the honour of our wives and 
daughters violated, our freedom trampled upon. No wonder, that the blood of 
thousands of innocent Chinese that has so besmirched and tainted the 
Indonesian Freedom Flag’ has led Chinese to form their ‘own “security corps”’.183 
 
Riding the Trojan Horse  
Eighty-five percent of the Plantation Guard functioned ‘adequately’; only one 
percent had deserted, February 1949 headlines announced.184 Nine months later 
a Surabaya paper reported differently as ‘Desertion brings chaos’.185 Already 
planters had complained that European staff schedules precluded monitoring the 
watchmen and that hiring ‘trained external’ guards was tantamount to ‘bringing 
in the Trojan Horse’. The PG, they said, had been ‘pushed on us like a necessary 
evil’ by the government.186  
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 Colonial security forces—despite the accoutrements of loyalty—performed 
not as well as some believed. The question is why. To attempt an answer, this 
chapter’s concluding pages will analyse two causes. The first is the role of 
indigenous, individual agency choosing to follow interests that mostly ran counter 
to colonial interests. Self-deployment made room for itself. The second cause lies 
with the interplay between levels of anti-colonial violence and colonial control: it 
engendered displacement of loyalties. For the second tier of the argument the 
focus lies with Indonesia. Indonesia’s case simply shows the most extreme 
consequences of loss of control. Certainly, desertion plagued Malayan security 
forces as well. It suffices here to note that Malaya’s paramilitaries did not perform 
as admirably as some scholars imply.187 Security men deserted there, too, but 
rates never rose so high that police and paramilitary forces virtually collapsed—
therefore the issue tends to be overlooked. Still, people absconded. The Malayan 
Communist Party gleefully reported that forty-eight Special Constables had 
deserted within six months in 1951; wags in the Legislative Council claimed 
people rather kept guard-dogs than trust the Specials.188  
 Those responsible certainly understood the dangers of insubordination due 
to individual, diverging interests. Deserting or absconding Specials faced prison 
or firing.189 Plantation Guards risked serious repercussions from misuse of 
authority, disobeying or cheating superiors, inebriation, opium-dealing or 
harassing the public.190 Special Force order No. 72, ‘Loyalty to the Police Force’, 
forbade Malayan policemen any outside affiliations. A man could not ‘divide his 
loyalty between the Police and some other organisation’ as much as he could 
‘serve two masters’.191 However, many did just that and served themselves. Placed 
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suddenly in authority they were not averse to exercising it. Revenge was a motive. 
One guard (on patrol) killed Leu See Hoon, the female insurgent leader 
responsible for his father’s death two years before.192 Settling scores resulted in 
intimate violence. Home Guards dispatched romantic rivals, shot friends in anger 
and took care of objecting in-laws.193 One Javanese fusilier shot a suspected 
‘extremist’ who ‘harassed’ his wife.194 Djarta, a 23-years old soldier, led a gang of 
his friends to find his wife, as suspected, in the arms of another. He bayoneted 
the lover. Djarta was charged with manslaughter, having taken ‘the opportunity 
given him as soldier, misusing the attributes of authority given to him, uniform 
and weapon’.195  
 Registers of violence, then, opened for personal, sometimes sinister gains. 
In Krawang, one indigenous soldier ‘to free himself from discovery’ killed the 
woman he had raped as well as her son. He was shot dead attempting escape 
after being sentenced to death.196 Forcing sexual acts upon children and women 
—‘plundering of honour’—happened frequently, on and off duty, by Dutch, 
Indonesian and Chinese enforcers.197 Their greedy hands liberated material 
possessions from their owners where they could, killing and stealing.198 
Elsewhere, Ambonese soldiers asserted dominance over Chinese merchants. In a 
scuffle over food two Chinese died. When Police Chief Henar came to investigate, 
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‘Ambonese and […] native policemen […] rushed into the Chinese camp’ and 
destroyed it. The military praised the troops’ aggressiveness; the Chinese should 
not resist the suppression of their profiteering—although the brawl had not been 
about that.199  
 In Malaya, the 1948 Batang Kali massacre was accompanied by smaller, 
lesser-known instances of unwarranted yet so-called necessary or accidental 
violence.200 In Rawang, an Indian policeman gunned down a Chinese man 
seated in front of a barbershop. As shopkeepers hastily closed the shutters more 
shots rang out. The responsible trio claimed they had repulsed a 50-man 
communist sortie in town, but brave witnesses refuted this account. Finding the 
man alive the police took him away to finish him off.201 In the aftermath, villagers 
berated the police for intimidating witnesses through mass-screening; the local 
police commander brazenly defended the false reporting.202 In 1956 British troops 
and local forces caused massive outrage subjecting 3,000 rubber tappers to 
‘indignity and brutal treatment’, strip-searching women and making ‘them run for 
their clothes’.203 Lao Jiang, a MRLA soldier, said British soldiers ‘went up to the 
women’ on rubber estates before dawn and ‘raped and killed them’. To cover their 
tracks, they would ‘leave a cap which belongs to the CMP cadre’ at the scene. ‘My 
hatred towards the British was boiling inside me’, he concluded.204  
 Perpetrators, then, were specifically empowered by the ‘utilization of a 
means given […] through [their] profession’.205 The pervasive war context certainly 
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sped up professional deformation, which assumed collective forms, too. Dutch-
armed units plotted out their own course. After a scuffle with Ambonese troops, 
one of the PAT members defiantly said that the Ambonese ‘should not think that 
we like you are dogs of the Dutch’.206 A livid Governmental Commissar in East 
Java found that a Plantation Guard ‘on their own accord’ had burnt down a 
kampong supposedly housing ‘extremists’.207 Another habitually scared off 
kampong populations ‘by shooting and then robbing the houses’.208 Fourteen 
guards were indicted for murdering two planters—planters Van der Nat and 
Veentjer—and stealing large quantities of ‘valuable goods’ in 1950. As the case 
dragged on, the defendants claimed the police had beaten them. Thirteen were 
acquitted.209  
 The Pao An Tui took liberties checking for contraband and renting 
themselves out as convoy protection for Chinese market-goers. These lucrative 
activities sustained the costly units. Relations between the military commander 
and the Chinese in Pasuruan, East Java, tensed up because the former 
consigned the PAT to three posts that, complained Chinese leaders, ‘became 
“coffee houses” for nightly military patrols’. PAT units were further connected to 
illegal weapons trade. Initially, units were officially allowed to buy weapons from 
anyone, including gangs and the TNI.210 Rescinded leniency cost the Advisor for 
Chinese Affairs in East Java his position. He had purchased illegal weapons 
stolen by a local KNIL soldier.211 PAT units did what Spoor feared all along, 
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despite earlier compliments on their exemplary (military) behaviour.212 
Throughout the archipelago they gathered intelligence and arrested people 
without warning the police, intimidated a police detachment into not pursuing 
Chinese suspects but also kidnapped and—much like the police—stole, molested 
and executed. PAT leaders excused misdeeds invoking youthfulness, recent 
recruitment and uncontrolled ‘sentiment’.213  
 To see the deep-cutting influence of control (incumbent’s or otherwise), we 
need to revisit the Indonesian plantations. A hackneyed phrase says that people 
vote with their feet to indicate support. In Indonesia, self-removal took the form of 
desertion. This section establishes how desertion became a necessity under 
shifting fortunes of war. After the first Police Action—called ‘Operation Product’ 
after the re-occupation of the many European-owned plantations and factories—
Dutch managers fanned out in the wake of the military. Many found their 
properties devastated yet enthusiastically rebuilt.214 The Director of Jasinga 
Rubber optimistically wrote the Department of Economic Affairs asking if the 
military could push just a little further to liberate his factory as well.215  
 The buoyant atmosphere did a drastic volte-face. By November 1947, 
planters recorded people ‘happily burning, murdering and sabotaging’. Reports 
containing nineteen instances of violence within roughly one month directed at 
anyone working with the Dutch (planters) such as Indonesian managers and 
guards became common.216 The Dutch military, police and the administration 
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were losing grip. Anti-Dutch resistance perked up. One over-confident gang sang 
the Dutch national anthem before attacking; Plantation Guards could face 200 
fighters in one single altercation. Groups of a thousand—once 5,000—were 
spotted.217 The Inland Administration groused about a ‘great many infiltrations’ 
into Dutch-controlled areas and ‘happy shoot-outs’. Insurgents attacked police 
posts multiple times, tried to eliminate indigenous spies and shot up civil 
administrators’ compounds. The enemy ensconced itself among the population. 
Combined military and police intelligence could not infiltrate these networks.218 
Planters were frequently murdered, leading to the abandonment of plantations in 
West Java; in East Java planters threatened to do so.219  
 The Renville Agreement of January 1948 and its cease-fire provided only 
temporary succour.220 In October, it was estimated that of the circa 30,000 
freedom fighters expelled from Dutch areas under Renville’s stipulations, more 
than half had returned. Incidents rose from 90 in May to 250 in August.221 The 
military limply decried TNI duplicity to the UN observers.222 The planters’ 
complaint that the military had ‘missed the bus to [Yogjakarta]’ had become 
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reality; they realised that ‘One cannot escape the notion that a guerrilla is being 
waged, that is led well’.223 Several commanders spoke of ‘an incremental 
encapsulation of many [Dutch] posts’, the disruption of lines of communication 
and illegal Republican local administrations. ‘[P]rimitive sentiments’ among ‘the 
masses’ came alive, took away inhibitions and led to a violent ‘psychosis’.224 
 Guerrilla efforts were certainly facilitated by constant civil-military 
infighting. Recall that despite the military’s incessant patrolling on a limited 
budget and with reduced numbers it had to cover for the ailing police. The 
Daerah Police remained the ‘stepchild who is taken seriously nowhere’.225 Little 
coordination between civil and military officials existed concerning ownership of 
the police. Military commanders demanded more and more control over this 
supposedly civilian instrument. They prevailed. Both in West and East Java, 
military authorities bypassed their civilian colleagues.226 By 1949, lack of police 
training and resolve were hidden, locally, by combined military-police-units.227 
Still Spoor scathingly mentioned that he once drove 275 kilometres without 
meeting one policeman.228 The Safety Battalions, too, could hardly operate 
without army support. The Sundanese SB functioned only where a majority of 
people were Sundanese, but not with the KNIL due to ‘animosity’. Westerling 
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called SBs a ‘hotbed for spies’.229 The Dutch policy to recruit former insurgents—
in the not necessarily unlikely belief that ‘loyalty regarding the republic is often 
[...] psychological and opportunistic’—exacerbated the situation.230 The preman 
(free man) Prandji and the circa 300 former laskar, for example, may have acted 
as Dutch shock troops, lures for other disgruntled Republic supporters and spies, 
but in the end these men proved untrustworthy and more interested in securing 
their own future within a changing Indonesia.231  
 The Plantation Guard, meanwhile, was coasting unchecked: the General 
Police had not been able to properly control and manage them and claimed 
planter and military interfering—even though the military temporarily disowned 
the Guard.232 Planters noted that guards were specifically vulnerable where 
military posts were vacated.233 Managers for their part hardly cared for the 
discipline of the guards.234 Spoor structurally tried to force military and police 
back in line.235 His Goalpara Committee demanded centralised retraining for both 
the Daerah Police and the Plantation Guard.236 Spoor’s last attempt, the ‘System 
of Security in Unruly Areas on Java and Sumatra’ from January 1949, proposed 
to bring the PAT, the Plantation Guard and the Police together in various 
imaginary circles supported by the military. With the system, the army now 
controlled all security forces.237 Naturally, the plan came very late, nor could it be 
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implemented everywhere. South Sumatra’s Territorial Commander stated that the 
population and its support were already out of reach.238  
 At this point, the army’s hubris had already been noted.239 Spoor (and 
others) overestimated the military’s ability to ‘pacify’ Java and Sumatra; he 
tended to dismiss the TNI as ‘roving gangs’.240 The General had insisted on a 
‘spear-tip strategy’ for the Police Actions which captured main cities and traffic 
arteries but allowed insurgents to deftly move into areas where no-one could 
dislodge them. Time and again they escaped.241 Rumour had it the Dutch army 
was only capable of European warfare.242 Sweeps looked impressive, but stayed 
close to roads. Soldiers displaced, but did not mop up.243 This observation 
became pertinent when in the course of 1949 Dutch troops withdrew to staging 
areas and left other localities to the TNI. Coming after ‘Renville’—very much 
devised to extract the Republicans from the federal areas—this concession 
underlined the disruptive consequences the guerrilla war wrought in terms of 
making parts of Java ungovernable.244 Local Joint Committees designated Dutch, 
TNI and combined patrolling areas.245 When all was failing, security forces took 
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van Normaal Bestuur’, De Locomotief, 23 September 1949, 1; ‘Plan-’sJacob Aanvaard? Aan Solo zal Status “Daerah 
Istimewah” worden verleend’, De Locomotief, 30 September 1949, 1. 
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refuge in gross violence, exactly what displeased planters wanted: unchecked 
violence reminiscent of ‘Aceh methods’.246 The moral downfall of security forces 
will be analysed in the next chapter. Suffices it to say that unbridled and often 
unpunished violence certainly allowed paramilitaries like the PAT to participate in 
the permissive environment to chase selfish, violent interests.  
 Through the combined prism of a Dutch loss of command over its own 
security forces and the loss of the direction of a war increasingly dominated by 
the Republic (aided by a propitious international constellation), it has been 
established that the vestige of paramilitary staying-power were fatally 
undermined. Guards and policemen could, at one point, resist ‘robbers’, but 
never ‘units, experienced in guerilla and “jungle fighting” and armed with 
machine guns and mortars’.247 By 1949, Spoor found the police and guards ‘no 
match against the trained guerillas and continued intimidation’.248 This captures 
how paramilitaries and policemen’s behavioural repertoires had changed. Facing 
a gale-force guerrilla, they had several options. Police and Guards (and soldiers) 
were constantly exposed to pamphlets entreating them to reconsider their present 
employ. Why work for the Dutch, they demanded to know, who destroyed your 
family? ‘Indeed, brother, there is no worse insult, than to witness the rape of your 
Own sister’s honour’. ‘What will you do’?249  
There was one thing the security forces, other than the army, could do no 
longer. The option to fight back, seeing the strong resistance by Indonesian 
freedom fighters, had seemingly disappeared. As a consequence, many left their 
station as neutrality was becoming less feasible. A much rarer transitional 
method was staging attacks as a lead-in to absconding.250 If, as the State 
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Secretary for Inland Security surmised, planters had succumbed to ‘fear 
psychosis’, Plantation Guards and policemen predictably chose to desert and 
switch sides.251 They did so in large numbers—specifically after the Dutch had 
captured Yogyakarta in December 1948. The Head of Temporary Administrative 
Services—they oversaw territories occupied with the Second Police Action—
already in February 1949 spoke of arrests and desertion. South of Cianjur 21 
PGs walked off with 22 guns; in North Sumatra similar reports circulated.252 
Guards lost 328 weapons in the first third of 1949; the police 415.253 Desertion 
became structural—even infecting the Dutch Royal Army and the KNIL.254 Central 
Java recorded almost 150 guards deserting within two nights in October; each 
day for seven days straight in December circa eight Guards deserted in East 
Sumatra.255  
 As the distance between fighters and the Guards became smaller, 
specifically during 1949, balanced neutrality became increasingly dangerous, 
particularly now that per Spoor’s ‘System’ some plantations were left outside of 
the security circles. According to Planter Plomp, this balancing act had always 
been precarious: Indonesians were asked to stave off other Indonesians.256 
Guards started to be arrested for signalling too openly their possible alliance-shift 
to the resistance. In West Java, some were caught with nine ‘assistants’ of the 
plantation in a ‘conspiracy’ with anti-Dutch forces.257 South of Surabaya, 
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Indonesian members of the local Intelligence and Security Group were aided by 
five Plantation Guards to make their escape into Republican hands. For unknown 
reasons the plan failed; the guards were beaten and their weapons lost.258 In 
Bondowoso, guards deserted due to the ‘uncertain circumstances’ exacerbated by 
the ‘whisper campaign’ of the Gabungan Pembela Proklamasi group.259 A constant 
barrage of pamphlets were grist on the rumour mills; they warned not to work for 
‘the fascist leader’ Spoor whose military constituted ‘a Hitler regime’ that tried to 
destroy the indestructible ‘Freedom Fighter’.260 Others fled to avoid being caught 
in eminent attacks.261 Other policemen decided to temporarily disappear as they 
knew an attack was imminent. To escape trouble, they refrained from warning 
the local military unit.262  
 The nature of desertions was twofold: a situation in which guards or police 
were not controlled was exacerbated by progressive Republican encroachment on 
contested territory. Where the resistance was strongest, the Guards needed a 
strong signal to illustrate their willingness to switch. Even after decolonization, 
this mechanism remained in force. Under these circumstances planters Van der 
Nat and Veentjer were shot dead in June 1950 by a gang seemingly made up by 
part of the Plantation Guard. Revenge-taking was a motive too: the guard ‘did not 
get along’ with the planters.263 The High Commissioner of the Crown—the new 
title for Commissioner-general—said it rather succinctly: he explained plantation 
guards and policemen’s ‘desertion, usually including taking their weapons, the 
latter functioning as a ransom to save themselves from revenge for the 
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collaboration with us’.264 Other pamphlets reminded security personnel they 
‘work for posterity, be careful you will not have regrets in the days to come’.265 
 
Conclusion  
Dutch authorities sought solutions to the desertion problem of ‘less-disciplined or 
organs less-connected with us (a Safety Battalion, police and plantation guards)’. 
TNI commanders simply walked unto the plantations and asked for the 
weapons.266 First, Dutch troops were removed from many areas on Java and 
concentrated to elevate the troops’ readiness and free up circa 2,500. New rounds 
of peace talks were under way, but the Dutch remained wary of renewed 
aggression and double-crossing. Second, a joint Dutch-Republican proclamation 
was published, underlining that desertion was no longer necessary as ‘all is being 
done to place any […] thoughts on revenge to the side and remove the last 
vestiges of fear and suspicion’.267 A last measure was the disarmament of disloyal 
or suspect Plantation Guard and the PAT.268 Ultimately, the Plantation Guard was 
disbanded officially, as one of the first acts of an independent Indonesia, on 22 
May 1950. The police would now care for the plantations.269  
 Although many felt disgruntled and unprotected from Indonesian revenge—
one toko immediately felt the sting of rampok—the Dutch decided that seven 
towns across Indonesia were safe enough to disband PAT units in March and 
April 1948. This had always been the plan.270 As a reminder of Indonesia’s 
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fluctuating levels of (un)safety, the PAT in Jamblang volunteered to lay down its 
arms. As some Plantation Guards, they had had enough of constant robbers, 
republican physical harassment and letters threatening destruction of the 
Chinese.271 Yet, the trend was irreversible. The Coordinating Chinese Federation 
of Indonesia decided to terminate the PAT for good in May. Chinese enthusiasm 
was lagging, the Dutch would not replenish its weapons, Chinese lives and 
businesses were less threatened and the USI would have no room for the PAT, 
specifically in the Pasundan. ‘When first-hand experience does not a PAT-
organisation is needed, it will be forgotten really quickly’.272 The Pao An Tui at 
least, unlike the Plantation Guard, wound down on a positive note. In a 
November ceremony, Tan Joe Gie, Chairman of East Java’s Pao An Tui, disbanded 
the PAT Headquarters in Surabaya. East Java’s Chinese corpse, a Central 
Headquarters emissary said, had ‘written the PAT’s name with golden letters in 
the history book of the Chinese in Indonesia’. Its pages were equally ‘black and 
beautiful, as the Chinese had never been so forcefully unified’.273  
 This chapter has traced alliance-formation in the ranks of the colonial 
security forces themselves. As opposed to the preceding chapter, it stepped down 
one rung on the colonial ladder, from elite-level to individual and communal level.  
The aim throughout has been to understand what were the driving forces behind 
fighting for interests that were not necessarily shared by those serving. Several 
have been found present. Stunted social perspectives combined with certain 
grievances, youth and adventure, drawing people into the colonial ranks—as far 
as they had a choice. Through serving, certain demands could be made on the 
colonial state. Most demands stemmed from tragic events, but quite a number of 
people—in Malaya—received citizenship in return as well as pensions, post-war 
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careers or land titles. By focussing on predominantly Indonesia, conversely, we 
again saw that the alliances always remained fluid. Often, ideals or ideology had 
little to do with choosing to serve. Rather, specific variations of violence—anti-
Sundanese/PRP and anti-Chinese violence—forced people to identify with and 
protect specific interest and in doing so serve the interests of the dominant power 
in the region, the Dutch. As soon as Dutch occupation of territory and the control 
that stemmed from it were proven to be not all-encompassing or corrupt, 
however, what was construed as loyalty turned brittle: self-serving interests 
boiled to the surface again. Furthermore, as the case study of the Plantation 
Guard (and police) has shown, when the Republic was able to turn the tide on the 
Dutch in the course of 1948 and 1949, guards took every opportunity to flee into 
the Republic’s open arms. Desertion became the tool for the Plantation Guards to 







Alliance-formation and the People 
Those witnessing the course of decolonization in the Netherlands East Indies 
employed various shades of essentializing rhetoric. The Sundanese feared—
rightfully—that their nationalism would elicit Republic retaliation. On the other 
side of the spectrum, the Javanese were ‘vivacious’ due to Republican political 
and military gains. The Chinese, for their part, were described as hesitant and 
neutral.1 The Temporary Federal Government itself had sprung from a collective 
‘peoples’ will’ (volkswil) in the Pasundan, Madura, East Sumatra, East Borneo 
and other ‘Malino-territories’.2 Contemporary historians have made the claim that 
entire communities came closer together during decolonization, blurring rather 
important, pre-war fault-lines.3 
 A similar process of collapsing disparate communities was current in 
British Malaya and Singapore. The Governor of Singapore reported that ‘as a 
whole the Chinese recognise that their interests at the present time may best be 
served by the continuance of British rule’.4 Conservative politician Sir Anthony 
Eden (later notorious for his mishandling of the 1956 Suez Crisis as prime 
minister) simply claimed that 99% of the entire Federation of Malaya population 
favoured government measures that ‘suppressed lawlessness’, completely 
disregarding their repressive nature.5 Mr. Soon Ting Ping, leader of the Malay 
delegation to the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference in October 1952 claimed 
that 99% of Malayan Chinese were ‘anti-Communist’. Novelist Nourma Handford 
in 1953 had no qualms with having one of her racist characters claim that for 
‘The Chinks’ the Emergency ‘is straight up their street…eighty percent of them 
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are in it up to their necks’.6 As we recall, the Communities Liaison Committee 
(CLC) was hailed for the ability of its Chinese, European, Eurasian, Malay and Sri 
Lankan members to harmoniously discuss ‘Malay economic backwardness, 
citizenship and nationality, language and education’.7 Yet, the CLC membership’s 
outlook was decidedly elitist.  
 A different transcript hid between the lines. Communities could hardly be 
lumped together where their behaviour was concerned. Newspaper articles from 
the time, without commenting on it as such, substantiate this claim. According to 
the Free Press (De Vrije Pers), in ‘the awakening East the radical element within 
the population remain[ed] an unpredictable factor’.8 The fickle nature of peoples’ 
reactions proved an obstacle for the nascent Republican government as well. 
When Lieutenant-General Raden Sudirman addressed ‘the Indonesian people’ by 
radio after the October 1946 Republican-Dutch cease-fire, he could only ‘hope, 
that his orders [to prevent escalations] were followed’.9 Throughout the Republic’s 
struggle for dominance within the emergent United States of Indonesia, 
Republicans competed with polities that, although sharing their anti-Dutch 
agenda, strove for autonomy from the Republic.10 The Malayan Chinese 
Association—historically lauded for rallying the Chinese together—was no 
monolithic organisation. Deciding the MCA rules close to its inauguration, for 
example, caused heated debates, complete with the throwing of furniture.11  
 After the Communities Liaison Committee had lost steam around 1951, the 
British continued with different representative liaison bodies to ‘press the 
Chinese population’ into open active support for the Government. According to 
Police Secretary J. B. Macefield their advantage lay with the fact that ‘the “little 
                                                 
6 Pan-Malayan Reviews of Security Political and Security Intelligence, 26 November 1952, No. 11, 1952, CO 
1022/210; Nourma Handford, ‘Blood on the Leaves’, part two, Sunday Times, 13 September 1953, 13.  
7 Cheach Boon Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 24; 
Joseph M. Fernando, ‘Elite Intercommunal Bargaining and Conflict Resolution: The Role of the Communities Liaison 
Committee in Malaya, 1949-1951’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 43 (2012), 301.  
8 ‘Het Onverwacht Onredelijke’, De Vrije Pers, 19 October 1948, 1. 
9 ‘Groote Stap op Weg naar Overeenstemming. De Sterkte der Troepen na 30 November. Orders van Commandant 
T.N.I.’, Het Dagblad, 16 October 1946), 1. Emphasis added. 
10 R. Frakking, ‘“Gathered on the Point of a Bayonet”: The Negara Pasundan and the Colonial Defence of Indonesia, 
1946-50’, International History Review 39, 1 (2017), 32, 37.  
11 Review of Chinese Affairs. February, 1949, TNA, CO 717/182/4. 
211 
man” can have his say’ through such bodies.12 The ‘little man’, however, hardly 
sat at the table of high-level, official bodies. Locals had to fend for themselves. 
While in April 1949 the CLC was discussing mining and transport at ‘Kampong 
level’ in Penut, Johore, for example, four Javanese attacked four Chinese, killing 
two. In the same month, a Perak assize judge worried about ‘too many cases of 
apparently motiveless attacks by Malays on Chinese’.13  
 The following sections are about these ordinary ‘little’ men and women 
trying to survive the violent wars of decolonization in Malaya and the Netherlands 
East Indies. More precisely, while passing through various local, communal and 
often violent episodes, this chapter will paint a complex picture of various power 
brokers, either colonial or anti-colonial, who tried to influence those they 
encountered. In other words, the chapter will construct a tableau depicting the 
vicissitudes of the general population and which forces exerted their mobilising or 
neutrality-inducing influences. Through this analysis this chapter will put into 
relief the agency of people who stood at the bottom rung of the colonial ladder. 
They, too, had their own interests and they are the subject of this final chapter.  
 The argument that threads through the various instances of individual or 
communal choices is that levels of local control by incumbent power brokers and 
their rivals determined whether people could be swayed one way or the other. 
Without underlining the importance of control, statements about the efficacy or 
detrimental effects of British or Dutch counterinsurgency in relation to 
communities’ behaviour make little sense: agency needs context. Against the 
backdrop of the continued probing of the limits of colonial loyalty and the triangle 
of the people, local elites and colonial governmental authority, this means three 
things. The first is that to bring out the peoples’ agency, we again need to bring in 
the Negara Pasundan and the Malayan Chinese Association. In this instance, 
they serve to analyse the level of entrenchment within their constituencies. 
Through them, secondly, we discover that only in uncontested areas did the 
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search for support from a colonial and anti-colonial perspective work. Where 
control was challenged in a meaningful way, support-seeking was overtaken by 
violence to steer entire communities. The rivals who challenged the colonial 
power-structures are the Min Yuen, MCP’s masses organization, and the 
Kommando2 (Onder) Distrik Militer, the Republic’s forward cells.  
 Only after having placed rivals and incumbents in perspective, can we come 
to the third and final tier: the people. Dispensing with hearts and minds 
arguments—often used as a frame to judge counterinsurgencies—altogether, the 
chapter argues that entrenched support for colonial or anti-colonial programs 
hardly existed. Certainly, many actors were motivated by strong convictions that 
dictated they carve out alternative paths to independence. Others tried to bring 
communities together in the face of centrifugal influences. After the above-
mentioned killing of two Chinese in Penut, for example, Malay and Chinese locals 
immediately ‘relieve[d] the tension’ on their own accord. Subsequently, the Malay 
penghulu—the administrative head of a district subdivision—‘suggested regular 
meetings between leaders of both communities to promote better 
understanding’.14 If anything, the upheavals did awaken many people to new, 
often violent, opportunities. The close reading of available sources reveals, 
however, that the majority of people—farmers, rubber tappers, tradespeople—
displayed conformist behaviour. Instead of warming to a specific cause, they 
chose to accommodate and appease to maximize their chances of survival without 
internalizing a specific idea. Only when a specific power broker had closed off 
alternative avenues did communities fully conform. Until such time, ordinary 
people operated within what the British called the ‘live-and-let-live’ system. To 
study the possibilities, consequences and changing currents of decolonization a 
base-line is needed. The first section, therefore, details the uncertainties brought 
on the unhinged state of Indonesia and Malaysia immediately after August 1945. 
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Societies divided 
Robert Lockhart, the Brit who became famous for his involvement in the attempt 
on Lenin’s life in the summer of 1918, turned to more romantic endeavours after 
his successful autobiographical book, Memoirs of a British Agent.15 With his 
Return to Malaya (1936) the diplomat-cum-writer delivered a travelogue 
documenting a three-month vacation to revisit his experiences he had had on his 
two uncles’ rubber plantation in his twenties.16 The ‘sentimental journey’ to 
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies resulted in ‘a maze of encyclopaedic 
trivialities, gossip anecdote, and high jinks’. One disappointed critic deemed the 
book a weak ‘gesture’ of an author who unjustly claimed expertise on Malaysia 
and the Far East.17  
 While Lockhart’s credentials were indeed doubtful, his lament that the days 
of superiority displayed ‘on the football field and at hotel and club bars’ had gone 
together with ‘the white man’s East’ was shared by so-called experts. Education, 
nationalism, self-determination and the Japanese threat negatively impacted on 
the imperialists’ position in the East, wrote Lockhart.18 The Pacific War brought 
all imperial fears into reality. Dutch conservatives were mortally afraid that 
reactionaries like Van Mook would dissolve the bond between the metropole and 
Indonesia, destroying the Kingdom entirely.19 Many feared—unjustly—that the 
Netherlands, with its open economy dependent on foreign trade, would sink to the 
rank of Denmark without recourse to Indonesia’s cash crops.20 Gurney hoped for 
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a ‘miracle’ that would affect Sino-Malay ‘political integration’ in Malaya. Aside 
from the fact that perhaps only an ‘anti-British platform’ could united the two 
communities, Gurney saw progress held up by the ‘political claims from the 
Chinese, promises of self-government, financial stringency and a Malay 
awakening’. No-one had a ‘clear idea of the shares to be allotted to the respective 
communities in an ultimately self-governing Malaya’.21 
 From the peoples’ perspective, the situation looked very differently and 
direr than from the elevated positions of colonial policy makers and agenda-
setters. Society in British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies was unmoored.  
The Japanese occupation and its raucous aftermath had etched deep and lasting 
tracts into society. From its relatively (self-proclaimed) opulent pre-war level, 
Malaya had been reduced to ‘a chaotic state’, the Colonial Office noted. ‘The 
people were close to starvation; trade and industry were at a standstill’. Schools 
had ceased to function, ‘communications and basic services had been neglected’ 
and, finally, crime and lawlessness ‘flourished’.22 Inside former Japanese 
internment camps in Indonesia food and medicines were scarce. Outside the 
camps the situation was little better.23  
 The concerted efforts of the Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and 
Internees (RAPWI) teams, the Red Cross, the Royal Air Force and British—and 
soon Dutch—troops made some alleviation possible.24 Yet, fear reigned supreme. 
Survivors, having lived through the torture, hunger, disease of overcrowded 
camps, soon became part of massive droves of displaced persons.25 On Java alone 
68,000 prisoners of war and internees, mostly (Indo) Europeans, were counted; 
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on Sumatra more than 13,000.26 One Army Captain ridiculously asserted that 
some 30,000 female ex-internees took heart, under pressure of a developing 
‘revolt’, from ‘a little lipstick’.27 Rather, Indonesians killed or disappeared between 
3,400 and 30,000 women, men and children who exited the camps during the 
bersiap period which lasted from August 1945 to the first months of 1946.28 The 
collection and movement of thousands of Indo-Europeans, Chinese or 
Indonesians internees perceived as pro-Dutch across the archipelago and the 
presence of foreign troops and RAPWI teams irked Indonesians. They often 
viciously attacked the convoys and camps or tried to force political concessions 
by taking internees hostage.29 Hundreds of thousands of landless, mainly 
Chinese squatters compounded the displaced internees problem in Malaya. 
Squatters had not been uncommon, but as the Japanese had closed mines and 
estates this labour force became dislocated. Their numbers had swollen to circa 
400,000 due to illegal immigration and because the Japanese forced people out of 
towns to stimulate food production. Now they had to be settled or relocated as the 
Malayan Communist Party sought to base itself among these squatters. The 
government desperately sought a way to regain control over them.30  
 As Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands busied herself welcoming former 
internees to the Netherlands, those domiciled in Asia continued to face the effects 
of the Japanese occupation that the developing wars would complicate.31 The 
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recent memory of occupation fed discussion and bitter recriminations.32 The 
number of massacred Chinese was contested in Singapore; the War Prisoners’ 
(Malayan Union) Association demanded the government pay ‘civil liability’ owed 
for pre-war ‘Local Defence Services’.33 Ex-internees asked by what right incoming 
soldiers took ‘all the best’ food and clothing and were fêted generally. Others 
parried that ex-prisoners should thank their erstwhile liberators.34 Even the 
death sentences three former tormentors from Sime Road Camp received was 
contested. An ex-internee wrote that ‘a life sentence would have been adequate’ 
even for the ‘“very evil and sadistic”’ Tominaga.35  
 Tens of thousands of politically-suspect Sundanese, Ambonese, 
Menadonese and Timorese, but also Chinese children and women—whose 
husbands, said Dutch sources, had been killed by Indonesian ‘extremists’—
continued to be moved from Republican into Dutch camps.36 KNIL families were 
exchanged for TNI families, but some KNIL men attempted ‘wild evacuations’ to 
save next of kin (5,000 in total) trapped in the Republic’s camps; adversely 
affecting KNIL behaviour.37 In the Netherlands the ‘Collective Action of Dutch 
Women’ group whipped up a media frenzy claiming that some 15,000 (Indo) 
Europeans were unaccounted for. Imprisoned by the Republic, the group claimed, 
women and girls lived as concubines under ‘the most horrible, dehumanizing 
circumstances’. The Red Cross (and General Spoor) diplomatically spoke of 
10,000 people in Republican ‘safety camps’. The few women who lived with 
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Indonesians did so voluntarily, Red Cross officials noted: at least they were 
protected this way. Lack of freedom of movement stemmed from bureaucracy and 
transport issues.38 For years, the war dead—both Dutch and Indonesian—refused 
to be forgotten.39 Mr. van Vuuren in 1948 still appealed to his fellow citizens to 
remove the ‘hated’ Japanese slogans that continued to remind (Dutch) Semarang 
of ‘the misery, tortures and humiliations’.40 
 Often ruthlessness was used to efface the pain of the twin injustices of the 
colonial divide and the Japanese occupation. Sometimes the Republican Polisi 
Tentara looked away as pemuda exacted sexual revenge on European women. 
Those supporting the Dutch-sponsored federal states were assaulted.41 Pemuda 
bands not only killed scores of Eurasians and Europeans between August 1945 
and December 1946. During a ‘social revolution’ they wiped out the local 
Sumatran aristocracy that had traditionally suppressed the peasantry on the 
colonial government’s agrarian landholdings.42 The colonial judiciary soon started 
bringing perpetrators or collaborators to justice but not before in Malaysia Malays 
ignited ‘anti-MPAJA and anti-Chinese struggle[s]’ inspired by ‘charismatic imams’. 
Their object was to protect the Islam and ‘avenge the many Malays who had been 
humiliated, abducted, tortured and killed as suspected Malay collaborators’, 
possibly by so-called peoples’ tribunals in the MPAJA had erected.43 As Dutch 
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troops poured into West Java in 1945’s closing months to replace British 
Commonwealth soldiers, tensions rose quickly. They did not get along. Based on 
locals’ testimonies, Dutch reports claimed that ‘British-Indian soldiers […] took 
[and molested] women’ or stole goods. They incensed the people by openly stating 
that Indonesia and India deserved independence proclaiming ‘that “Dutch, 
Chinese no good, Indonesian Oké”’. The population paid the price. Around 
Tangerang and Serpong in West Java, Indonesians and Chinese prepared to flee 
on receiving news that ‘British Indian’ soldiers would arrive. Simultaneously, the 
resistance responded with infiltrations and kampong burnings where Dutch 
troops showed themselves. Desas were forced into acquiescing to either Dutch or 
Republican dictates.44 
 Governmental officials scrambled to unfold initiatives to jump-start the 
gutted economies. Self-congratulatory memoranda detailed how hundreds of 
millions had been spent on rehabilitation schemes for, among others, the school 
system or the tin and mining industries; all were ‘vigorously pushed ahead’. The 
Malayan government needed massive financial injections from His Majesty’s 
Government to cover rehabilitation costs. In 1950, ‘The financial position of the 
Federation was [still] grave’.45 In Batavia, various governmental departments 
likewise budgeted large sums for rebuilding infrastructure such as harbours.46 
Van Mook, with the Dutch government, prioritized the return of planters to their 
estates and factories as quickly as military momentum allowed. Renewed 
production would provide relief for Indonesia’s ailing economy. Planters were 
tasked with rehiring former labourers and even illegal squatters: paid 
employment would calm down agitated local labourers.47 Soldiers were sent to 
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Indonesia precisely as the panacea to the problem of restoration. In Indië, they 
would ensure that the government could, in the—grossly ironic—words of the 
Minister of War, ‘bargain with those who had acquired a certain authority, to 
ultimately come to restoration and rehabilitation in mutual co-operation’.48 
 Despite governmental counter-measures the victuals and clothing situation 
seemed to deteriorate steadily along with personal security. The buying power of 
rubber in 1947 stood low in relation to pre-war years. ‘Rehabilitation of both 
rubber plantations and tin mines was retarded by a lack of capital resulting from 
the low prices and high costs’. Worse still, rubber and tin production exceeded 
demand in 1950 and the Colonial Office expected the production of natural 
rubber to shift to other territories, among them Indonesia.49 The 1950 Draft 
Development Plan for the Federation saw little opportunities to increase revenues 
(or cut expenditures) needed for social services.50 The outbreak of the Korean War 
(1950-1953) proved a major boon to Malaya’s economic position. With the 
massive hike of tin and rubber prices, the Federation was not only able to finance 
the increase the Police Forces; it poured massive amounts into agricultural 
development and social services such as education and medical services. Richard 
Stubbs firmly believes the efficacy of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people 
started with the Korean War boom: to him the influx of revenue it generated could 
show the people the advantages of the free world as opposed to life under the 
communists.51  
                                                                                                                                                                  
2.20.02.01/17.8; Verslag van de Mededelingenvergadering Indische Ondernemers Bond, 7 November 1947, NL-HaNA, 
Orani 2.20.02.01/107.2; Instructie voor Ondernemingen en Bedrijven; Herziene Instructie Inzake Economische Beleid. 
Algemene Instructie II, both in NL-HaNA, Federabo 2.20.50/57. 
48 Dr. Ir. C. Coolhaas, Plantenteelkindige Vraagstukken in Verband met het Herstel van Landbouwbedrijven in 
Indonesië. Rede Uitgesproken bij de Aanvaarding van het Ambt van Hoogleraar aan de Landbouwhogeschool te 
Wageningen op Dinsdag 30 November 1948 (Wageningen: H. Veenman & Zonen), 4; Nota van Minister van Oorlog, 
Fiévez) aan de Leden van de Raad voor Militaire Aangelegenheden van het Koninkrijk, 21 April 1947, NIB 8, 131. 
49 R. Stubbs, Counter-insurgency and the Economic Factor: The Impact of the Korean War Prices Boom on the 
Malayan Emergency, Occasional Paper No. 9 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), 5-6; H. T. Ross, 
Interim Report on Wages by Joint Wages Commission (Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Union Government Press, 29 July 
1947), 6. 
50 Federation of Malaya, Draft Development Plan of the Federation of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 
1950), 3. 
51 Stubbs, Counter-insurgency and the Economic Factor, 9, 11-13, 15, 18. 
220 
 Poverty was not eradicated, however, and it is questionable if Malaya’s new-
found wealth trickled down at all. The Singaporean Swee brothers who had aided 
many internees ‘died in poverty without receiving any official recognition’.52 
Continued misery sparked (long-lasting) public debate ranging from Malay 
‘laziness’ caused by a lack of vitamins to the advantages of birth-control—which 
‘religious sentiments’ would not allow.53 Sporadically but for years regions in 
Dutch and Republican territory suffered food shortages, worsened by draughts or 
crop failure.54 People wore rags.55 Many were undoubtedly angered when Dutch 
troops exacerbated housing shortages that had plagued places like Makasar, 
Batavia and Bandung.56 In 1947, ‘malnourishment’ and ‘starvation’ simply 
prohibited medicines’ effectiveness.57 Meanwhile, Dutch soldiers spent large 
amounts of Dutch guilders—21 million a month in Medan alone—which 
combined with Republican, Japanese and Indische currencies, black 
marketeering, fluctuating food prizes and locally competing trade organisations to 
deregulate the economy.58 
 Continuous hardships, the war and the overall context of lawlessness fed 
each other. The resettlement of Seremban Chinese in the Negri Sembilan State, 
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Malaya, caused suffering among those left behind. Many of the squatters had 
grown vegetables or reared pigs commercially. Their removal disrupted local 
markets.59 Police functionaries told people that the Development Plan depended 
on their giving intelligence on the insurgents.60 Where a Dutch presence 
emboldened (or forced) locals to stop feeding the resistance, smaller ‘terror 
groups’ robbed kampongs of food. Some of them surrendered when raids failed.61 
Wily TNI soldiers dressed in rags to infiltrate West Java.62 Life became a cheap 
commodity.63 Even after Indonesia had been finally recognized as independent, 
Bogor (Buitenzorg) saw 189 murders in May 1950. Chinese secret societies used 
the Emergency context to rid themselves of competitors.64 Impoverished youths—
Indo-Europeans, in this case—turned from thieving to murder.65 Rampok or 
looting was rife; lines separating ‘gangsterism’ from political terror blurred.66 One 
planter noted that now, the impoverished ‘population [...] meets their needs’ by 
stealing’.67  
 
Figuring weakly in the minds of the Sundanese: The people versus Pasundan 
With various communities left to largely fend for themselves, at each other’s 
throats and anxious, policy makers perceived a threat to loyalty. Spoor warned 
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that the restoration of the Republican government in 1949 would damage the 
‘trust of the population in numerous areas’.68 ‘Prevailing insecurity concerning 
the future’ proved fertile ground for anti-colonial ‘propagandists’ spread the 
rumour that the Dutch military would soon depart.69 A show of strength was 
needed. Indonesian federalist Dr. Tengkhu Mansur, the Wali Negara of Sumatera 
Timur, promised ‘most powerful methods’ whereas Malayan planters demanded 
the death penalty, ‘martial law’ and from the High Commissioner he ‘govern or get 
out’.70 Their Dutch colleagues welcomed the Police Action. Renewed economic 
exploitation ‘would convince the people […] that under the authority of the Dutch 
Government they would be better taken care of than under the Republic’.71  
 The people’s support, then, constituted the prize. Who, however, was to 
shape this show of strength needed to access the people? Aside from the Inland 
Administration or the Federal, State and District authorities, those elements that 
professed a willingness to cooperate were expected to carry their weight to provide 
a standard to rally to. Earlier the role of both the PRP/Pasundan and the MCA 
has been discussed in terms of their commitment to security forces recruitment. 
This role was designed to improve indigenous leaders’ standing with their 
constituencies as much as with the colonial authorities. This section adds 
another layer to Sundanese and MCA’s claims to political and social relevance; it 
analyses whether the Pasundan or the MCA could muster peoples’ support.  
  A cursory glance at numbers alone suggests that Suriakartalegawa and Tan 
Cheng Lock made good their promise of commanding the ear of many. By April 
1947, the PRP boasted local chapters in Batavia, Meester Cornelis, Pasar Rebo, 
Depok and Ujung Berung, with headquarters in Buitenzorg.72 Circa 40,000 
members in twenty towns—indicative of the partai’s urban origins—had signed 
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their name. Later, a PRP-affiliate, the Badan Penolong Keselamatan Umum (the 
Helper Agency for Public Safety) comprised of mostly ‘religious farmers’, reported 
another 97,000 members. Some estimates even found a number close to 250,000 
plausible although later, ‘after purging’, membership stood at three to four 
thousand.73 That people had been made to sign up through perintah halus—
supple commanding—mattered little.74 In Malaya, the MCA likewise quickly 
collected subscribers. In a year’s time membership in Perak rose from 55,832 to 
58,640 members.75 Non-Chinese members constituted a crucial step to shedding 
the association’s ‘purely communal character’.76 In April 1951, total membership 
stood at 160,000. Five years later, officials counted almost 250,000 MCA 
subscribers, although they had to admit that they had ‘no way of knowing how 
many […] are still alive or have […] been deported’ by the British.77  
 Such numbers hide that the PRP and the MCA had difficulties casting a 
wide net. The latter continued to carry the taint of elitism, although defenders 
lauded the possibility for labourers and hawkers to sit on MCA committees. A 
commentator called ‘Chinese Poor’ saw hypocrisy in MCA leaders sending their 
children abroad while others contributed. With the MCA serving only the rich 
Chinese a wedge was driven between pro-MCA Chinese and those remaining 
neutral.78 A Straits Times reader applauded recruitment policies and the MCA for 
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finally exposing ‘those who try to escape the common duty of a good citizen’.79 
With the supposed quarter of a million MCA members representing less than a 
tenth of the total Chinese population, however, the realization that the ‘man in 
the streets had but little interest in the organisation’ was unavoidable.80  
 The Pasundan State fared little better. Recall that the Sundanese identity in 
Krawang became truly salient when anti-federalist forces began attacking 
Sundanese individuals. The PRP, too, was accused of keeping double agendas. 
The ‘Patriot of Bandoeng’ wrote ‘On His Word of Honour’ that he would never 
follow Suriakartalegawa. He deliberately promoted imaginary differences between 
the Republic and the Sundanese to become ‘Monarch of the Sunda Lands’.81 The 
Negara Pasundan was not without supporters, however. Locals openly declared 
their co-operation with the Dutch military as PRP officials.82 More importantly for 
the Pasundan—and the Dutch—was the ostensible betrayal of the Republic by 
elements of the West Java Divisi Siliwangi. The men felt that the division’s 
Sundanese character was being diluted by ‘Djokja’-mandated Javanese 
influences.83 According to Republican sources, the divisi’s morale was already low 
after its post-Renville evacuation to Central Java; it took to thieving.84 Circa 3,000 
disgruntled former stalwarts of anti-Dutch resistance deserted from the TNI after 
re-infiltration, brought in by the Pasundan’s Wali Negara, his son Major Achmad 
and a TNI general. Another 8,000 were reportedly interested in doing the same.85 
To ease the transition, Siliwangi men were told they were ‘preventing further 
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needless bloodshed...and further waste of time with the build-up of […] their own 
[ailing] negara and their own federal army’.86 Specifically the dilution and the 
possible corrosion of the tradional links between the Siliwangi Division, their 
Sundanese identities and West Java constituted a motivation to desert as it Even 
today, the importance of the Siliwangi Division is plain to see. In Bandung, Aceh 
Street, for example, has a Siliwangi bowling centre; the Siliwangi Golf driving 
range is not far away. Around the corner from Aceh Street, the façade of the 
Bandung Siliwangi Field or Siliwangi Stadium—a football complex owned by the 
Regional Military/Siliwangi Command—bears a mural with the inscriptions ‘1945’ 
and ‘Esa Hilang Dua Terbilang’, meaning ‘we are united as one.’ To underline the 
continued significance of and the prestige the Siliwangi men have accrued, the 
mural depicts the men of the division attacking a lion (signifying the Netherlands) 
while others walk with a tiger (symbolizing the Siliwangi Division) or bayonet 
Dutch soldiers to death.87 
 On the whole, however, the Pasundan made a paltry impression in 
garnering deep-seated support, despite the Sundanese dominating West Javanese 
demographics.88 In 1948, the PRP needed a pamphlet to explain to the 
Sundanese that their government still worked hard at the Negara’s ‘consolidation’ 
and public safety. Leaders signalled their independence by demanding the 
removal of the Dutch army although they knew ‘their own safety […] rests on the 
bayonets of this army’. Van Mook was asked to dismiss ‘non-Sundanese civil 
servants’ and call on the Sundanese to take up arms to protect the negara’s 
infrastructure. In an attempt at enhanced sovereignty, the Wali Negara had to 
ask for the substitution of Indonesian for Dutch administrators mere months 
before independence.89 Such a move was hardly prudent. The Dutch had re-
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instated city councils across Indonesia but for the regency councils, technical 
personnel and resources were scarce. The Pasundan State, therefore, could not 
show itself on a regency level.90  
 The reasons behind the Negara’s weak position were manifold. The major 
instabilities caused by the ambiguities of affiliation vis-à-vis the Republic and the 
Dutch were compounded by many other obstacles. To begin with, since May 
1947—Suriakartalegawa’s Pasundan declaration—the status of West Java as a 
separate polity continued to be discussed. Only after the third West Java 
Conference in February 1948 was official ratification set in motion.91 The 
resulting petition to the colonial government to appoint the democratically-chosen 
participants as the ‘provisional parliament’ of a ‘separate negara’ caused 
confusion; some opined that the ‘Negara Djawa Barat (West Java State) was 
already in the process of being created’. The Djawa Barat moniker was rejected in 
favour of the Negara Pasundan that the Dutch recognized in April.92 How the 
newly minted parliament would govern seems unclear, however. It gained various 
powers, such as designing legislation, yet the colonial Government (‘het Land’) 
retained 39 state functions for itself, among which foreign relations, defence, 
citizenship regulations and ‘colonization’.93 Financially, too, the Pasundan 
depended on the colonial coffers.94 
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 Indeed, the Dutch wondered what the Pasundan administrators were doing 
with their time.95 The cabinet did not seem to disseminate any records of 
proceedings.96 Politicians squabbled frequently. Initially, the Interim 
Representative Body wondered if they administered a province or a state.97 
Fractions had trouble staying together. Within the provisional parliament one was 
tainted by its leader’s collaboration with the Japanese; another politician seemed 
to be a secret communist while Fraksi Kesatuan members were distracted by 
careerism.98 The Partai Rakyat Pasundan’s anti-Javanese stance made it 
unpopular.99 Adil Puradiraja of the Paguyuban scoffed at the idea of a fusion 
with the PRP. The latter, he told journalists, was ‘a party created by the Dutch, 
that otherwise has no right to exist’.100 No-one had missed Suriakartalegawa at 
the first West Java Conference whereas Republicans were, in theory, welcome. In 
the first parliament, the PRP had five seats, whereas the Fraksi Indonesia had 
35.101 Meanwhile, Dutch intelligence claimed Republicans had inserted 
themselves into the Pasundan’s cabinet and parliament to affect their stance on 
the Republic. The Wali Negara, Djumhana, Suriakartelegawa, Fraksi Indonesia: 
all were in on it.102 The Siliwangi desertions, too, proved destabilizing. Where the 
Dutch feared these armed men—handsomely paid for by the Crown—may not 
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relinquish ‘their original fighting-ideal’ and make the negara power-hungry, its 
cabinet nearly collapsed over the efficacy of tempting the Division.103  
 Lastly, the foundational story of the Pasundan hardly constituted a tale 
shared between the Sundanese leadership and their followers. ‘[N]o public 
demand’ for the second conference had existed. In fact, the Republic averred, 
twenty ‘influential’ men from Java had signed a manifesto condemning the 
conference which received support from 250,000 people in ‘various places in the 
occupied areas of West Java’.104 The Republic was right. The Inland 
Administration had indeed been the convener, wide spread endorsement for the 
manifesto did exist and of the twenty speakers on the fourth day of the first 
conference only three supported ‘the Pasoendan idea’. Eleven wanted a 
‘temporary regime’.105 Ordinary Sundanese experienced little of the ‘attained 
political, cultural or social autonomy’ the negara had acquired—although, as we 
know, there was not much autonomy to be had. The state figured ‘very weakly in 
the minds and lives of the Sundanese’.106 They refused to ‘delude’ themselves into 
supporting the negara ‘as long as the possibility existed that in a while the 
Republic will be pulling the strings’.107 The choice made by Hoessein Effendi, a 
Sundanese living in Cianjur, serves as an apt example. When Dutch influence 
declined markedly in his immediate vicinity in 1947 he joined the infiltrating 
Republican Markas Besar Tentara (Army Headquarters) to protect himself but 
also because he and his friends now felt that ‘the Republic would eventually 
win’.108  
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 The Republic was adamant in pursuing that goal. Officials unleashed a 
paper offensive against the Sundanese separatists. Their propaganda spoke of a 
‘devide [sic] and rule-policy […] reviving the last remnants of provincialism, which 
are still slumbering in the hearts of […] Dutch puppets’.109  Soon, anti-Pasundan 
committees within and outside Dutch-controlled areas in West Java set to work 
intimidating influential Sundanese leaders, Inland Administration officers, the 
army, the Military Police [and] the barisans’. Pamphlets threatened collaborators 
with death.110 Suriakartalegawa’s mother was used to speak against her son on 
the Radio; his sister reputedly said she would marry the man who killed her 
brother.111 Villages denounced the negara through standardised ‘resolutions’ 
stating that ‘Java, Madura and Sumatra’ were indivisible under the Republic. 
Village leaders—coerced or not—simply signed ‘on behalf of the people’.112 
Sukarno supposedly received hundreds of letters with similar declarations.113 
When simply appeared in Garut, the very place where the Suriakartalegawa 
dynasty originated, and announced that if the Sundanese would accept the PRP, 
he no longer wished to be president. He would rather be slaughtered in front of 
the people, he stated.114 
 Words spilled over into action. In Krawang, Sukarno’s May 1947 visit 
sparked violent outbursts. The TNI and local militias tortured those accused of 
secessionist leanings. Some were forced to hold up an image of Suriakartalegawa 
with bound hands that were then set on fire. Aggressors put one sympathiser in a 
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sack and dunked him repeatedly in a nearby river.115 In October 1947, the 
Pasundan’s Central Information Service issued a report giving a gruesome 
account of anti-PPR violence, listing ten cases of murder, 86 kidnappings and 
101 burnt-down houses.116 The build-up to the last West Java conference was 
equally violent. As the Republican delegation to the UN petitioned against it, 83 
people were murdered or severely wounded between December and February 
1948 across the Buitenzorg, Cianjur and Sukabumi regencies. These acts of 
aggression proved effective in undermining the West Java Conference’s 
democratic potential. Scores of villagers fled (others were ‘taken away’) leaving no-
one to vote for the electors who would appoint the representatives to the third 
conference. In the Kuningan Regency, only ten desas of a possible 260 saw 
elections; lurahs had to appoint the electors.117  
 
Selling the country and cheating the people: The Malayan Chinese Association  
The Malayan Chinese Association’s trajectory contrasts starkly with that of the 
Negara Pasundan. In fact, ‘the Emergency [became] central to the process by 
which [...] MCA emerged as the dominant Chinese political party’.118 In the 
context of the Malayan case as the reputed successful counterinsurgency 
paradigm and our overarching argument, this statement puts into words the fact 
that alliances to the colonial government during decolonization—MCA’s in this 
case—were predicated on sustained control by said government.119 The 
Pasundan, buckling under the pressures of the Republic, the Dutch and internal 
struggles and with its supposedly loyal supporters dispersed by violence shows 
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the consequences of an absence of control. The MCA’s entrenchment elucidates 
what the effect of functioning counterinsurgency meant: that an organization that 
drew only a small percentage of the total Chinese into its ranks still constituted a 
dominant factor.120  
 This is especially clear when the Malayan Communist Party’s reaction on 
the MCA is considered. The MCP and its affiliates pursued the disruption of social 
order and safety rather actively, especially in the initial stages of its insurrection. 
Its propaganda machine depicted the British—with some justification—as 
perpetrators of ‘ruthless Fascist violence’. ‘[W]e must not submit ourselves to the 
slave-hold of British Imperialism which aims to suck our blood’, one manifesto 
ran. The MNRLA aimed to ‘extinguish’ the British and ‘her collaborators, the 
K.M.T. and her running-dogs’.121 Tan Cheng Lock and his MCA had sold the 
country (alongside the UMNO), ‘[pledging] loyalty to the British’ while ‘[cheating] 
the people’.122 Visible MCA-officials, much like those of the PRP, were therefore 
targeted.123 In Batu Anam, Johore, the president of the sub-branch was attacked 
in his shop.124 The estates belonging to MCA members, such as Mr. Yong Shook 
Lin but also Tan Cheng Lock, were likewise purposefully targeted; in Penang a 
secretary was shot in his own house.125 ‘Enthusiasm for the M.C.A. […] waned 
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considerably’ due to such attacks.126 Around 300 MCA members lost their lives 
during the Emergency.127 
 Unlike the PRP the MCA was not cowed. The association’s survival, I argue, 
lies with the fact that the Malayan Communists lost the initiative which was 
preceded by a British strategic shift. This shift involved a re-thinking of the 
approach to combating insurgents. When General Templer arrived in 1952, the 
British had been finalizing the implementation of plans that allowed them to have 
coercive measures combined with more conciliatory approaches.128 Most 
fundamentally, from January 1949 onwards, the British with the planters, 
mentri2 besar and their British advisers in tow, took to resettling and deporting 
those Chinese they mistrusted. Squatters’ alliances had to be forced to make 
them governable and disrupt the flow of food and intelligence to the insurgents: 
‘the Asiatic mind understands force’.129 The Squatter Committee’s 
recommendations paved the way for collective detention, forced individual or 
collective resettlement and deportation.130 In April 1950, Lieutenant-General Sir 
Harold Briggs, the newly arrived Director of Operations, ‘drew up the first 
systematic’ plans to ultimately resettle more than 500,000 Chinese (plus 600,000 
estate labourers) into New Villages and centralized labour lines.131 Between 1948 
and 1957, more than 30,000 people would be detained. Deportees, 12,190 of 
them, were sent back to China although other ‘disposal’ options, such as the 
Christmas Islands, North Borneo and Kenya, were contemplated.132 Naturally, 
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Chinese leaders expressed their disgust, claiming that most ‘squatters knew 
nothing of politics and only wish to cultivate their land’.133 
 With the squatters registered, Labour Minister Mr. Rees-Williams boasted 
before the British press in November 1949 that ‘the back of the bandit forces had 
been broken.134 The minister was far off. As Hack has convincingly argued, 
however, those who place the reversal in 1952—due to Templer’s arrival as the 
new supremo steering the war-effort—are equally off.135 Rather, Templer started 
to exert his influence when the MCP’s fortunes were on the cusp of changing due 
to, among other factors, better intelligence and resettlement.136 By Chin Peng’s 
own admission 1949-50 had been the MCP’s highpoint. ‘I heard of Templer’s 
appointment over Radio Malaya. By then we were really feeling the heat of the 
new villages’.137  
 In 1951-52, MCP room for manoeuvre was being severely restricted. ‘[W]e 
had...a whole haversack of money...but we can’t get a bit of food’, said Peng.138 
MRLA soldier Liang Xian corroborated this: ‘Our food supplies were blocked’ 
behind New Village fences. With the MRLA’s search for food, animal life took a hit. 
Ah Hai admitted that in 1952 the British separations of insurgents from 
population ‘began to take effect […] we had no choice but to retreat [...] north to 
the Thai border’.139 Cells went underground in Johore and Selangor; already in 
1950, the Third MRLA Regiment had to relocate due to food shortages—although 
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the first Federal food denial plan commenced in June 1951. Obtaining food had 
always been ‘[o]ne of the chief weaknesses’ of the MCP.140 Insurgents’ intercepted 
letters in Kedah from January 1952 spoke of ‘a miserable future’: ‘The public are 
frightened by […] constant [British] pressure from doing anything against the 
[British] enemy’. Villagers dared not welcome the freedom fighters any longer, 
ignored meetings and ‘begged us not to come to the village’. Local communists 
had ‘completely lost the co-operation of the public’, the epistles ended.141 Chin 
Peng later stated that the Briggs plan quickly caused ‘a crisis of survival’.  
 The highest MCP echelons reacted with the October 1951 Directives. They 
took a year to be properly disseminated and implemented.142 The Directives 
envisaged the saving of the revolution by finally attempting the elusive ‘United 
Front’ that would bring all races—including ‘petty’ bourgeoisie capitalists—
together into supporting, victualling and fighting with the MCP.143 Without mass 
support, future liberated areas could not be linked up—a prerequisite for 
insurgent governance.144 ‘[W]anton terrorism’—detrimental to labourers’ 
perceptions of the revolution—was to be replaced by surgical strikes on security 
forces by ‘Independent Platoons’. Armed Work Forces would maintain liaison with 
the people, but overall, the changed nature of the Emergency dictated the MRLA 
retreat deeper into the jungle where units and party cadre would cultivate their 
own food.145 Incident rates subsequently declined.146 
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 With the MCP on the back-foot, the MCA swooped into the New Villages and 
Chinese lives. Members applauded Regulation 17E and judging on their 
involvement with the early resettlements, the association indeed ‘wanted a field 
for practical activity’.147 H. S. Lee and others declared his support for ‘law and 
order’ measures from MCA’s inception—although the British ‘pointed out’ to the 
‘promoters’ that said commitment needed to figure prominently in MCA 
statutes.148 Guiding the fate of the squatters became the means to MCA’s 
establishment.149 The despised squatters needed the patronage.150 Kedah’s mentri 
besar wanted ‘Palestinian and [North West] Frontier’ methods: ‘burning out’ 
squatters without contingency planning; he hoped they would move into 
Thailand.151 Any squatter was guilty merely by living in the vicinity of communist 
activity.152  
 The Colonial Office claimed a ‘really humane policy’, but resettlement 
proved otherwise.153 Particularly ‘bad’ settlements received no warning. Squatters 
branded resettlement ‘brusque’ as their old lives were destroyed, families and 
village communities deliberately separated and houses burnt down; they feared 
New Village curfews.154 Food denial operations put ‘very harsh restrictions […] 
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upon the Chinese small-holders’. Agricultural plots were abandoned and could 
not always be re-allocated near new locations. Cultivation recovery would take a 
long time ‘if [it] could be achieved’.155 Within many villages drainage was 
disastrous; others resembled slums.156 Lack of arable land and the rubber boom 
turned villagers away from agriculture, yet local economies could hardly 
accommodate the ex-squatters. Worse still, planters refused would-be labourers 
as their identity cards marked them as detainees under Regulation 17F.157 
Tappers moving in and out of the villages were structurally checked for food and 
messages and vulnerable to raids.158  
 With fences, barbed wire, possible arrest and police always near, ex-
squatters and certainly the MCP soon called the New Villages ‘concentration 
camps’.159 The image was reinforced by collective punishments. The ‘terrorized 
rather than […] terrorist’ villagers of Tras, circa 2,000 people, were arrested for 
‘harbouring’ those who killed High Commissioner Gurney in Pahang. Other 
settlements soon experienced the same sting of ‘release and resettle’ for ‘helping 
the terrorists’.160 Officials blamed the villagers themselves. ‘If you want the gates 
to be re-opened again, have the courage to come forward with information’, they 
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said.161 The March 1952 Tanjong Malim incident caused uproar in Great Britain 
for their severity. A fatal ambush on water supply repair men resulted in 28 
arrests, a 22-hour curfew and reduced rice rations for thirteen days. Twenty 
people using outdoor latrines were fined. Internally the measures were 
repackaged as prerequisites for safe information-sharing.162 Members of 
parliament, the public and newspapers disagreed.163 Officials parried angry 
letters that mentioned Nazi practices by underlining communist ‘atrocities’.164 
Continued protests did not stop collective punishment, however. The 4,000 
inhabitants of Sungei Pelek faced self-financing another protective fence for food 
‘leaking’ aside from curfew and rice-rationing.165 
 The MCA, meanwhile, did not protest the ‘threats, house-arrests, bullying[,] 
repeated questioning’ and collective fines too much.166 They largely acquiesced 
due to governmental expectations and the fear of loss of face resulting from 
failure of governmental policy the MCA had supported.167 Instead the association 
focussed on relief, investing in education, health care, agriculture programs, 
village halls, markets, drains and youth movements to engage ‘hearts and minds’ 
and ‘create […] a bulwark against communism’.168 ‘[A]t no little personal risk 
[MCA officials] visited terrorist dominated areas’ to explain the need for more 
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intelligence and ‘helped in the formation of Village Committees and […] 
recommendations for Village Councils’. Members collated information to 
disseminate to the police through their district branches and preached respect for 
the law.169 MCA officials reduced the risk of retaliation for villagers by suggesting 
villagers speak to them instead of government representatives during ‘Question’ 
operations.170 Others guided squatters through their entire detention period—
often lasting years—from capture up to and after release.171 Chinese squatters 
turned to the MCA for help. Tan Kooi asked the South Kedah Branch to 
investigate how his son had died; rumour had it he had been shot by a Home 
Guard from Baling.172 A ‘Benevolence Fund’, garnering an estimated two million 
dollar—members paying $12 in subscription with two dollars going into MCA 
coffers—allowed the association to help rural communities and families whose 
sons faced recruitment.173 The MCA in May 1952 pledged more than $1,6 million 
to resettlement work financed through lotteries.174 Less known is that, MCA’s 
wish for ‘racial harmony’ in Perak resulted in new tools for a local Malay trade 
school and a $15,000 hostel in Ipoh for Malay apprentices.175  
 The colonial government itself granted resettlement $41 million for 1951. 
Three-quarters went to housing, fences, road-construction or drainage. Police 
posts proved another big expenditure. With the Korea War boom past its zenith 
the budget dropped to $19 million for 1952. Still, $1,7 million was now allocated 
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to education while a relatively higher amount went to ‘medical and health 
services’ and ‘agricultural aid’.176 In November, town planners’ ‘first priority’ was 
to ‘plan “new, new villages”’.177 Seven months later about half of the villages had 
‘new schools’ and 301 had been allotted funds for the construction of community 
centres and village halls.178 Temporary Occupant Licences to land were being 
converted into long-term leases.179 Years after resettlement, New Villagers still 
showed resentment. They were tired of being distrusted by the government. Now 
that their ‘hearts and minds’ had become less important as ‘terrorist strength has 
waned’, the ‘loss and hardships’ should not be forgotten. New Villages had to be 
turned from ‘anti-Communist weapons’ into true development programmes.180 
 Those who see colonial (decolonization) warfare as sale guerre and 
‘wholesale oppression’ alone find plenty of proof in colonial—not just British—
resettlement schemes.181 Khalili sees the dead hand of despotism behind all 
measures regarding the New Villages—partially through ignoring the MCA.182 In a 
section that includes New Villages, Gerlach asserts that ‘Grand schemes for a 
capitalist modernization of the countryside often failed due to a lack of resources’ 
as the military was prioritized ‘and objections by the old elites against the 
massive redistribution of property’.183 His generalization oversimplifies the 
Emergency’s context, not least because Chinese elites did—with British help—
address gross neglect in the New Villages.184 In other words, one official’s 
                                                 
176 Renick, ‘The Emergency Regulations’, 11-12; Loh mentions that in 1952 ‘only $0,89 million’ went to medical and 
health facilities, but forgets that this number meant a larger portion of the total budget went to medical and health 
facilities in relation to 1951’s budget; see: Loh, ‘Beyond the Thin Mines’, 111-112. 
177 Memorandum Meeting with the High Commissioner, Mentri2 Besar, Resident Commissioners, British Advisers and 
Other Dignitaries, Federal Legislative Council Library, 17 November 1952, T.P.D. 311/1952 New Villages Federation 
of Malaya.  
178  Monthly Administrative Report for December, 1952, 12 January 1953, No. 51/33, TNA, CO 1022/449; Extract 
from Printed Questions and Replies Tabled in Leg.Co., 15 July 1953, ANM, Chief Secretary 4531/53/10 Legislative 
Council 15 July 1953 Questions by Mr, Leung Cheung Ling, Subject New Villages. 
179 W. C. S. Corry, A General Survey of New Villages: Report to his Excellency Sir Donald MacGillivray High 
Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1954), 24, 26. 
180 ‘Old Villages’, The Straits Times, 1 June 1957, 1 and ‘The New Villages’, The Straits Times, 1 July 1960, 8.  
181 French, The British Way, 7; Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies, chapter 5; Khalili, Time in the Shadows, chapter 6. 
182 Khalili implies that amenities were installed: Time in the Shadows, 178-179. 
183 Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies, 218. 
184 For example, funding did not all go to the Military curtesy of the Korean War boom, although the Malay elites did 
protect Malay ‘reservations’ against encroaching Chinese. For an example, see ‘The Uprooted Village: Mr. Leong 
240 
statement, that the colonial government earnestly attempted to ‘provide 
foundations to the New Villages, and a permanent stake in the country for […] 
their inhabitants’ was not spurious, per se.185  
 Malaya’s villagization cannot solely be determined by one’s analytical 
vantage point. Obscuring one side of the counter-insurgency medal to emphasize 
violence constitutes a distortion of the historical record. The fairest approach to 
analysing the New Villages therefore is to place them into the overall periodisation 
of the Emergency. The first two periods ending in August 1951—counter-terror 
and Briggs’s arrival—were followed between August 1951 and July 1954 by the 
maturation of the ‘Briggs Plan’ and the collapse of the insurrection.186 For New 
Villagers, this meant that attempts at betterment followed coercive resettlement. 
The first six months proved the hardest, they attested.187 Still, progress was 
limited. Education policies faltered, land offices processed applications too slowly 
and due to the economic slump after 1952 financial allocations to the New 
Villages dropped.188 Chinese resettlement workers were scarce while some 
Resettlement Officers were hated for corruption.189 Yet, a purposeful lack of 
effort did not necessarily cause the delays or shortages; certainly when 
considering MCA’s efforts.  
 Still, such a statement cannot mitigate that these colonial enclosures did, 
indeed, delineate spaces wherein new communities were forged.190 After being 
stripped of their belongings, they were—when circumstances dictated—stripped 
of agency. Especially during the height of the Emergency barb-wire fences, police 
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posts and gates physically and mentally forced inhabitants into socially and 
politically desired patterns.191 Operation ‘Service’, meant ‘to foster […] friendship’ 
between police and locals, or the adoption of Home Guards by military units 
seemed more about control than co-operation.192 Likewise, Village Committees 
had little autonomy: both Templer and his Director of Operations threatened its 
members.193  
 
A Hand in every pie? The Komando Distrik Militer and the Min Yuen 
Templer’s threats did not occur in a vacuum. The MCP and the Republic reacted 
with counter-states within territory claimed by the colonial government.194 Their 
aim was to attain horizontal integration of scattered insurgent groups, the 
realization of centralized decision-making and co-ordinated ‘ideological 
production’. Vertically, ‘institutions for local control’ needed establishing.195 
According to Staniland the MCP at the height of its powers (1948-1951) was 
rather integrated both vertically and horizontally. With resettlement, however, 
came parochization: strong top leadership progressively ‘disembedded from its 
core local communities’ followed by marginalization.196 Based on Staniland’s 
categorizations, the Republic initially displayed ‘vanguard’ and ‘parochial’ 
characteristics. Independence animated united its leaders but the TNI was forced 
to share influence with local power-brokers.197 By and large the struggle became 
integrated as Yogyakarta gained strength.198 Either way, freedom fighters needed 
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to engage those blind to ‘political processes’ and make them participants; taking 
care they did not switch again to unresponsive ‘subjects’.199  
 The Republic and the MCP therefore needed presence and legitimacy. They 
sought both by injecting various Kommandos Distrik Militer (Military District 
Commandos) and Min Yuen (peoples’ movement) cells into the populations of 
Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively.200 In Indonesia rumours circulated that 
Spoor had underestimated the ‘breadth, depth and the meaning of the 
“Republican national” feeling’.201 This reading implies broad support for the 
Republic. For similar reasons, the MCP’s Min Yuen seemed quite successful—also 
to the British—especially before the Briggs Plan: the guerrillas held out until 
1989. The Min Yuen needed to be excised from squatter communities. True (state) 
legitimacy is created through taxation, providing protection, justice, and 
reciprocal ‘dispute resolution mechanism[s]’.202 The question is whether these 
local rebel administrations offered these services.  
 The counter-states did not necessarily descend upon an unresponsive 
population. The Republic built on pre-existing nationalist foundations. 
Ubiquitous hatred for the Dutch certainly helped, as did the formation of various 
Japanese-sponsored bodies that contemplated the ‘political and administrative 
framework for an independent Indonesian state’ from March 1945 onwards.203 
Lastly, a great number of the Indonesians, trained within various Japanese 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Formation, 43. 
199 Kilcullen, ‘The Political Consequences’, 29-30; for a schematic interpretation of mechanisms initiating or 
sustaining rebellion, see: Petersen, Resistance, 32, 82. 
200 The Min Yuen and certainly the KOMs have received little attention in relation to their effect upon the population; 
the limelight is stolen by ‘hearts and minds’ approaches by their colonial counterparts. 
201 Koets to the Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de Kroon, 12 May 1949. 
202 Suykens, ‘Comparing Rebel Rule’, 145-155; Zachariah Charian Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance 
and Civilian Life During War (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2011), 17-18. Staniland is more interested in explaining 
insurgent group construction and its changes over time but other than mentioning friendship and family networks, 
Staniland does not explain the MCP’s legitimacy and how it related to the severing of its vertical ties to the people, 
Networks of Rebellion, 1, 186-189. 
203 Van der Plas (Gedelegeerde bij het Geallieerde Opperbevel in Zuid-Oost Azië) aan Van Mook (lt. Gouverneur-
generaal), 18 sept. 1945, NIB 10, 125; B. R. O’G. Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese 
Occupation: 1944-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1961), 16-17, 39-42. See D. M. G. 
Koch, Om de Vrijheid: De Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesië (Jakarta: Jajasan Pembangunan, 1950) for the pre-
1942 nationalist movement. 
243 
defence-bodies, carried the idea of independence with them.204 Prior to its 
proscription in July 1948, the MCP employed an ‘open and legal’ strategy that 
possessed trans-communal appeal. Malay nationalist parties supported the MCP, 
such as the Malay Democratic Union, the Malay Nationalist Party and its affiliates 
the Angkatan Pemuda Insaf and the Angkatan Wanita Sedar.205 The party 
rekindled its pre-1942 connection to Chinese organisations, keeping former 
guerrillas close through ‘MPAJA Ex-Comrades Associations’. Cadres had 
infiltrated 214 of 277 labour units.206   
 As the embodied clandestine expression of insurgent influence within 
government-controlled territory, Min Yuen cells lived on jungle or estate fringes to 
collect intelligence, supplies and finances. They mingled with workers and 
directed the masses into subversive action, thereby multiplying the MRLA’s 
disruptive impact.207 Members shielded themselves within various organisations 
such as sports clubs, ‘secret trade unions’, the ‘Anti-British Backing-up Society’ 
and a Women’s Union, and were protected by and part of Armed Work Forces.208 
In fact, the Min Yuen strongly mirrored MCA activities—as the KDMs did the 
PRP’s. They, too, ‘exploited the real and imaginary grievances of labourers and 
peasants’ to gain traction. As ‘the champions of the oppressed’ they likewise 
‘encouraged’ people to actively resist through organizing. Lastly, Min Yuen cells 
identified opponents to their cause with the significant difference that they killed 
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them. Min Yuen-sponsored organizations were quite illegal.209 Ultimately, Min 
Yuen cells were a force to be reckoned with that deigned to protect its supporter 
from the invasive British and their stooges.210 
 Whereas the MRLA was being rapidly ‘milked’ to sustain the ailing Min 
Yuen, the Republic in August 1945 was coalescing into a state. The Komite 
Nasional Indonesia Pusat, or Central Indonesian National Committee to which the 
president became responsible, was followed by a cabinet (September) and an 
army that would become the TNI.211 Local National Committees engaged the 
public where possible.212 Tension between diplomasi, represented by the older 
generation, and perjuangan (struggle) demanded by the grass-roots pemuda, 
remained, however, as less moderate elements disdained Dutch-Republican 
parleys.213 East Javanese ‘Nationalist youth leader’ Dr. Abdulgani’s pemudas 
accepted Sukarno’s leadership, he recalled, but ‘always’ demanded ‘influence’. 
His and other groups took up weapons ‘without further instruction’. In West 
Java, Dr. Abu Hanifa became a ‘powerful man’ as ‘head of the [local] defence 
forces, head of administration’ and leader of ‘the so-called Provincial Council’. 
Standing ‘completely separate from the centre’, it did not take long for TNI 
General Nasution’s men to rein him in.214  
 Dutch penetration of Java (and Sumatra) led to a fundamental change in 
both Republican civilian and military administration. Incremental Dutch 
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influence (however thinly-spread), the Police Action and the Renville-mandated 
evacuation scattered Republican bodies or forced them into Central Java. Against 
instructions many Republican officials simply remained to co-operate with the 
Inland Administration. The ‘politically unreliable’, demonstrable criminals or 
those with a history of propaganda-dissemination were refused—but only when 
strictly needed.215 Some 4,000 recalcitrant Hizbullah troops lingered in West 
Java.216 The Republic did allow its police a choice: work for the enemy, retreat to 
Republican territories or resign to become a ‘preman’ (free-man).217  
 Dutch-occupied territories thus held enormous potential for agitation, 
especially with troops re-infiltrating. General Nasution created military 
‘Wehrkreise’ to complement existing civil ‘shadow organisations’ to commence 
proper guerrilla warfare. He claimed guerrillas were welcomed heartily: ‘Basically 
in every desa the administration was able to house some 60 men’.218 They meant 
to foster civil-military ties but also re-establish the Siliwangi Division scattered by 
the Police Action.219 Wehrkreise obviated the plethora of ‘private armies’ 
undermining the war-effort. Military commanders used a ‘pasukan gerilja desa’ 
(hamlet guerrilla troops) system that ‘channeled’ ‘the people’s burning spirit of 
resistance’. Having sworn loyalty to Republic, recruits reconnoitred, applied 
scorch-earth tactics and sabotaged.220 Wehrkreise were speedily and successfully 
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implemented. Divided into districts (Distrik2 Militer; DM) and sub-districts (Onder 
Distrik2 Militer; ODM), they mushroomed across Java.221 West Java had five 
military regions by October 1947.222 Two years later, the Republican governor 
with the KDMs had crippled the Pasundan.223 Its political landscape pocked with 
ungoverned ‘white areas’, the negara held sway only where Dutch troops 
dominated. KDMs deposed Dutch-appointed lurahs for more malleable characters 
and extracted taxes.224 Villages switched off: in Tumpang district, East Java, ‘only 
5 of the 62 desas’ obeyed the Inland Administration.225 Renville’s cease-fire with 
its subsequent TNI-exclusive patrolling-zones did not stop Military Districts from 
also flourishing in off-limits, Dutch areas. Regents limply threatened to disown 
lurahs if they heeded the call of the K(O)DMs, generals decried the ‘encapsulation’ 
of Dutch posts and planters, in turn, lamented the abandonment of patrolling 
and subsequent ‘heightened terror’.226   
 The above has little meaning without a notion of the legitimacy the Min 
Yuen and KDMs derived from their presence. Legitimacy had two components.227 
In secure territories, state-like consolidation was paramount. The MCP’s (deep) 
jungle camps that would ideally link into liberated areas accommodated farms for 
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the members and their families.228 They served as sites for self-criticism and 
study. When Comrade ‘X’ criticised Comrade ‘Y’ for his ‘individual heroism’, 
Comrade Kuan, having read X’s letter, criticised the latter in turn. Another 
‘comrade’ wanted ‘a finger in every pie’, micro-managing the local Min Yuen into 
idleness.229 Likewise, the Republic consolidated within its territory. ‘The spirit of 
bersiap faded away and the social revolutions were steered into calmer waters’. A 
‘silent majority’ for the time being supported Prime Minister Sjahrir, who had 
dissenters arrested, trusted on Sukarno’s authority and, lastly, allowed 
opposition parties into the cabinet. Even Linggadjati’s divisive impact was 
dampened: Sukarno enlarged the KNIP to ease its acceptance.230 The Police, 
furthermore, worked at guiding the revolution and make people ‘polisiminded’, 
organizing its criminal investigative branches and the Pengawasan Aliran 
Masyarakat bodies for the ‘Supervision of Societal Trends’.231 Both the MCP and 
Republic employed surveys and questionnaires to solicit feedback from the people 
and ranks. Through them, they established reciprocity, gauged revolutionary 
fervour or the availability of weapons.232  
 Legitimacy became a different issue altogether in areas where the MCP or 
the Republic were not uncontested; areas where Min Yuen and K(O)DM cadres 
encountered people who needed mobilization. Some, naturally, were forthcoming. 
Lurah Dulgani offered ‘his kindness and […] protection’ to passing insurgents. 
MRLA soldier Lau Yiew interpreted peoples’ food donations to indicate anti-British 
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‘hatred’, but overall coercion became important.233 The Min Yuen tax collection 
was hardly a voluntary affair.234 Refusal to pay cost one wealthy business man 
his estate’s smoke house.235 Aside from such perceived enemies of the people, the 
Min Yuen intimidated their natural allies, the workers, as well. British 
intelligence estimated that 63% of MCP income derived from extortion rather than 
sympathiser subscriptions.236 Finance constitute a problem from the start of the 
Emergency. As if to illustrate the chaotic circumstances, the Perak MCP planned 
to kidnap five ‘anti-Communist Towkays’ in 1948, ‘made to look like ordinary 
crime’.237 Its tactics dictated that labourers stood at the forefront of subversive 
activities. Labourers were forced to strike.238 It is illogical to assume that true 
believers alone slashed 70,000 rubber trees in December 1952.239 Those opposing 
participation paid a hefty price. One Chinese farmer was found dead with a nail 
driven into his skull; newspapers abounded—also after resettlement—with 
workers’ executions.240 More than 1,200 ‘traitors’ were ‘eliminated’ between June 
1948 and December 1950, claimed the MRLA.241 Naturally, the British clamped 
down on any organisation with ties to the MCP, such as the Malay Democratic 
Union and the Malay National Party.242 
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 The same approach to garnering support took place around the KDMs. 
Arguably, the TNI did try to protect the people by imposing order, also within 
KDM areas.243 In Tapanuli, a military court condemned seven suspects to death 
for murdering refugees.244 The TNI reserved the right to shoot anyone bearing 
illegal fire-arms in Wonosobo, East Java.245 Other soldiers chose to demand alms 
or rob people, instead.246 In Dutch-controlled territory, the intensity of violence 
increased further. Obeisance was ruthlessly imposed and little actual protection 
took place. Much like Malayan rubber tree slashing, bumi hangus (scorched 
earth) policies resulted in massive economic damage that hurt the public. Still, 
local lurahs were ordered to not be squeamish and destroy food, houses and 
anything the Dutch could use, while sparing mosques and churches.247 Officials 
touring Sukabumi counted hundreds of destroyed houses—including places of 
worship. ‘All life along the big road seems to have been rolled back...to keep the 
people and goods out of reach for the Netherlanders’.248 The hunt for spies took 
flight as there were ‘banyak mata-mata’. Locals were forced to attend TNI-
mandated meetings; entire hamlets were pressed into the Hizbullah or were made 
to ‘contribute’ with food. Non-compliance meant more deaths and torched 
villages.249 Sundanese civil servants and officers were coerced into signing 
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declarations condemning the Pasundan; even Republican supporters were not 
free from suspicion or attack.250 
 The variations of violence directed at possible sympathisers were endless. 
What the above has demonstrated is that both KDM and Min Yuen tapped from 
the same set of behaviours despite having diametrically opposed reasons for 
doing so. After all, the Min Yuen was cut off from its base, whereas the KDMs 
successfully moved closer to theirs. For the KDMs, at least, a more conciliatory 
approach would seem obvious. What accounts for violence from both is that they 
acted in border-area contexts that also held stubborn British and Dutch 
competitors. The latter hindered chances for insurgent legitimacy. When exposed 
to various competitors simultaneously or consecutively, ordinary people felt there 
was not one ally to structurally protect them, making them loathe to be activated 
as supporters. In this context, violence was necessary to outbid rivals.251  
 Unfortunately for Min Yuen and KDM units, Dutch and British security 
forces had created a rather permissible environment for themselves to seek 
dominance.252 Dutch mass killings in South-Celebes and Rawagede were not 
singular events.253 Spoor accepted summary justice (standrecht) and the ‘light’ 
inclination ‘towards regrettable excesses’. The military operated Special Courts 
Martial from March 1948 onwards and even sceptics argued for capital 
punishment.254 Captain Westerling—notorious for the Celebes killings—thus 
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hanged thirty ‘terrorists at the side of the big road’ near Purwakarta to mollify the 
planters.255 In Malang, sixteen prisoners were used as counter-gangs, executed 
and left exposed to frighten local resistance cells. Culprits tried to bury the case 
citing prisoner escape and falsifying release forms.256 Shooting fleeing people 
became such a trope it alarmed the Attorney-General, no castigator of counter-
terrorism himself.257 After troops had massacred a wedding party in August 1949, 
local protests were dismissed as being part of ‘organized [republican] action’. The 
‘complainers’ deserved ‘thorough yet utmost correct interrogation’.258 It was 
during interrogations that indigenous men were conspicuously remembered for 
their ‘third degree’ work.259 ‘[T]hose elements recruited from the Indonesian 
population’, one veteran wrote in an attempt to shift blame, proved ‘particularly’ 
keen to inflict pain.260 And so, within this permissive framework Ryun fatally beat 
a prisoner on the decks of the M.S. Garut while around the Cililitan airport (East 
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Jakarta) base commander Schrijver’s men unleashed a deadly spate of intra-
communal score-settling alongside local informants.261  
 In Malaya, jungle squad leader Dato Yuen recalled ‘pump[ing] a few more 
bullets’ into a female fighter he had shot—he ‘couldn’t stand her screaming’.262 
Since paramilitaries were told to shoot when in doubt and anyone running off, 
tragedy struck.263 Chan Suy Sang declared seeing trucks ferrying dead bodies 
‘quite a normal thing’.264 One police officer loosened locals’ tongues by walking  
them along corpses show-cased on a badminton court.265 Other witnesses 
claimed to have seen the hacking off of heads (for identification), rape and the 
parading of naked women.266 Children were lost to Home Guard shootings, a 
young couple was wounded failing to halt and one Special shot dead two Indian 
labourers. Strikingly, many of these incidents happened in 1957 long after the so-
called counter-terror period.267  
 Local, British and Dutch perpetrators were largely protected.268 Officials 
defended security forces’ shootings under ‘police promulgation’.269 Investigation of 
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facts ‘based on old and often incomplete intelligence’ was deemed tedious. Inquiry 
would only empower the enemy.270 Sadi Purwopranoto was arrested for ‘spying 
[and] contacts with the enemy’, but he had also made notes on ‘a series’ of 
‘condemnable’ offences ‘to discredit’ the local commander.271 The judiciary proved 
understanding; officers ‘did not see or refused to see’ war crimes.272 Excuses 
ranged from revenge and inexperience to following orders or front-line stress.273 
Many believed that war inescapably led to violence, especially when insurgents 
were invisible.274 The Malang shootings were recast as ‘self-defence’.275 This 
blaming the victim had great exculpatory powers. An Asian thirst for violence, 
expressed in devious war-fighting and preying on the innocent, whipped the 
supposedly civilized Dutch into a frenzy.276 Torture morphed into a means to 
protect the people from themselves.277 Spoor’s disdain for ‘Japanese methods’ 
rang hollow, indeed.278  
 
The live-and-let-live system 
In most transitions from uninterested subject to participant or even wilful 
neutrality, (anti) revolutionary fervour, let alone loyalty, did not exist. People and 
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their communities—especially those tied to their land—were swayed by violent 
power-brokers locked in deadly rivalry. Where the British discovered Min Yuen 
activities and goaled subscription collectors, for example, locals immediately felt 
emboldened ‘to adopt a stern attitude’ towards remaining insurgents.279 
Conversely, Abdoerachman, Ismail Effendi, Soekatma, Machbi bin Nasipin and 
Sobri joined the same subversive cell, they claimed, to shield their families from 
attack.280 
 Peoples’ agency, however, was more complicated than that. As most of this 
chapter concerns the fact that ‘the’ people were buffeted by the combination of 
war’s uncertainties and those who tried to steer them, it is only fair to end by 
analysing the set of behaviours people had to cope. Their agency rested with two 
categories: participants and those who needed activation and measures to keep 
them from switching back to inactivity. Studies that afford ‘common’ people a 
place often overlook the various activities and motivations of the Home Guard, 
Chinese or common Indonesians in favour of those highly motivated.281 This 
glosses over that agency was more complex than the strict dichotomy of 
bystander versus participant but also that certain statements—such as 
‘Operation “Service” […] appears to have had positive results’—are too broad and 
push individual choices to the background.282  
 The object of this final segment, therefore, shall be to bring vanguardists 
and followers together to underline the possible ways in which they asserted 
themselves to navigate the various pressures analysed above, but also that their 
registers of behaviour—switching alliances and hedging their bets—were the 
same. 
 Both the Emergency and the Indonesian War for independence were 
revolutions, as well.283 Social orders were overthrown, lending motivated people 
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the opportunity for change. Immediate action often stemmed from earlier political 
activity that had vetted them. Rashid Maidin, a senior Malay MCP member, was 
in 1941 inspired by an MCP propagandist tasked with organizing local labour.284 
Entire villages could carry over into the Emergency their affiliations with the war-
time MPAJA.285 Pak Sunaryo’s Japanese-sponsored defence unit network allowed 
his former commander to recruit him into a local youth defence group.286 Youths 
‘of all [social] strata’ were agitated as the Japanese occupation had upset 
traditional attainment of adulthood. Simultaneously, shared experiences in the 
Japanese defence units amplified their ‘sense of mass power [and] of fraternal 
solidarity’.287 Under these circumstances, jagos—powerful men who attracted 
followers and acted as champions of the oppressed, criminals or both—rose to 
prominence.288 People attempted to govern themselves, or at least be more 
assertive. In September 1946, the Chinese Sin Po newspaper counted 175 
political parties in the Republic, ‘of which 17 [formed] their own little government 
and their own army’.289 This period of self-governance was referred to as 
‘Kedaulatan Rakjat’ or the ‘Daulat period’: the period of the people’s 
sovereignty.290 
 If throughout the Emergency and the Indonesian revolution ideology may 
be found, it is with the vanguardist. Ideology certainly animated the Negara Islam 
Indonesia (NII, or Islamic State of Indonesia) in West Java. Its rise clearly shows 
that in border-localities the Republic ‘constituted only one of many other 
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entities’.291 The NII sprouted from the mind of Sukarmadji Maridjan 
Kartosuwiryo, but was facilitated by a Japanese policy of ‘activating the rural 
Islamic leaders’ who grasped the proffered ‘opportunities for winning over the 
population’.292 Men like Kartosuwiryo and Raden Oni, commander of the 
Sabilillah fighters, disagreed with Kartosuwiryo’s parent political party, the 
Islamic Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi): after Renville it opted for 
diplomasi along with the wider Republic. With the Divisi Siliwangi absent, 
Kartosuwiryo depended on various struggle groups (among them the Hizbullah 
and women’s groups) as well as Sundanese devout Muslims to insert himself into 
what soon would be the Pasundan.293 The resultant Islamic Council on seven 
august 1949 proclaimed the NII that included a Tentara Negara Islam Indonesia 
(TNII). The NII’s holy war ordained that in territories outside the negara’s core—
the Darul Islam; House of Islam—people should be made more ‘Islam-minded’.294  
 NII success hugely complicated the situation in West Java; the Negara 
Islam case shows that strong (religious) motivations attracted others willing to 
take alternative paths to independence. By and large, the Islamic movement was 
able to transgress ‘local sentiments and feelings’ and marry them to an 
‘alternative to the Indonesian Republic without having lost touch with local 
society’.295 This was largely Kartosuwiryo’s doing. Although his father was 
relatively affluent, this ‘skilful organizer’ remained close to the rural 
population.296 In Tegal, local mujahedeen, already embroiled with the Republic, 
raised another TII regiment. As far as Yogyakarta the NII found willing allies. 
                                                 
291 C. van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhof, 
1981), 65. 
292 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, 16. 
293 S. Soebardi, ‘Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 14, 1 
(1983), 1-17; Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, 83-85, 89; De Negara Islam Indonesia, De Staat op 
Islamitische Grondslag voor geheel Indonesië, NL-HaNA, Nefis en CMI 2.10.62/1719. The Hizbulla and Sabilillah 
troops distrusted the TNI and the Republic’s Minister of Defence, Sjarifuddin, who was a member of the Partai Sosialis 
Indonesia and so stayed behind. 
294 Van Dijk, Rebellion, 89, 92; De Negara Islam Indonesia, De Staat op Islamitische Grondslag voor geheel Indonesië, 
NL-HaNA, Nefis en CMI 2.10.62/1719; Soebardi, ‘Kartosuwiryo’, 120. Kartosuwiryo had tried to proclaim a NII 
before, see: Kementerian Penerangan, Republik Indonesia. Propinsi Djawa Barat (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 
1953), 216. 
295 Van Dijk, Rebellion, 18. 
296 Van Rijk, Rebellion, 20-21. 
257 
Kartosuwiryo’s call that with the Republic negotiating with the Dutch the NII now 
guaranteed the proklamasi kemerdekaan resonated strongly.297 The Barisan 
Banteng, Hizbullah/Sabilillah and the Laskar Rakyat Djawa Barat collectively 
denounced the Republic for abandoning ‘total peoples’ defence’.298 
Simultaneously, Commander-in-Chief Sudirman and Nasution set out to organize 
the Bambu Runcing (Sharpened Spear) Divisi to counter the TNII and soften the 
Siliwangi’s ‘defeat’, picking up stragglers who had switched to the Dutch post-
Renville.299 No less than three parties—the TNII, Siliwangi, the Dutch (with the 
Pasundan)—now fought each other.300  
 The lines of alliance blurred accordingly. As Islamic power around Krawang 
grew some Bambu fighters made overtures.301 Conversely, the August 17 Division 
coalescing around Yogyakarta included TNI and Hizbullah groups, but in Bantam, 
at least, this division agitated against the TNII.302 Growing communist influences 
in national politics allowed for communist leanings to permeate various troops. 
Masyumi and Tan Malaka, the rising star of Indonesian communism, made 
common cause, leading to cooperation between the August 17 Divisi and TNII, 
Hizbullah and elements of the Bambu Runcing in West Java.303 Even the TNI and 
Dutch forces sought local rapprochement against the NII.304 Most of these groups, 
however, turned on the Pasundan. With Dutch forces vacating large swaths of 
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territory East of Bandung due to the May 1949 cease-fire, the Pasundan had to 
acquiesce in Siliwangi’s ‘very harsh and repressive measures’ against Darul Islam 
‘cruelties’.305 Again we see that to gain influence, the population paid the price. 
The Negara Islam displaced village heads or co-opted them to allow Darul Islam 
indoctrination and the formation of local Islamic Councils and army units.306 
After independence the TNII stepped up its activities, causing thousands of burnt 
houses, refugees (52,672 for the last quarter of 1951) and cases of looting. 
Damages amounted to almost Rp. 7,500,000.307 Still, there was some room for 
manoeuvre. Various local Masyumi leaders declined to fall in line. ‘[O]lder D.I.-
members and various kiaji’s’ had had enough and called in the Dutch in 
Tasikmalaya.308 Others welcomed the House of Islam, or at least the presence of a 
stabilizing factor. ‘[N]ormal village people’ reached for security within a 
community ‘shocked to its core’. They hoped that within the Negara Islam the 
jagos would be contained and that various parties—the Dutch, the Pasundan, the 
Republic—would stop calling for support.309  
 Others who tried to manipulate new possibilities to their favour were 
women. The social revolution afforded them a chance to challenge the past and 
through doing so, make the future. The Malay Mail wrote that ‘Women want a 
fuller life’: the ‘ordinary day-to-day work in kampongs’ bored them.310 Many 
women were taken up in the exhilarating flurry of activity that would amalgamate 
into revolution. Like others, they heard about independence but had little 
understanding of its meaning.311 In Indonesia, reading circles, performances 
(sometimes featuring the murder of Dutch people) and mass meetings filled in the 
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blanks and opened ways to ‘imagining independence’ and ‘Indonesia’.312 Roadside 
storytellers read newspapers to those who could not. Women joined groups who 
travelled from village to village to sing merdeka’s praises, daring parents to allow 
their children to fight. Others were taught reading to engender understanding.313  
 In Malaya, Ling Guan Ying joined the underground during the Japanese 
occupation—as did her entire village. To her the British presence was equally 
oppressive. She related to the MCP’s attention to the poor and its message of 
liberation.314 Chen Xui Zhu also switched from ideological to active participation 
against British brutality. In her New Village, she keenly felt oppressed: ‘If anyone 
was caught assisting the Communists, they were beheaded’.315 Zhu Ning felt the 
sting of British heavy-handedness, too. They arrested her husband for aiding the 
communists. Her admiration for the Communists until in 1967 she went 
underground.316 Women found that men and women were equal in the jungle.317  
 The (insurgent) women carried their weight. North of Bandung, soldiers 
spotted a group of armed female insurgents; others smuggled weapons or 
prepared food.318 They were not ‘followers’. During the infamous siege of Bukit 
Kepong, MRLA women collected the dead.319 Resistance could be subtle, too: in 
some hamlets where the male population had disappeared, women ‘rudely’ 
refused to talk.320 In Solo, four women’s organisations in 1946 declared their 
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support for the Republic and its call for women to participate in the war effort 
next to the Tentara and Polisi. Their ‘urgency program’ sought to establish 
communal kitchens and assist evacuees and the poor. They also demanded 
access to more and higher education.321 On the other side of the official divide 
female searchers checked for food at New Village gates. From 87 in 1948 their 
number rose to 853 in 1957. Others actively resisted the local TNI, informing 
Dutch intelligence that the TNI knew who worked for them.322 In Indonesia and 
Malaysia, women had to assert themselves and petition those in power to ask for 
their son’s whereabouts.323  
 The women and men who joined the guerrilla cited a wish to liberate.324 
Belief in the success of the revolution, improved opportunities and serving ‘a 
common cause’ were salient motivations.325 Others took heart in communist 
successes in China, Korea and Viet Nam.326 Mobilization was facilitated by 
networks of friendship, family, association and empathy.327 TNI guerrilla manuals 
underlined the efficacy of familial ties in activating the population.328 Whereas 
other Chinese organizations such as the Hakka Association showed no interest, 
the Communists ‘were always coming around’ to talk to people.329 Listeners were 
drawn in by MCP speakers’ zeal, convincing others to satisfy their curiosity and 
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also go. A former recruit drew strength from communist propaganda.330 
Participation was not always completely informed by voluntary decisions. Fear of 
arrest was by far the most poignant catalyst for action. Not surprisingly, this fear 
impacted strongly on those who were uncertain about moving to begin with.331 
One ‘Subscription Collector’ explained the above to Tan Cheng Lock personally. 
Seventy percent, he wrote, ‘were forced to evacuate [resettle] or were earmarked 
for arrest’. Due to corrupt officials and lascivious Special Constables new 
converts showed up with ‘a special hatred against Government’. They all wanted 
to partake in ambushes.332 The government’s violence, then, was turning people 
into enemies.  
 Family and other societal ties also worked in opposite directions. They 
served as beacons when participants had had enough. Disaffection with the 
harsh jungle life came in many guises for the 1,927 who surrendered.333 
Starvation, harsh critiques, ambushes, inactive or lusty superiors could all 
contribute. From abroad, the 1954 Geneva talks in Vietnam convinced some rank 
and filers they now fought alone.334 In some units, signs of wavering—by ‘Bad 
eggs’—were met with execution. Others felt that what the MCP had promised 
turned out to be false. When revolutionary enthusiasm was sufficiently dampened 
to want to go home, those who saw an opportunity found their way into the arms 
of husbands, uncles and other understanding relatives. The constant barrage of 
pamphlets facilitated switching greatly. The British, for the most part, were 
equally understanding. Those who surrendered could be rewarded and resettled 
in exchange for informing on erstwhile comrades. Surrendered Enemy Personnel 
encouraged further surrenders by informing known family members outside the 
jungles their loved ones would not be hanged after their surrender. In pitting 
Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP) against their old comrades, the British 
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facilitated yet more intra-communal violence.335 In a Dutch twist on atonement, 
the ‘boisterous and useless’ group led by Panji (of HAMOT fame) who had 
surrendered found redemption through turning on the rebellion. Afterwards and 
under Dutch wings, they could quiet down and ‘once more happily work for the 
whites and will be taken back as such’.336  
 Another set of communities that functioned on the premise of kinship and 
family were the Chinese in Indonesia and Malaya. We recall that they were 
broadly split between perenakan (inward-looking) and sinkeh (China-focussed) 
groups that the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT), fighting the Communists in 
China, tried to constantly win over.337 In Indonesia the Japanese had largely 
decimated the KMT. The British forbade the party in Malaya.338 Beginning with 
the power vacuum that existed after the Japanese surrender, the Chinese lived in 
fear for their lives. Worries were compounded by officials who demanded the 
Chinese declare allegiance. In Indonesia, the Dutch therefore allowed the 
organization of the Pao An Tui; in Malaya, the Malay Chinese Association primed 
the Chinese for security force duty.  
 Such measures did not calm people. The Communist victory over 
Nationalist forces in China divided Chinese communities. British recognition of 
the new regime flew in the face of its own campaign in Malaya, confusing the 
Chinese.339 Whereas the massively influential Nanyang Siang Pau wrote against 
the Chinese communists, the Sin Chew Jit Poh and the Nan Chiau Jit Pao—with 
increasing readerships—supported their victory.340 In Indonesia, some 
conspicuously turned their gaze to China; the Sin Po reviled the Kuomintang for 
                                                 
335 The Security Forces Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 112 for the Week Ending 26th June 1952; The Security 
Forces Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 118 For the Week Ending 7 August 1952, both in TNA, CO 1022/15. 
336 Memorandum van Directeur-generaal Algemene Zaken (Idenburg), 26 aug. 1947, NIB 10, 645, see also note 1; 
Verslag van de Vergadering van de Raad voor Oorlogsvoering op 14 Nov. 1945, NIB 2, 65. 
337 Png Poh Seng, ‘The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1912-1941’, Journal of Southeast Asian History, 2, 1 (1961), 6-9.  
338 Rapport van NICA-ambtenaar voor Chinese Zaken (Abell), 29 okt. 1945, NIB 1, 468; C. F. Young and R. B. 
McKenna, The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya 1912-1949 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990), 
119; Yong and McKenna, ‘The Kuomintang Movement, 125-132. 
339 Review of Chinese Affairs May 1949, TNA, CO 717/182/4. 
340 Review of Chiense Affairs March 1949, TNA, CO 717/182/4. 
263 
‘losing the people’.341 In Batavia Keh Chuan Shou, vice-chairman of the local 
Chung Hua Chung Hui, an umbrella organization for Chinese voluntary 
organizations, illustrated the split alliances of the Chinese well. This ‘strong 
advocate of Chinese Indonesian friendliness’ criticised the Dutch for keeping their 
colonizing agenda intact. He faulted the Republican army for stealing the 
Chinese’s money, destroying their property and lives and suppressing more 
moderate Republican voices. The anti-Chinese atrocities, continued Keh, ‘made 
the Chinese turn to the Dutch’. Still, the door to Chinese-Indonesian 
reconciliation had not shut, as the Dutch would only protect the Chinese as long 
as they could be used ‘to restore their [the Dutch] policy for colonization’.342  
 As tradition dictated, Chinese consuls continued to meddle.343 In Malaya, 
Consul Ma called himself the protector of the Chinese: when security forces burnt 
down their houses, they came to him, he said.344 Tsiang Chia Tung, Consul-
General in Indonesia, gave Dutch official an ear-full because soldiers killed and 
beat Chinese people without being ‘properly punished’.345 From his post in 
Republican territory, the Vice-consul lambasted Dutch aggression for frustrating 
Chinese-Republican relations.346 The position of the two consuls was indicative of 
the fact that the Chinese communities—too diverse to disaggregate here—were 
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split between the Republic and the Dutch. To Republican distaste, the latter had 
strong motivations to curry Chinese favour; one being their possible 
reinvigorating influence on the economy.347 The Dutch, in turn, were perturbed 
with the Chinese consuls for not shunning the Republic: they feared 
rapprochement.348  
 Being pulled in various directions, Chinese communities across Indonesia 
had to appease. During the successor conference to Malino, held in Pangkal 
Pinang in October 1946, Chinese leaders had agreed on a neutral stance to 
enhance unity among the Indonesian Chinese, but also to not endanger the 
Chinese on Republican territory.349 It was for similar reasoning that for example 
Teng Tjin Leng of Makassar intimated that many ‘Indo-Chineezen’ felt that the 
citizenship dilemma should be left alone during ‘this time of strong tensions’. If 
one element was shared among the Chinese, Leng said, it was that ‘in the new 
Indonesia’, there would be no place ‘For a feeling […] that in the Netherlands-
Indies there were first and second class citizens’.350  
 Neutrality proved hard to maintain. In uncontested territory, the Pao An Tui 
stood with the Dutch. The Dutch certainly invited them to do so. Spoor, always 
the keen observer, seemed cognizant of the bind the Chinese were in; he 
recognized that to save themselves, many Chinese had to, under certain 
circumstances, at least pretend to support the Republic. He therefore warned his 
military commanders to not treat them as collaborators: ‘collaboration is a very 
delicate concept, as experience has pointed out, and [it] must be treated with the 
utmost caution’.351 The anti-Japanese association ‘Fuk Hsing She’ was thanked 
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officially in 1947 for their support at a function where a letter from the Dutch 
queen was read.352 Civil and military authorities were given stern warning to 
behave fairly without ‘any discrimination’ when dealing with the Chinese. Ideally, 
Chinese liaison officers had to be on stand-by. ‘Police action [must] never be 
unnecessarily rough or abusive. Cavity searches, which are seen as especially 
abusive [by the Chinese] can be performed only when circumstances demand 
it’.353 
 Where Republicans had influence the situation changed accordingly. 
Republican leaders put much pressure on Chinese communities. In July 1945, 
the Indonesian business elite with Hatta and Sukarno propaganted economic 
centralization to serve the Indonesian pribumi (indigenous) middle class that 
would emerge after the revolution. Chinese leaders felt uneasy with this 
development: if economic centralisation and pribumi priority were conflated, the 
Chinese could only hope to adapt, not dictate.354 These fears may have not been 
unfounded. Republican leaders were poised to break the elevated Chinese 
economic position. Hatta accused the Chinese ‘merchants’ of always having 
trampled on Indonesian interests—under Dutch rule, then again under the 
Japanese and after August 1945 still. This behaviour did not accord with the 
Republican Constitution; it stipulated a cooperative, egalitarian economy, ‘based 
on principles of the Family State’.355 In April 1946, the Republic wanted to bring 
the Chinese communities under control by trying to declare citizenship for all 
Chinese in Indonesia. With this decision looming, Chinese living in Republican-
controlled areas would face a strategic choice. Although the Chinese Consul 
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stated that acceptance would not mean loss of Chinese citizenship, Chinese in 
Indonesia could not ignore ‘the amount of anti-Chinese feeling’.356  
The Republic, of course, saw the Pao An Tui as ‘units of the Dutch police 
army’.357 Therefore, Chinese-owned security forces were unthinkable. Republican 
forces around Sukabumi, West Java, for example, coerced (according to a Dutch 
report) some 20 Chinese into the TNI ranks in March1948.358 In Blitar, the Chung 
Hoa Chung Hui disavowed the PAT. The Dutch, members said, had riled up the 
Chinese.359 Where territory was still contested, such as in Medan, Sumatra, PAT 
members in 1946 had to clarify to the Dutch that they would rather remain 
neutral: too close an affiliation with the KNIL would invite reprisals against the 
city’s Chinese quarters.360 As it was, a precarious situation had existed in Medan. 
Chinese (and Indonesian) organisations could both support the Allies and parade 
around with ‘Red-white [the colours of the Indonesian flag], Chinese Nationalist 
and British-Indian Freedom banners’.361 The PAT, however, had provoked a 
violent Indonesian reaction that led to an ultimatum: either the PAT joined the 
Republican police, the Peoples Defence or it should disband.362 
 Chinese support to the Indonesian cause was not necessarily involuntary, 
however opportune.363 The ‘Servants of Society’, a small Chinese group in Dutch-
controlled Surabaya that still represented a third of that city’s youth, opposed the 
PAT as a Dutch ‘instrument’ against the Republic. Chinese intellectuals, in turn, 
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criticised the SOS’s ‘Indonesian-ness’.364 The Republican Ministry of Defence 
counted some 200 Chinese members in a local fighting organization. In Malang 
and Surakarta some Chinese organized on the Republican side, too.365 Whether to 
appease or from conviction, many simply read the tide. Or, as the Sin Min Pao 
wrote: the Chinese ‘must be convinced that they are living in a new Indonesian 
society’.366  
 The same—yet hardly acknowledged—diversity of behaviour should be 
accorded to the Home Guard, the Plantation Guard and the New Villagers. 
Studies invariably stop at condemning New Villages or branding them—with 
caveats—as a counterinsurgency success. A deeper glance into the relation 
between the New Villages and their surroundings is rarely endeavoured. To 
substantiate that Templer’s ‘controversial decision to allow Chinese Home Guards 
to take over village security from the police’ in 150 [Phase III] New Villages’ proved 
successful by stating that no weapons were lost, is typical in this regard.367 Such 
a reading is not the complete picture. It presupposes that indeed, colonial control 
could be complete and that so-called hearts and minds approaches were more 
than mere ‘subordinate parts’ of population control.368 On another level, leaving 
aside incidents that happened after the resettlement began to sort effect (1951-
1952) robs people of agency. A close reading of available sources, then, reveals 
that where control was challenged profoundly enough, insurgents, security forces 
and ordinary people still inhabited a grey area wherein outwardly stable alliances 
with—or, in subordination to—more powerful parties could be subverted. These 
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semi-luminous areas existed despite the MCP’s collapse and despite Home 
Guards operating independently under ‘Phase III’.369  
 The existence of the ambiguities of alliance even in the strictly-controlled 
environs of post-1952 New Villages is glaringly apparent from the 1955 
‘Examination of Policy Regarding Phase III Home Guard’. Between January 1954 
and May 1955, Home Guards lost 111 weapons plus ammunition to the MCP.370 
Most were taken from phase two Home Guards, who liaised with Malay police 
forces. The report clearly indicates, however, that phase three Home Guards did 
not prove more resistant than their phase two colleagues. Rather, the three cases 
where no-one resisted at all happened in Phase III New Villages. If, then, the 
examination states that without police present the MCP was less inclined to 
‘[antagonize] the masses by attacking HG’ and that MCP policy had changed to 
‘Making it clear’ that those yielding would escape violence, it is obvious that ‘a 
live-and-let-live agreement’ was in place.371 This conclusion is eminently logical in 
light of the October Resolutions. After all, they ordered that ‘subtle […] 
underground penetration’ should replace indiscriminate force.372 Of the circa 430 
Villages, the ‘Examination’ detailed, 110 had phase III status in Johore, Perak 
and Negri Sembilan alone.373 With Johore and Perak continuously having the 
most MCP-related incidents, a major local ‘live-and-let-live’ potential existed.374 
 The live-and-let-live system hinged on the fact that insurgents and the 
people lived in close proximity.375 Despite the restrictions due to quite literal 
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barriers in the form of New Village or estate gates and a decline in insurgent 
numbers, they could still access the people.376 In Indonesia the resistance 
operated close the Plantation Guard and police posts: it hid among the massive 
estates’ kampongs.377 Local Min Yuen agents accessed the guards during their 
tapping cycles due to the part-time nature of their job. If needed, they made 
resistance at night mean death at dawn. The same, naturally, applied to ordinary 
inhabitants.378 Contact was made on a personal level or through friends.379  
 Three categories of people inhabited the live-and-let-live system. Active 
sympathisers constituted the first category: they facilitated the system and gave it 
strength. In Banjar, Central Java, a labourer was discovered as a resistance 
leader preparing an attack after having worked on the plantation for fourteen 
days.380 The Goalpara guard stood under influence of the famed Bambu Runcing 
gang; after the Goalpara incident, several had fled to join them or other gangs.381 
Former Sergeant Bakker, stationed on the Tjikoempai Estate, only after the war 
found out—from a TNI veteran—that the Guard had been infiltrated by the TNI.382 
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Another veteran, Dijkstra, received a letter from Saleh, a Guard he had worked 
with. Like others, Saleh came from the republican side, ‘thinking [he] would have 
a better life choosing for our side’. He wrote Dijkstra in 1948: the Plantation 
Guard was now under TNI control.383 Rapid recruitment brought many 
‘undesirable elements’ into the Home Guard and Special Constabulary whose 
MCP connections ranged ‘from slight to strong’. In Selangor, leaders of at least 
four New Villages supported the MCP.384  
 The second category were those in the security forces who did not support 
the insurgents, but needed to survive. As such, security forces and their 
opponents brokered local ‘non-aggression pacts’.385 In Indonesia, policemen 
decided to temporary disappear as they knew an attack was imminent without 
warning the local military unit.386 Security personnel stood aside, in one case, 
while a mere ten men burn down 64 houses.387 The Gunung Susuru estate 
guards were reminded that as they had earlier assumed a double alliance, it was 
now time to make the transformation complete, live up to their oath and join the 
resistance.388 Home Guards could be ‘on the friendliest terms’ with the 
resistance. In two North Perak areas, MCP documents revealed there ‘was no 
reason to fear’ indigenous forces.389 Despite the screening of thousands, also in 
New Villages, in 1953 communists still collected weapons effortlessly.390 In 
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February 1953 four Chinese Specials in Perak permitted food to be smuggled out 
of the Tanah Mas New Village. Three non-Chinese Specials, involved with 
delivering ammunition to the MCP, wore white towels on patrol so they would not 
be shot at. Shun Sheng remembered he slowly tried ‘to influence them [Chinese 
guards] and get them on our side’. Both Special Constables (Selangor, October 
1951) and Home Guards (Johore, August 1955) at times decided to not repel any 
MCP attack.391 Possibly, the winding down of the Emergency’s intensity led to an 
overall relaxing: in Kota Bharu, Kelantan, Home Guards decided not to always go 
on duty.392  
 The last category was inhabited by the general population. They stood 
between security forces on the one hand and the insurgencies on the other. As we 
have seen, incumbent and incoming forces needed mobilizational violence; 
acquiescence followed. This explains why one level 350,000 volunteers gave life to 
‘Anti-Bandit Month’—prompting the New York Times to declare the ‘terrorists’ 
enjoyed no popular support. On another level, conversely, the MCP could mobilize 
some 6,000 Chinese and Indian labourers in a two-state strike.393 For every child 
manipulated into food smuggling, a Chinese would be coerced, under curfew, to 
divulge information—or, in Indonesia, someone would report with the ‘Indigenous 
Volunteers’.394 Under these circumstances, circa 3,000 rubber tappers from six 
villages in Pahang protested stringent food control. Although they resented rice 
rationing, they were goaded on by ‘129 relatives and contacts of terrorists’.395 
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Whoever wished to live, served two masters.396 Agricultural Officer Jamaludin bin 
Aji opined that the people of the kampong lived ‘between the Devil and the deep 
sea’. ‘Each one is under nervous tension and constant terror’ but with nowhere to 
go, they were fair game for the bandits who ‘easily poison the mind of the 
weak’.397 Indonesian Guards, servants and washer women ‘could only work and 
survive [...] when they passed messages […] to the enemy’. They had to ‘cover two 
bases’.398 Chong Peng did so: he ‘was spying on both sides’.399 ‘We are much 
gratified’, said one TNI officer, ‘to hear from our followers that the Lurah only 
works for the Netherlanders for outward appearance, but in his heart he is on the 
side of the Republic’.400 Close to the transfer of sovereignty, such dual 
administrative structure had become commonplace.401 Unsurprisingly, the 
Intelligence and Safety Group in West Java complained that even the barber 





In an August 1947 report, the Governmental Commissar for Administrative 
Affairs for Central Java touched upon the very substance of the past chapter. In a 
rare display of perhaps frankness, he wrote that:  
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 The stance of the people cannot be called hostile anywhere; [their] attitude, 
 which oscillates from great co-operation to fearfully holding back, is closely 
 connected to the safety, that Dutch authority can provide locally. 
 
Peoples’ attitudes, he continued, ‘[were] for a large part determined by what 
happens in front of their eyes’. As this chapter has shown, this interpretation was 
on point. On an observable level, people indeed responded positively to being 
protected. Where the British authorities had enough control to keep insurgents 
away or establish the first signs of implementing a concerted effort to establish 
control, the Malayan Chinese Association had ample room to insert itself into 
Chinese lives that in one fell swoop were captured in New Villages. The same 
applied initially to the Partai Rakyat Pasundan’s campaign. In the early stages of 
the Indonesian war for Independence, Suriakartalegawa and others saw the 
number of members of his party rise rather quickly, allowing him to claim that a 
Sundanese polity may be feasible.  
  A similar nexus between control and support animated the pre-1952 
Malayan Communist Party and its vanguard cells, the Min Yuen. As we have 
seen, various political organisations worked with the MCP and later its camps 
served as sites to educate the people. The Min Yuen meanwhile continued to 
attempt and transform various organizations into allies of the MCP. Where the 
Republic’s power was felt most keenly, in Central Java, it installed the Komite 
Nasional Indonesia Pusat and built a functioning government around it while 
trying to establish the monopoly on violence. Both the MCP and the Republic 
attempted—like the Dutch and the British—to earn state legitimacy in one form 
or another.  
 The Commissar continued. ‘Specifically in the border areas the enemy tries 
to move the desa population into evacuation through threatening [them] with 
arson and rampok’. This all-important observation has been another tenet of this 
chapter’s argument. However, contrary to the report’s dichotomy between the 
Dutch—and the British—and ‘the enemy’, the argument has shown that all 
parties to the conflict failed spectacularly where their power stood less 
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unchallenged. Both the MCP’s Mass Movement and the Republican Kommando 
(Onder) Distrik Militer cells failed to permanently make participants out of 
bystanders. Instead, they employed violence to force participation. In turn, the 
British and the Dutch—with more than tacit approval of their indigenous allies—
tried to outbid their rivals in the extremely coercive construction of friends and 
foes. At best, they could undermine other power brokers’ chances on successful 
engendering of support. 
 Only in relation to the Pasundan did Republican violence bear fruit, it 
seems. The Commissar’s report accounted for this, as well: ‘the intellectuals […] 
are influenced by political considerations’. They wish to work with the incumbent 
powers, ‘but [they] are in doubt about the end’. This dynamic co-explains the 
trajectories of the MCA and the Pasundan. Whereas the Communist insurrection 
collapsed and the MCA flourished despite it not canvassing all Chinese 
sympathies, the Pasundan’s stature declined in tandem with the receding 
presence of the Dutch. The Pasundan’s leaders and their constituencies indeed 
feared ‘the return of the terrorizing methods of the groups that now play such a 
leading in the Republic’.403  
 To ‘ordinary’ people—surrounded by guns, gates and fences—the situation 
looked distinctly less black and white. Certainly, as the case of the Darul Islam 
movement showed, those highly motivated could become yet another contender in 
the race for independence. Others, among them many women, chose to put the 
insecurities of the time to good use and assert themselves, either for or against 
the colonial rulers. By and large, however, the people in the desas, kampongs and 
New Villages were forced to cooperate with whom they had in front of them at that 
moment. The search for neutrality translated into the live-and-let-live system. 
The people kept their ears open and their heads down to not invite the violent 
reflexes of colonial and anti-colonial forces alike. Amidst the ruins of war, 
peasants wanted little to do with politics. One observer said it well: ‘the desa 
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people want nothing more than to be left alone, cultivate their sawah[s], marry 
[and] have children’.404 
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Histories of decolonization usually become chronological and linear affairs when 
caught between two bookends. For long as enough historical distance has 
existed, treatises on the transformation of the Netherlands East Indies into 
Indonesia between 1945 and 1950 more often than not strung together the 
conflict’s various (often political) watersheds. As such they end with the final 
denouement of the Dutch Empire in the East: the Round Table Conference in The 
Hague in 1949.1 The conference, which lasted more than two months in 1949, 
marked the official transfer of power and with it, the end to an inevitable process 
that had been set in motion prior to 1945.2 Dutch military operations had failed 
and the subsequent military stalemate allowed diplomasi to prevail.3  
The majority of the literature on the Malayan Emergency likewise displays a 
certain rigidity. Broadly speaking, either analyses revolve around the even-
handed manner in which the British approached both decolonization and 
counterinsurgency or they underline the various ways in which the British were 
‘nasty, not nice’.4 All research on the Emergency (sometimes grudgingly) finds 
common ground, however, in the assertion that, regardless of British brutality, 
the methods they employed were successful. They point to the separation of 
insurgents from their base of support, the people. ‘[A]n archipelago of “white 
areas” […] gradually extended across the peninsula’ from 1953 onwards.5 With 
the Malayan Communist Party marginalized after 1955, the Malayan Emergency 
slowly gave rise to a British ‘Counter-Insurgency Myth’ that became entrenched 
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in subsequent limited but protracted wars.6 The myth held that in Malaya the 
British had unlocked the secret to winning the hearts and minds, or the 
acquiescence, of the people in which insurgents had ensconced themselves. 
Within the emerging narratives that leaned towards watershed moments, the big 
men who engineered them fit perfectly.7 Together they created an enduring 
historical record that overshadowed local agency. Instead, agency was 
disassociated from the local altogether. One commentator could therefore 
conclude that ‘The role of agency, namely the impact of General Sir Gerald 
Templer, also needs to be accounted for’.8  
 The task this thesis has set itself was to prise out the various instances of 
local agency where they could be found. In attacking the reductionist streak that 
has marred the history of decolonization and counterinsurgency and in engaging 
critically ‘the language of insurgency’, my research has tried to un-flatten, so to 
speak, ‘the varied histories, motivations, and makeup of individual groups that 
challenged the legitimacy and policies’ of power-brokers more influential than 
they.9 Local communities, like the Chinese in both Indonesia and Malaysia, but 
also regular Indonesians, who had fallen by the wayside as minor, subaltern 
elements, have been brought back unto the central stage where possible.  
 It is one thing to prioritize local agency, but demonstrating it poses 
considerable evidentiary and methodological challenges. Local agency, foremost, 
does not obviously feature strongly in the colonial archives. Even when reports do 
mention individuals, their motivations are passed over or described 
monolithically. Local agency has furthermore been eclipsed in historical analyses 
that sought to explain what bound colonizer and subjugated communities 
together. The introductory chapter—from a multi-empire perspective—therefore 
                                                 
6 Andrew Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare (London: Routledge, 
2012), 25. 
7 Rommel Curaming, ‘Towards Reinventing Indonesian Nationalist Historiography’, Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, 3 
(2003), http://kyotoreview.org/issue-3-nations-and-stories/an-introduction-to-indonesian-historiography/. Last visited on 
07-08-2015; De Moor, Generaal Spoor; Salim Said, Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military 
in Politics, 1945-49 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991). 
8 Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth, 25. 
9 Gurman, ‘Introduction’, 7. 
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set out to identify and peel away the categories that have been employed to 
explain these linkages. Co-operation as an element to foster interactions was 
dispensed with. Early imperial contacts with indigenous populations may have 
offered communication and brokering on a level close to parity, but as imperial 
interests became more invasive and invested, asymmetry soon characterized 
colonial networks.  
 I likewise dismissed loyalty. Even though colonial and indigenous officials 
of various plumage continuously tried to foster loyalty, pursuing it as a binding 
factor from an analytical point of view seems fruitless. The reason is that it 
presupposes an almost unchallenged fealty of local communities in relation to the 
agents of the imperial states that lorded over them despite the almost obsessive 
search for loyalty by colonial policy makers. In terms of the security forces, 
loyalty—and its expression in the ‘martial races’ narrative—would suggest that 
troops would continue to serve the colonial state no matter what it asked of the 
local enforcers. In engaging with what animated various indigenous security 
forces across empires, notably the Askari, chapter one showed that what could be 
construed as loyalty was, in fact, something different. Local elites and individuals 
who served were not transformed into unquestioning agents of the state. As the 
thesis has shown through the Ambonese, for example, supposedly loyal troops 
adopted the state’s accoutrements without giving up their own interests. 
 Finally, the chapter identified alliance-formation as the linking agent that 
promised to provide the most room for agency. Alliance-formation circumvents 
issues such as intention and motivation attached to local agency-measuring: as 
they are formed, become unstable or break, alliances at least make visible the 
behavioural patterns accessible to those the colonial report writers often 
overlooked. Furthermore, unlike loyalty, alliance-formation gives weight to the 
influence that contexts loaded with violence, destitution, famine and overall 
uncertainty exerted on people’s lives and how these contexts influenced people’s 
choices. Another advantage of alliance-formation, although as an ordering 
principle ‘alliance’ sounds more formal than the realities of decolonization 
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allowed, is that it undercuts false, non-fluent dichotomies—so long espoused by 
colonial studies—like colonizer and colonized or ruler and ruled. In our context, 
this meant that alliance-formation brought out the fact that the ruthless 
pacification was not necessarily categories befitting of the Dutch, for example.10 
To further underline the fact that this research has departed from adopting 
often deterministic approaches that characterized earlier histories—and through 
borrowing from the political sciences—I have re-framed communities from 
monolithic entities into organisms with their own preferences, empathies and 
networks of kin- and friendships.  
 While alliance-formation figured as the analytical benchmark to tease out 
local decision-making, a comparative framework functioned to underline the 
various processes that interspersed our inquiries across empires. A comparative 
framework made eminent sense. First, matching decolonization in the 
Netherlands East Indies to decolonization in British Malaysia has underscored 
that although trajectories differed across Southeast Asia, the context in which the 
transformations took place shared the same processes. Second, the comparison 
has yielded that even where the insurgents may have been beaten (in Malaysia), 
both colonial agents and their opponents structurally and continuously relied 
heavily on bloodshed to garner support for the various causes they expounded. 
‘Hearts and Minds’ or ‘loyalty’, therefore, did not exist even where both 
practitioners and, later, historians, wished to see it. Such a result is important 
because it once more underlines that ultimately it mattered little that the British 
could approach the Emergency in a more balanced fashion than the Dutch did in 
their attempts to undermine the Republic Indonesia. During the revolutions, 
violence remained an all-important tool to implement zero sum games geared to 
mobilize the people regardless of their personal preferences.  
 The comparative framework has benefited this research in one more 
important respect. As said, the nature of the archival material I had at my 
disposal—although abundant—made instances of indigenous agency difficult to 
                                                 
10 For the rule of colonial difference, see Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 14-34. 
280 
detect. The comparative perspective helped to overcome this challenge. As similar 
processes animated divergent paths to independence chosen by different actors, 
analyses could be completed by combining limited proof from both sets of source 
materials into plausible explanations. An added dividend was that comparing 
allowed for micro-histories across Malaysia and Indonesia to be woven into larger 
narratives.  
 The central question this thesis has tried to answer revolved around the 
way in which local elites, communities and individuals navigated the powerful 
currents of decolonization through making and breaking alliances. Dispensing 
with fixed notions of loyalty, revolutionary fervours and even ideologies, the 
question was informed by the notion that survival determined most peoples’ 
behaviour. The inquiry fell into three major components that all focussed on how 
the decisions of locals from various social and political strata interacted with 
facts created by the colonial authorities in their attempts to steer the course of 
decolonization.  
 The first component centred on how colonial elites rose from both earlier, 
pre-World War Two political-cultural activities and the ashes of the Japanese 
occupation. The activities Partai Rakyat Pasundan (PRP) and the Malayan 
Chinese Association (MCA) served to illustrate how alliance-formation proved to 
be a process by which both parties—indigenous and foreign—had to display 
concessionary behaviour. Through an analysis of how the PRP and the MCA 
sought and found influence with the colonial authorities, the comparison showed 
that both parties could work together with the colonial authorities as long as 
interests dove-tailed. However, alliances became strained when fortunes of war 
changed or certain boundaries were transgressed. With the Republic Indonesia 
gaining considerable strength in 1948, for example, Negara Pasundan’s leaders 
had to creep closer to the Republic to enhance its chances of survival. Elite 
alliance-formation proved highly unstable; constant renegotiation was 
paramount.  
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 The second case study already brought more local agency into view with its 
focus on indigenous security forces. It showed how self-appointed leaders claimed 
and familiarized themselves with the trappings of (local) power. By shifting the 
analytical gaze away from the colonial authorities and unto its manpower 
issues—the need for indigenous men to restore ‘peace and order’—I argued that 
for local elites had to gather grass-roots support to truly manoeuvre themselves 
into a position of power with the colonial authorities. To do so, they had to 
become power brokers in their own right, injecting themselves between their 
constituencies and the colonial policy makers—and attracting both. Comparisons 
yielded that in this regard support from the colonial authorities proved vital. 
Whereas the Dutch never allowed the Pasundan to claim spokespersonship for 
the ten million Sundanese across Java, the MCA was able to make the Chinese 
visible to the British and the Sultans.  
 The second half of the thesis, roughly speaking, approaches the realities of 
the common people, or, in more colonial parlance, the ‘masses’. The last two 
chapters tried to disaggregate those ‘masses’ and show the agency of various 
groups. In doing so, the cases of Malaya and Indië illustrate how violent contexts 
shaped specific repertoires of conduct. The preponderance of indigenous men and 
women in the security forces had several consequences for our inquiries into local 
actors. Through mapping out petitioning and the demand for rewards, such as 
citizenship, I have analysed how colonial authorities incurred a debt of honour 
that indigenous enforces came to collect. Moreover, the focus on serving, revealed 
that not loyalty to a certain cause made identities—Sundanese, Chinese—salient, 
but that it was the insurgents’ myriad violent reactions that did so. Men who 
joined indigenous security forces did so for various reasons that resonated with 
their age, social status and wishes for social advancement and adventure. 
Between the training they received—to instil loyalty—and their actual behaviour, 
however, gaped a chasm. Recruits in the various security units opened registers 
for violence for reasons that did not stroke at all with the loyalty the state 
expected or the state’s military and political objectives. Serving in security forces 
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offered many opportunities into chasing self-serving agendas. As the analysis of 
the Plantation Guard further showed, any alliances forged between the colonial 
authorities and their troops was merely an expression of temporarily converging 
interests: as soon as resistance fighters proved too powerful, the Plantation 
Guard—and police forces—deserted in droves.  
 The final chapter added yet another layer to the population’s repertoires of 
behaviour. I have traced the ways in which various individuals and groups could 
use the uncertainties of decolonization to attain self-assertion and self-
preservation. They did so even though various parties demanded they declare 
themselves. By comparing attempts to garner peoples’ support by the Min Yuen, 
the Military District Commandos, the MCA and the PRP/Negara Pasundan, the 
chapter brought out yet more starkly that peoples’ decisions and actions have to 
be seen as reactions to pervasive aggression and violence; particularly where 
rivalries intensified the battle for contested territory. Such an outlook certainly 
explains the sudden surge in Sundanese-ness in Krawang and the activation of 
many Chinese under the aegis of the Pao An Tui.  
 Amidst the chaos and violence, however, people still pursued their own 
goals through the live-and-live system. This system, named by the British was 
implemented by people in an attempt to mitigate the pressures brought to bear 
upon them. I have used this system to explain how three categories of people 
tried to further their interests; interests revolving around self-assertion and self-
preservation. The first group, supporters (and part) of the insurgency, enforced 
the system and gave it strength. Here the Negara Islam Indonesia should be 
placed: a coalition of highly motivated groups led by men like Kartosuwiryo who 
took advantage of the chaos and lawlessness to forge alternative paths to 
independence.  
 The second category we find a more passive group of actors: those who 
served in the security forces, but needed to survive. Together with their opposites 
in the insurgents’ forces, indigenous police officers, Plantation Guards, Home 
Guards and Special Constables agreed on non-aggression pacts to safeguard 
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mutual survival. Those who stood between the security forces and the 
insurgents—the labourers, peasants and hawkers—constituted the final section 
of the live-and-live-system. Being largely a-political, or at least war-weary yet the 
centre of attention, they catered two sides. When the insurgents came, they gave 
food and intelligence; when state-owned troops presented themselves, they 
showed the same hospitality. 
 The major contribution of this study lies with the fact that it has given due 
weight to the complexities of decolonization and to the choices, behaviours and 
agency of local actors. It has been able to do so by stepping away from big men 
and their big events and utilizing an analytical approach that combined alliance-
formation, microhistories and comparison as explanatory and organizing 
principles, respectively. By relocating indigenous agency, I have shown that 
various groups, communities and individuals had their own interests that were 
mostly informed by the need for security and safety and, sometimes, ideas that 
required immediate action. In many cases, participating in violence as a party to 
the conflicts provided a means to social advancement or becoming a power-
broker, be it politically, socially, for a limited time or, in the case of the Malayan 
Chinese Association, for a period that crossed over into post-independence. In 
other cases, interests were much more limited and risk-averse; they revolved 
around survival. Where survival was key, individuals chose the way of least 
resistance and tried to remain non-participants by acquiescing to whatever 
power-broker asked them to do so. Whatever interests local communities, 
individuals or political parties pursued, however, resulted in alliances; alliances 
that were always temporary and volatile.  
 The above may not sound too surprising, but this study has been an 
attempt to turn around the perspective that normally focusses on the powerful. 
Without the attempt this research has undertaken, the fortunes of the 
PRP/Negara Pasundan, for example, would not have become known. The 
federalization of Indonesia was dominated by the large federal states and their 
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actions in the Federal Consultation Assembly and this is reflected by the 
historiography; the Pasundan figures only as a footnote.  
 Furthermore, the comparison has shown that the Malayan Emergency and 
the Indonesian war for independence were not so different, after all—even though 
in Indonesia the oppressor was roundly defeated, whereas in Malaysia the anti-
colonial MCP was. Both in Malaysia and Indonesia, the threat of violence turned 
out to be the motivational force, rather than hearts and minds programs. This 
does not mean, however, that I underwrite studies that only see violence. Even 
after 1952, the Malayan Communist Party could, where it was still strong—for 
example in Perak and Johore—challenge the order of the New Villages and find 
people to turn to for assistance.  
 The Malayan Chinese Association and the Partai Rakyat Pasundan/Negara 
Pasundan trajectories, despite glaring differences, also showed many congruities. 
Both were beset by issues related to a lack of true grass-roots support; they could 
not mitigate the continued violent pressure upon their constituencies, that were 
left out in the cold as a consequence. Concerning these two local organisations, 
together with the case studies on the Pao An Tui and other security forces, I have 
shown that no narrative is complete without giving countenance to active roles of 
local interests within the extremely violence pacification programmes deployed by 
colonial authorities too keen to direct the course of decolonization.  
 
Limitations 
Although this project has tried to not paint entire communities with the same 
brush, I was forced to apply reduction myself. Reductions are inevitable; without 
them, arguments cannot be developed. What follows are some of the reductions I 
made. 
The Negara Pasundan was by no means the only Indonesian party that 
made overtures towards the Republic. The Gathering for Federal Consultation 
(GFC) that has only figured minimally in the preceding chapters could not agree 
on many things according to one Dutch memorandum, but after the second 
Police Action this body’s many members reached ‘complete agreement’ one major 
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point: that ‘the Government of the Republic must be restored’.11 Admittedly, the 
Indian communities are absent. Indians in Medan, Indonesia, displayed 
behaviour that was based on motivations that likewise prompted Chinese 
decisions in Medan: to escape the violence they chose between self-imposed exile 
or declaring support for the Republic.12 In Malaya, a Tamil named Veerasenan 
was killed with Chinese bandits; he had been president of the Singapore 
Federation of Trade Unions that went underground in May 1948.13 In various 
places in the thesis, the two main Chinese groups have been mentioned but the 
distinction disappeared again to make the point that in the eyes of many all 
Chinese were suspect. Through the focus on the Pao An Tui and the Hua Ch’iao 
Chung Hui that sponsored these security forces, other Chinese organisations have 
been neglected. In Medan alone, tens of Chinese organisations existed—either 
under the HCCH or autonomously—such as the Chung Kuo Min Tju Tong Min 
(Democratic League), the Chin Nen Thoan youth movement, the Fu Nu Hwee 
women’s movement and many others.14 
 The Kuomintang similarly disappeared from the narrative after the point 
was made that the British viewed China with suspicion. Its role was not entirely 
played out, however: the British ban had not been complete. The KMT continued 
to fulminate against the communists for which some members paid the ultimate 
price.15 When the Malay Mail in 1949 dramatically published an internal 
document MCP that detailed its self-proclaimed defeat, the communists partially 
attributed their failed insurrection to not crushing KMT reactionaries.16 In 1957 
the mere mentioning of the Kuomintang still caused consternation. When Tunku 
Rahman, head of the United Malays National Organisation (MCA’s senior partner 
                                                 
11 Memordandum, no date, NL-HaNA, Spoor 2.21.036.01/43. 
12 Kort Overzicht van de Britsch-Indisch Gemeenschap in Medan, Hoofd Nefis B.K. Medan, 23 June 1947, Nefis en 
CMI 2.10.62/1687. 
13 Weekly Situation Report 29th April – 5th May, 1949, No. 14, TNA, CO 717/178/4. 
14 Chinese Organisaties in Noord-Sumatra, March 1949, No. 9/A, NL-HaNA, Nefis en CMI 2.10.62/1687. 
15 ‘“Red Visit Will Upset Briggs’ Plan”’, Straits Echo & Times, 15 March 1951, 1; ‘Five Murders in One Day in 
Rengam. H.E. Promulgates Additional Regulations. Indians Suggest Government Based on Popular Vote’, The Sunday 
Mail, 27 June 1948, 1. 
16 ‘Communist Admission of Defeat. Executives “Disheartened”, says Captured Document. “Fighting Reduced to 
Hopelessness”’, The Malay Mail, 4 March 1949, 1-2. 
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in the Alliance) claimed the association had been infiltrated by KMT elements, the 
MCA was up in arms. ‘At this state of our progress towards independence’, wrote 
one member, ‘we cannot […] make an exhibition of the lack of liaison between 
heads of the three parties of the Alliance’.17  
 Even if they did not subscribe to the KMT, many Chinese did not look to 
the MCA for support, either. Where the Emergency was less palpable, Chinese 
had no need for the MCA. In Kuala Lumpur, the influence of the Assembly Hall 
and the ‘old-fashioned urban guilds’ was not overshadowed by the MCA. The 
Chinese consul-general urged the Assembly Hall to financially support squatters, 
‘thus trespassing on the preserve of the MCA’. Sinkeh Chinese distrusted the 
MCA; some claimed that Tan Cheng Lock ‘wants us to give up sharks’ fins, bird 
nests, and suckling pigs’ to forcefully impose Malayanization.18 The fact that 
some MCA officials were caught actively supporting the MCP did not help the 
association.19 
 
The Way Forward 
My thesis was not written in a vacuum. The shift in focus it propagates and has 
implemented belongs a greater, recent current in colonial and decolonization 
studies. This current engages with the uncritical belief in hearts and minds 
approaches (not in the least by its practitioners). Because of that angle, this 
current also, but more indirectly, criticises the turn to violent in colonial studies 
that dictates that contacts between colonizer and colonized were, by definition, 
expressions of micro or macro aggressions. Violence, according to the latter 
reading, was applied constantly and with equal measure. The reconfiguration of 
perspectives—bringing in local elutes—has shown that was not the case.20  
                                                 
17 T. H. Tan to Tan Cheng Lock, 6 July 1957, P.522/57/T/Z, ISEAS, TCL 3.326. 
18 Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs June 1949; Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs May 1949, both in TNA, CO 
717/182/4. 
19 The Security Forces Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 158 for the Week Ending 14th May 1953, TNA, AIR 22/507; 
Weekly Situation Report, 8th-14th July 1949, No. 24, TNA, CO 717/178/4. 
20 Robinson, in his ‘Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism’ already made this point in 1972, but the 
violent turn has glossed over the role of the indigenous. 
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As I have shown extensively, both insurgent and incumbent power brokers 
could find people to support them one way or the other. This means that studies 
that continue to approach decolonization solely through the eyes of politicians, 
generals or planters, only tell half the story, or at least apply reductionism. A 
perspective that incorporates all voices—top and bottom; local and colonial—will 
certainly give justice to the complexities on the ground. To begin with, by adding 
as much local voices to those of the Dutch, we can begin to understand how ‘the 
experiences of the Dutch and Indonesians cannot be compartmentalized in a 
watertight fashion’. The horrors of the Japanese occupation, for example, were 
shared horrors to a large extent, but ‘We do not seem to realize this’.21  
 Moreover, if the voices of local, non-elite communities or individuals are 
elevated to the same footing as those of the elites, the idea that decolonization 
was a phenomenon encompassing continuities that connected the pre and post 
Second World War periods, will gain in strength. We know already about the 
various embryonic nationalist movements in Indonesia, Malaysia and elsewhere, 
but there is much to learn about the subaltern voices of labourers or rubber 
tappers who did not adhere to a defined political program of emancipation. They 
certainly had ways of showing their discontent, however. Before World War Two, 
plantations forced the labourers into the behavioural patterns acceptable to the 
colonial state.22 Labourers aired their grievances at the same sites. Arson of 
valuable crops, strikes or petitioning against hitting by overseers were common, 
as was their violent repression.23 Despite the planters’ array of means to peer into 
indigenous society, they were never fully successful, leaving a grey area where 
reservoirs of grievances built up in the same men and women who worked on the 
estates. During the War for Independence, planters again operated within this 
grey area. Some employed a ‘trusted man’ who would, in case of trouble, 
negotiate deals with local resistance members whom he knew. The confidant may 
                                                 
21 Remco Raben, ‘De Knopen van de Bevrijding’, De Groene Amsterdammer, 13 August 2015, 21. 
22 Frakking, ‘The Plantation as Counterinsurgency Tool’, 60. 
23 Marieke Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van de Politie in Nederlands-Indië: Uit Zorg en Angst (Amsterdam: Boom, 
2009), 110-111, 117; Indisch Verslag. II. Statistisch Jaaroverzicht van Nederlands-Indië over het Jaar 1931 (Batavia: 
Landsdrukkerij, 1932), 187, 216. 
288 
actually have been part of the very resistance group he dealt with for the 
planter.24 
 Conversely, decolonization did not stop with independence. 
‘[D]ecolonization has driven a wedge between groups that made up one colonial 
past’, said one Dutch historian.25 The MCA saw a period of decline after in the 
1960s and beyond, but little is known about others who had thrown in their lot 
with the colonial authorities.26 In Indonesia, veterans of the wars of independence 
receive a state pension for their services and two of them I spoke with told me 
they had forgiven those who collaborated with the Dutch—‘Belanda hitam’ (Black 
Dutch)—long ago.27 In 1949, however, an instruction from the ‘Military 
Government Resort Semarang/Pati’ stated that collaborators who now offered 
themselves to the Republican government had done ‘much harm’. ‘Traitors or not’ 
‘we must be able to use their energy to bring a blow to the Dutch and other 
traitors who entirely won’t cooperate with us’. ‘We shall decide afterwards’, the 
instruction ominously concluded, ‘which punishment we will give […] in due time 













                                                 
24 Plomp, De Theeonderneming, 61-63.  
25 Raben, ‘De Knopen van de Bevrijding, 20. 
26 Koon, Chinese Politics, 251-261. 
27 Interview with Pak Malyo Sardjono and Pak Sunaryo Gun Wirali, Yogyakarta, 7 Augustus 2015. 
28 TNI Military Government of the Resort Semarang/Pati, Representation of the Resort Pati, 6 September 1949, 
Instruction 3/XIII/SUPM/49, annex to Republican Instruction with Regard to Officials, 31 October 1949, No. 2307, A. 
Wempe to the Chairman of the Local Joint Committee, NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie 2.10.14/4992.  
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Abbreviations 
AHN   Achter het Nieuws 
ANRI   Arsib Nasional Republik Indonesia 
ANM   Arkib Negara Malaya 
AMCJA   All-Malaya Council for Joint Action 
ASU    Area Security Units  
ALS   Algemeen Landbouwsyndicaat 
BKR    Badan Keamanan Rakyat  
CCP   Chinese Communist Party 
CHTH   Chung Hua Tsung Hui  
CLC   Communities Liaison Committee 
CO Colonial Office 
DIS Directorate for Inland Security  
DO  District Officer 
DP  Daerah Politie 
DWEC District War Executive Committee 
FCO Foreign and COmmonwealth Office 
FEDERABO  Federatie van Verenigingen van Bergcultuurondernemingen in 
Indonesië 
FRUS   Foreign Relations of the United States 
HAMOT  Hare Majesteits Ongeregelde Troepen 
HG   Home Guard 
HSL   H. S. Lee Papers 
HCCH  Hua Ch’iao Chung Hui 
IMP   Independece Malaya Party 
ISEAS  Institute of South East Asian Studies 
ISPA    Safety Battalions and Police Affairs  
IWMSA  Imperial War Museum Sound Archives 
KMS   Kesatuan Melayu Singapura 
KL   Koninklijke Landmacht 
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KMT   Kuomintang 
KNIL   Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger 
K(O)DM  Kommando (Onder) Distrik Militer (2 = plural) 
Masyumi  Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia 
MPAJA  Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army 
MCA   Malayan Chinese Association 
MCP   Malayan Communist Party 
MDU   Malayan Democratic Union 
MNLA  Malayan National Liberation Army 
MRLA  Malayan Races Liberation Army 
NAM   National Army Museum 
NIB   Officiële Bescheiden van de Nederlands-Indische Betrekkingen 
NL-HaNA  Nederlands National Archief 
PAT Pao An Tui 
PG Plantation Guard 
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia 
PRP   Partai Rakyat Pasundan  
RAPWI  Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees  
RUSI   Republic of the United States of Indonesia 
SB   Safety Battalion  
SC   Special Constable 
SEP   Surrendered Enemy Personnel 
SCBA   Straits Chinese British Association 
SWEC  State War Exucitve Committee 
TCL   Tan Cheng Lock Papers 
TNA   The National Archives 
TNI   Tentara Nasional Indonesia 
UMNO  United Malays National Organisation 
USI   United States of Indonesia 
VOC   Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie 
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WO   War Office 
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